



CBO

An Update to the Budget and Economic Outlook: 2019 to 2029

Percentage of Gross Domestic Product




Percent



Trillions of Dollars



Changes in Projected Deficit



At a Glance

The Congressional Budget Office regularly publishes reports that present projections of what federal deficits, debt, revenues, and spending—and the economic path underlying them—would be for the current year and for the next 10 years if existing laws governing taxes and spending generally remained unchanged. This report is the latest in that series.

- **Deficits.** In CBO’s projections, the federal budget deficit is \$960 billion in 2019 and averages \$1.2 trillion between 2020 and 2029. Over the coming decade, deficits (after adjustments to exclude the effects of shifts in the timing of certain payments) fluctuate between 4.4 percent and 4.8 percent of gross domestic product (GDP), well above the average over the past 50 years. Although both revenues and outlays grow faster than GDP over the next 10 years in CBO’s baseline projections, the gap between the two persists.
- **Debt.** As a result of those deficits, federal debt held by the public is projected to grow steadily, from 79 percent of GDP in 2019 to 95 percent in 2029—its highest level since just after World War II (see Chapter 1).
- **The Economy.** Real (inflation-adjusted) GDP is projected to grow by 2.3 percent in 2019, supporting strong labor market conditions that feature low unemployment and rising wages. This year, real output is projected to exceed CBO’s estimate of its potential (maximum sustainable) level. After 2019, consumer spending and purchases of goods and services by federal, state, and local governments are projected to grow at a slower pace, and annual output growth is projected to slow—averaging 1.8 percent over the 2020–2023 period—as real output returns to its historical relationship with potential output. From 2024 to 2029, both output and potential output are projected to grow at an average pace of 1.8 percent per year, which is less than the long-term historical average. That slowdown occurs primarily because the labor force is expected to grow more slowly than it has in the past (see Chapter 2).
- **Changes in CBO’s Projections Since May 2019.** CBO’s estimate of the deficit for 2019 is now \$63 billion more—and its projection of the cumulative deficit over the 2020–2029 period, \$809 billion more—than it was in May 2019. The agency’s baseline projections of primary deficits (that is, deficits excluding net outlays for interest) for that period increased by a total of \$1.9 trillion. Recently enacted legislation accounts for most of that change. In particular, incorporating the higher discretionary funding limits for 2020 and 2021 that were established in the Bipartisan Budget Act of 2019 increased CBO’s projections of primary deficits for the 2020–2029 period by \$1.5 trillion. (Those projections reflect the assumption—required by law—that future discretionary funding will grow at the rate of inflation after those limits expire.)

Partly offsetting the increase in projected primary deficits is a net reduction of \$1.1 trillion in the agency’s projections of interest costs over that same period. The largest factor contributing to that change is that CBO revised its forecast of interest rates downward, which lowered its projections of net interest outlays by \$1.4 trillion (including interest savings from the resulting reductions in deficits and debt). Taken together, other changes to the budget projections increased projected debt-service costs by nearly \$0.3 trillion; \$0.2 trillion of that amount is associated with the increase in projected spending stemming from the Bipartisan Budget Act (see Appendix A).



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Notes

Unless this report indicates otherwise, all years referred to in describing the budget outlook are federal fiscal years, which run from October 1 to September 30 and are designated by the calendar year in which they end. Years referred to in describing the economic outlook are calendar years.

Numbers in the text, tables, and figures may not add up to totals because of rounding. Also, some values are expressed as fractions to indicate numbers rounded to amounts greater than a tenth of a percentage point.

Some figures in this report have vertical bars that indicate the duration of recessions. (A recession extends from the peak of a business cycle to its trough.)

The Congressional Budget Office completed its current economic forecast on July 25, 2019. Unless this report indicates otherwise, the projections of economic variables are based on information that was available at that time. Thus, the projections do not reflect the comprehensive revisions to the national income and product accounts that the Bureau of Economic Analysis released on July 26. However, the actual and historical data shown in figures describing the economic forecast are based on those revisions, as are the discussions of recent economic events in the text.

CBO periodically reports to the Congress about the accuracy of its baseline projections of economic outcomes (www.cbo.gov/publication/53090) and about the accuracy of its projections of spending, revenues, and the deficit (www.cbo.gov/publication/54872). And CBO will soon publish a short report about how budget projections would differ if they were based on certain revenue and spending policies that differed from those underlying the agency's baseline projections.

Supplemental data for this analysis are available on CBO's website (www.cbo.gov/publication/55551), as are a glossary of common budgetary and economic terms (www.cbo.gov/publication/42904), a description of how CBO prepares its baseline budget projections (www.cbo.gov/publication/53532), a description of how CBO prepares its economic forecast (www.cbo.gov/publication/53537), and previous editions of this report (<https://go.usa.gov/xQrzS>).




Visual Summary

In this report, the Congressional Budget Office provides projections of the federal budget and the U.S. economy under current law for this year and the decade that follows. Deficits in the current projections are larger than those in the projections that CBO published in May, primarily because recently enacted legislation raised the caps on discretionary funding for fiscal years 2020 and 2021. The budgetary effects of new legislation were partially offset by revisions that the agency has made to its economic forecast since it was last updated in January 2019. In particular, markedly lower projected interest rates reduced the agency's projections of borrowing costs. CBO also raised its projections of economic growth in the near term.

Deficits

CBO estimates a 2019 deficit of \$960 billion, or 4.5 percent of gross domestic product (GDP). The projected shortfall (adjusted to exclude the effects of shifts in the timing of certain payments) rises to 4.8 percent of GDP in 2029.



Over the 2020–2029 period, deficits are projected to average 4.7 percent of GDP, totaling \$12.2 trillion. Such deficits would be significantly larger than the 2.9 percent of GDP that deficits averaged over the past 50 years.

See Figure 1-1

Deficits (Continued)

Trillions of Dollars




Since May 2019, CBO has increased its projection of the 10-year deficit by a total of \$0.8 trillion. The largest factor in that revision was the Bipartisan Budget Act of 2019, which increased projected deficits for the 2020–2029 period by \$1.7 trillion (including debt-service costs). A reduction in projected net interest outlays, which stemmed from lower projected interest rates than those in CBO's January 2019 forecast, offset much of that increase.

See Figure A-1

Debt

Federal debt held by the public is projected to rise steadily over the coming decade, from 79 percent of GDP in 2019 to 95 percent of GDP in 2029. It would continue to grow after 2029.


Percentage of Gross Domestic Product



Relative to the size of the economy, federal debt in 2019 is projected to be nearly twice its average over the past 50 years. At the end of 2029, debt is projected to reach a higher level than it has at any point since just after World War II.


See Figure 1-4

Revenues In CBO’s baseline projections, revenues total \$3.5 trillion in 2019, or 16.3 percent of GDP, and rise to 18.2 percent of GDP in 2029. Over the past 50 years, revenues averaged 17.4 percent of GDP.



See Figure 1-7; * = between zero and 0.05 percent of GDP


Outlays In 2019, CBO estimates, outlays will total \$4.4 trillion, or 20.8 percent of GDP. In the agency’s baseline projections, they rise to 23.0 percent of GDP in 2029 (after an adjustment to exclude the effects of certain timing shifts). Over the past 50 years, outlays averaged 20.3 percent of GDP.



See Figure 1-5


The Economy

The economy was strong in 2018 and the first half of 2019: Real (inflation-adjusted) GDP grew at an average annual rate of 2.5 percent, unemployment remained low, and wages rose. In CBO’s forecast, the economy expands more slowly over the next decade than it did in 2018, growing at an annual rate of 1.8 percent, on average. That rate of output growth is below the long-run historical average, primarily because the labor force is expected to grow more slowly than it has in the past.




Real GDP growth is projected to slow from 2.3 percent in 2019 to an average of 1.8 percent over the 2020–2023 period, reflecting slower growth in consumer spending and government purchases as well as the effect of trade policies on business investment.

See Figure 2-1



In CBO’s projections, the unemployment rate remains close to its current level of 3.7 percent through the end of 2020 and then rises to 4.6 percent by the end of 2023 as output growth slows.

See Figure 2-3



CBO expects the Federal Reserve to keep the target range for the federal funds rate at its current level through most of 2020 and then increase it at the end of that year. That increase, along with other factors, would put upward pressure on short-term and long-term interest rates.

See Figure 2-1

The Budget Outlook

Overview

The Congressional Budget Office now estimates that, if no further legislation is enacted this year that affects revenues or outlays, the total federal budget deficit for fiscal year 2019 will be \$960 billion, or 4.5 percent of gross domestic product (GDP). According to CBO's projections, the deficit would generally increase in nominal terms through 2029 and would remain a considerably larger share of GDP than its average over the past 50 years (see Figure 1-1). Such increases in deficits would lead to growth in debt held by the public: Under current law, the federal government is projected to borrow an additional \$13.6 trillion from the end of 2018 through 2029, boosting debt held by the public to \$29.3 trillion, or 95 percent of GDP, in that year—up from 79 percent now. Relative to the projections CBO published earlier this year, the agency's estimate of the deficit for 2019 is now \$63 billion more—and its projection of the cumulative deficit over the 2020–2029 period, \$809 billion more—than it was in May 2019 (see Appendix A).¹

CBO's projections are created in accordance with provisions set forth in the Balanced Budget and Emergency Deficit Control Act of 1985 (Public Law 99-177, referred to here as the Deficit Control Act), and the Congressional Budget and Impoundment Control Act of 1974 (P.L. 93-344). Those laws require CBO to construct its baseline under the assumption that current laws will generally remain unchanged. Thus, CBO's baseline is not intended to provide a forecast of future budgetary outcomes; rather, it is meant to provide a benchmark that policymakers can use to assess the potential effects of future policy decisions. Future legislative action could lead to markedly different outcomes—but even if federal laws remained unaltered for the next decade, actual budgetary outcomes would probably differ from CBO's baseline, not only because of unanticipated economic conditions, but also as a result of the many other factors that affect federal revenues and outlays.

The Budget Outlook for 2019

In CBO's baseline projections, the 2019 budget deficit is \$960 billion, which is \$181 billion more than the shortfall recorded last year (see Table 1-1). That increase would be smaller if not for a shift in the timing of certain payments. The 2018 deficit was reduced by \$44 billion because certain payments that would ordinarily have been made on October 1, 2017 (the first day of fiscal year 2018), were instead made in fiscal year 2017 because October 1 fell on a weekend. If not for that shift, last year's shortfall would have been \$823 billion, and the estimated increase in the deficit in 2019 would be \$137 billion, or 17 percent (see Table 1-2). (The discussion of CBO's projections in this chapter reflects adjustments to remove the effects of those timing shifts.)

Relative to the size of the economy, this year's deficit, at 4.5 percent of GDP, is also expected to exceed last year's shortfall of 4.1 percent. Estimated debt held by the public has also increased, to 78.9 percent of GDP from 77.8 percent in 2018. Outlays are estimated to rise as a percentage of GDP, from 20.5 percent in 2018 to 20.8 percent this year. In contrast, revenues are expected to fall slightly below their 2018 level relative to GDP, from 16.5 percent in that year to 16.3 percent in 2019.

Outlays

In CBO's projections, total federal outlays increase by \$258 billion (or 6 percent) in 2019, to a total of \$4.4 trillion. More than half of that growth is attributable to mandatory outlays, which are projected to rise by \$144 billion, or 6 percent. Discretionary outlays are projected to increase from last year's amount—\$1.3 trillion—by \$67 billion, or 5 percent. The government's net interest costs are also anticipated to grow in 2019, increasing by \$47 billion (or 14 percent), to \$372 billion.


Federal outlays in 2019 are projected to be 0.5 percentage points of GDP above their 50-year average of 20.3 percent. That increase over historical amounts is

1. See Congressional Budget Office, *Updated Budget Projections: 2019 to 2029* (May 2019), www.cbo.gov/publication/55151.

Figure 1-1.

Total Deficits and Surpluses

Percentage of Gross Domestic Product



Deficits as a percentage of gross domestic product are projected to remain relatively stable over the coming decade. They exceed their 50-year average throughout the 2020–2029 period.

Source: Congressional Budget Office.

When October 1 (the first day of the fiscal year) falls on a weekend, certain payments that would have ordinarily been made on that day are instead made at the end of September and thus are shifted into the previous fiscal year. All projections presented here have been adjusted to exclude the effects of those timing shifts. Historical amounts have been adjusted as far back as the available data will allow.

largely attributable to significant growth in mandatory spending (net of the offsetting receipts that are credited against such outlays), which is expected to equal 12.8 percent of GDP in 2019, compared with its 9.9 percent average over the 1969–2018 period. As a share of GDP, the other major components of federal spending are estimated to fall below their 50-year averages: Discretionary outlays are projected to equal 6.3 percent of GDP this year, compared with their average of 8.4 percent over the past 50 years, and net outlays for interest are expected to equal 1.8 percent of GDP, compared with their 50-year average of 2.0 percent.

Mandatory Spending. Mandatory, or direct, spending includes outlays for some federal benefit programs and for certain other payments to people, businesses, non-profit institutions, and state and local governments. Such outlays are generally governed by statutory criteria and are not normally constrained by the annual appropriation process.² Certain types of payments that federal

agencies receive from the public and from other government agencies are classified as offsetting receipts and are accounted for in the budget as reductions in mandatory spending.

The Deficit Control Act requires CBO to construct baseline projections for most mandatory spending under the assumption that current laws continue unchanged.³

for Coast Guard retirees and annuitants, are considered mandatory but require benefits to be paid from amounts provided in appropriation acts. Section 257 of the Deficit Control Act requires CBO to project outlays for those programs as if they were fully funded, regardless of the amounts actually appropriated.

2. Each year, some mandatory programs are modified by provisions in annual appropriation acts. Such changes may increase or decrease spending for the affected programs for one or more years. In addition, some mandatory programs, such as Medicaid, the Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program, and benefits

3. Section 257 of the Deficit Control Act also requires CBO to assume that certain mandatory programs will continue beyond their scheduled expiration and that entitlement programs, including Social Security and Medicare, will be fully funded and thus will be able to make all scheduled payments even if the trust funds associated with those programs do not contain the funding to make full payments. Other rules that govern the construction of CBO's baseline have been developed by the agency in consultation with the House and Senate Committees on the Budget. For further details, see Congressional Budget Office, *How CBO Prepares Baseline Budget Projections* (February 2018), www.cbo.gov/publication/53532.

Table 1-1.

CBO's Baseline Budget Projections, by Category

	Actual, 2018	2019	2020	2021	2022	2023	2024	2025	2026	2027	2028	2029	Total	
													2020– 2024	2020– 2029
In Billions of Dollars														
Revenues														
Individual income taxes	1,684	1,698	1,800	1,895	1,981	2,076	2,171	2,272	2,501	2,731	2,838	2,962	9,923	23,227
Payroll taxes	1,171	1,247	1,281	1,332	1,385	1,442	1,505	1,567	1,629	1,692	1,759	1,828	6,945	15,420
Corporate income taxes	205	228	245	268	298	335	371	400	409	398	407	415	1,517	3,547
Other	271	278	293	298	307	309	345	345	361	385	386	415	1,552	3,443
Total	3,330	3,451	3,620	3,792	3,971	4,163	4,392	4,585	4,900	5,206	5,390	5,619	19,937	45,637
On-budget	2,475	2,532	2,677	2,811	2,951	3,104	3,292	3,443	3,714	3,974	4,111	4,291	14,835	34,368
Off-budget ^a	855	919	943	981	1,020	1,059	1,100	1,142	1,186	1,231	1,279	1,328	5,103	11,269
Outlays														
Mandatory	2,523	2,707	2,838	2,962	3,192	3,326	3,446	3,682	3,900	4,101	4,405	4,454	15,764	36,306
Discretionary	1,262	1,332	1,400	1,446	1,481	1,513	1,543	1,584	1,622	1,661	1,706	1,736	7,382	15,690
Net interest	325	372	390	418	456	506	554	602	653	704	758	807	2,325	5,848
Total	4,109	4,411	4,628	4,826	5,130	5,344	5,543	5,869	6,174	6,466	6,868	6,997	25,470	57,845
On-budget **	3,261	3,505	3,661	3,794	4,027	4,166	4,287	4,533	4,763	4,969	5,277	5,309	19,935	44,785
Off-budget ^a **	849	906	967	1,032	1,102	1,179	1,256	1,336	1,412	1,497	1,591	1,689	5,536	13,059
Deficit (-) or Surplus	-779	-960	-1,008	-1,034	-1,159	-1,181	-1,151	-1,284	-1,274	-1,260	-1,479	-1,378	-5,533	-12,208
On-budget **	-785	-972	-984	-983	-1,076	-1,062	-995	-1,090	-1,048	-995	-1,167	-1,017	-5,100	-10,417
Off-budget ^a **	6	12	-24	-51	-83	-120	-156	-194	-226	-266	-312	-361	-433	-1,791
Debt Held by the Public	15,750	16,685	17,755	18,841	20,042	21,264	22,457	23,784	25,102	26,407	27,917	29,322	n.a.	n.a.
Memorandum:														
Gross Domestic Product	20,236	21,157	22,013	22,870	23,727	24,611	25,529	26,514	27,518	28,582	29,699	30,847	118,750	261,911
As a Percentage of Gross Domestic Product														
Revenues														
Individual income taxes	8.3	8.0	8.2	8.3	8.4	8.4	8.5	8.6	9.1	9.6	9.6	9.6	8.4	8.9
Payroll taxes	5.8	5.9	5.8	5.8	5.8	5.9	5.9	5.9	5.9	5.9	5.9	5.9	5.8	5.9
Corporate income taxes	1.0	1.1	1.1	1.2	1.3	1.4	1.5	1.5	1.5	1.4	1.4	1.3	1.3	1.4
Other	1.3	1.3	1.3	1.3	1.3	1.3	1.4	1.3	1.3	1.3	1.3	1.3	1.3	1.3
Total	16.5	16.3	16.4	16.6	16.7	16.9	17.2	17.3	17.8	18.2	18.1	18.2	16.8	17.4
On-budget	12.2	12.0	12.2	12.3	12.4	12.6	12.9	13.0	13.5	13.9	13.8	13.9	12.5	13.1
Off-budget ^a	4.2	4.3	4.3	4.3	4.3	4.3	4.3	4.3	4.3	4.3	4.3	4.3	4.3	4.3
Outlays														
Mandatory	12.5	12.8	12.9	13.0	13.5	13.5	13.5	13.9	14.2	14.3	14.8	14.4	13.3	13.9
Discretionary	6.2	6.3	6.4	6.3	6.2	6.1	6.0	6.0	5.9	5.8	5.7	5.6	6.2	6.0
Net interest	1.6	1.8	1.8	1.8	1.9	2.1	2.2	2.3	2.4	2.5	2.6	2.6	2.0	2.2
Total	20.3	20.8	21.0	21.1	21.6	21.7	21.7	22.1	22.4	22.6	23.1	22.7	21.4	22.1
On-budget	16.1	16.6	16.6	16.6	17.0	16.9	16.8	17.1	17.3	17.4	17.8	17.2	16.8	17.1
Off-budget ^a	4.2	4.3	4.4	4.5	4.6	4.8	4.9	5.0	5.1	5.2	5.4	5.5	4.7	5.0
Deficit (-) or Surplus	-3.9	-4.5	-4.6	-4.5	-4.9	-4.8	-4.5	-4.8	-4.6	-4.4	-5.0	-4.5	-4.7	-4.7
On-budget	-3.9	-4.6	-4.5	-4.3	-4.5	-4.3	-3.9	-4.1	-3.8	-3.5	-3.9	-3.3	-4.3	-4.0
Off-budget ^a	*	0.1	-0.1	-0.2	-0.3	-0.5	-0.6	-0.7	-0.8	-0.9	-1.1	-1.2	-0.4	-0.7
Debt Held by the Public	77.8	78.9	80.7	82.4	84.5	86.4	88.0	89.7	91.2	92.4	94.0	95.1	n.a.	n.a.

Source: Congressional Budget Office.

n.a. = not applicable; * = between zero and 0.05 percent.

a. The revenues and outlays of the Social Security trust funds and the net cash flow of the Postal Service are classified as off-budget.

[** Values corrected on September 24, 2019]

Table 1-2.

CBO's Baseline Projections of Outlays and Deficits, Adjusted to Exclude the Effects of Timing Shifts

	Actual, 2018	2019	2020	2021	2022	2023	2024	2025	2026	2027	2028	2029
In Billions of Dollars												
Payments That Are Shifted in CBO's Baseline ^a	-44	0	0	0	62	5	-68	0	0	0	94	-93
Outlays Adjusted for Timing Shifts												
Mandatory	2,563	2,707	2,838	2,962	3,135	3,321	3,509	3,682	3,900	4,101	4,317	4,542
Discretionary	1,266	1,332	1,400	1,446	1,476	1,512	1,548	1,584	1,622	1,661	1,700	1,742
Net interest	325	372	390	418	456	506	554	602	653	704	758	807
Total	4,153	4,411	4,628	4,826	5,067	5,339	5,610	5,869	6,174	6,466	6,775	7,090
Deficit Adjusted for Timing Shifts	-823	-960	-1,008	-1,034	-1,097	-1,176	-1,219	-1,284	-1,274	-1,260	-1,385	-1,471
As a Percentage of Gross Domestic Product												
Outlays Adjusted for Timing Shifts												
Mandatory	12.7	12.8	12.9	13.0	13.2	13.5	13.7	13.9	14.2	14.3	14.5	14.7
Discretionary	6.3	6.3	6.4	6.3	6.2	6.1	6.1	6.0	5.9	5.8	5.7	5.6
Net interest	1.6	1.8	1.8	1.8	1.9	2.1	2.2	2.3	2.4	2.5	2.6	2.6
Total	20.5	20.8	21.0	21.1	21.4	21.7	22.0	22.1	22.4	22.6	22.8	23.0
Deficit Adjusted for Timing Shifts	-4.1	-4.5	-4.6	-4.5	-4.6	-4.8	-4.8	-4.8	-4.6	-4.4	-4.7	-4.8
Memorandum:												
Baseline Deficit, Unadjusted												
In billions of dollars	-779	-960	-1,008	-1,034	-1,159	-1,181	-1,151	-1,284	-1,274	-1,260	-1,479	-1,378
As a percentage of GDP	-3.9	-4.5	-4.6	-4.5	-4.9	-4.8	-4.5	-4.8	-4.6	-4.4	-5.0	-4.5

Source: Congressional Budget Office.

GDP = gross domestic product.

a. When October 1 (the first day of the fiscal year) falls on a weekend, certain payments that would have ordinarily been made on that day are instead made at the end of September and thus are shifted into the previous fiscal year. Those shifts primarily affect mandatory outlays; discretionary outlays are also affected, but to a much lesser degree. Net interest outlays are not affected. (For the 2018–2029 period, revenues are not affected by timing shifts.)

Therefore, CBO's baseline projections for mandatory spending reflect the estimated effects of economic influences, growth in the number of beneficiaries for certain mandatory programs, and other factors related to the costs of those programs, even for those that are set to expire under current law. The projections also incorporate a set of across-the-board reductions in budgetary resources (known as sequestration) that are required under current law for some mandatory programs.

In 2019, CBO estimates, total mandatory outlays (net of offsetting receipts) will amount to \$2.7 trillion, up from \$2.6 trillion in 2018. Most of that \$144 billion increase is attributable to greater outlays for Social Security, Medicare, and higher education, moderated by an increase in offsetting receipts from Fannie Mae and

Freddie Mac (among other, smaller and largely offsetting, changes):

- Social Security outlays will rise by \$56 billion (or 6 percent) relative to those outlays in 2018, CBO estimates, reaching \$1.0 trillion this year, or 4.9 percent of GDP. That increase stems from growth both in the number of beneficiaries and in the average benefit payment.
- Outlays for Medicare (net of offsetting receipts) will rise from \$605 billion in 2018 to \$636 billion in 2019, remaining at 3.0 percent of GDP. That increase results from growth both in the number of beneficiaries and in the amount and cost of services.

- Federal outlays for higher education will increase by \$41 billion this year, primarily because the Department of Education made an upward revision to the estimated net subsidy costs of loans and loan guarantees issued in prior years.
- In the other direction, payments from Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac are estimated to increase by \$15 billion in 2019. (Such receipts are recorded in the federal budget as offsetting receipts, which are reductions in outlays.)

Discretionary Spending. Discretionary spending encompasses an array of federal activities that are funded or controlled through annual appropriations. Such spending includes most outlays for national defense, elementary and secondary education, housing assistance, international affairs, and the administration of justice, as well as outlays for highways and other programs. In any year, some discretionary outlays arise from budget authority provided in the same year, and some arise from appropriations made in previous years.⁴

CBO's baseline incorporates all appropriations for 2019, which amount to \$1.4 trillion, including both regular and supplemental appropriations.⁵ CBO anticipates that, if no further appropriations are provided this year, discretionary outlays will total \$1.3 trillion in 2019—\$67 billion (or 5 percent) more than last year's amount.

Discretionary funding for defense for 2019 totals \$719 billion, including \$69 billion for overseas contingency operations (OCO) and \$3 billion for activities designated as emergency requirements. Defense outlays, which amounted to \$627 billion in 2018, will increase by \$44 billion (or 7 percent), to \$670 billion, according to CBO's estimates. Outlays are projected to increase by \$16 billion (or 6 percent) for operation and maintenance, \$10 billion (or 9 percent) for procurement, \$5 billion (or 4 percent) for military personnel, and \$11 billion (or 15 percent) for research and development.

4. Budget authority is the funding provided by law to incur financial obligations that will result in immediate or future outlays of federal government funds. Outlays are the amount of money spent each year.

5. That amount does not include changes in mandatory programs included in supplemental appropriation acts.

For 2019, nondefense discretionary funding totals \$658 billion. That amount includes \$44 billion that is not limited by the caps on discretionary funding: \$22 billion for activities designated as emergency requirements, \$12 billion for disaster relief, \$8 billion for OCO, \$2 billion for program integrity initiatives, and \$1 billion for programs authorized by the 21st Century Cures Act (P.L. 114-255).⁶ CBO expects that nondefense discretionary outlays will increase by \$23 billion (or 4 percent) in 2019, to \$662 billion. Higher spending on veterans' benefits and services accounts for \$6 billion of that increase in outlays. In addition, discretionary outlays for various health programs will increase by \$5 billion, and outlays for federal law enforcement activities by \$3 billion, CBO estimates.⁷ The remaining growth in nondefense discretionary outlays is the result of a number of smaller increases in spending for various programs.

Net Interest. In 2019, net outlays for interest will rise to \$372 billion (or 1.8 percent of GDP), from \$325 billion last year, CBO estimates, primarily because interest rates on short-term debt have been higher in 2019 than in 2018 and because the amount of federal debt is larger than it was a year ago.

Revenues

On the basis of receipts through June 2019, CBO expects federal revenues to total \$3.5 trillion this fiscal year, \$121 billion (or 3.6 percent) more than in 2018. Because CBO anticipates that nominal GDP will grow at a faster rate (4.6 percent), revenues are projected to decrease relative to GDP.

Individual Income Taxes. CBO estimates that collections of individual income taxes will increase by \$15 billion (or 1 percent) in 2019. That increase reflects income growth that is offset in part by the effects of changes in tax law and in part by reallocations the Treasury makes between income and payroll taxes.

Although wages and salaries are projected to grow by about 4 percent in 2019, individual income taxes

6. Budgetary resources for 2019 include \$60 billion in limitations on obligation authority for certain transportation programs.

7. Spending for most federal health care programs, such as Medicare and Medicaid, is mandatory. Spending for some health programs is discretionary; the largest recipients of discretionary funding include the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, the National Cancer Institute, the National Institute of Allergy and Infectious Diseases, and the Indian Health Service.

withheld from paychecks will decrease by \$18 billion (or 1 percent), in CBO's estimation. That decline reflects two factors: First, the Internal Revenue Service issued new withholding tables in January 2018 to reflect changes made by the 2017 tax act (P.L. 115-97). Those new withholding rates were in effect during all of this fiscal year but for only seven-and-a-half months of 2018. Second, withheld taxes classified as individual income taxes were boosted in 2018 and reduced in 2019 by reallocations made between income and payroll taxes. Specifically, the Treasury recategorized about \$21 billion in collections from payroll to individual income taxes during 2018 and about \$7 billion from individual income to payroll taxes so far in 2019. The Treasury does not observe a difference between amounts withheld for payroll and income taxes as they are collected, instead initially allocating withheld taxes to one source or the other on the basis of estimates. As detailed tax-return information becomes available, amounts are reallocated between payroll and income taxes. Even though those revisions amend allocations made in prior years, the reallocations are made in the current fiscal year.

Nonwithheld payments of individual income taxes are expected to rise by \$9 billion (or 1 percent) in 2019. Those payments include both estimated and final payments for the 2018 tax year, as well as estimated payments for the 2019 tax year. Refunds, largely for the 2018 tax year, are expected to be \$23 billion (or 9 percent) lower than last year, further boosting net receipts. The extent to which those changes reflect the effects of the 2017 tax act or other factors will become clearer as detailed tax-return data become available over the next several years. (For a discussion of what CBO has learned from recent data about the effects of the 2017 tax act, see Box 1-1.)

Payroll Taxes. CBO expects that receipts from payroll taxes—which primarily fund Social Security and Medicare's Hospital Insurance program—will increase by \$76 billion (or 6 percent) this year. The expected increase in payroll taxes exceeds growth in wages and salaries, largely because of amounts reallocated between income and payroll taxes in 2018 and 2019.

Corporate Income Taxes. Income tax payments by corporations, net of refunds, are expected to grow by \$24 billion (or 12 percent) in 2019. Collections in fiscal year 2019 include businesses' final tax payments for the 2018 tax year and their initial payments for 2019.

During the first eight months of 2019, those payments declined by about 9 percent compared with amounts during the same period a year ago. At least some of that initial decline stems from provisions of the 2017 tax act, which lowered the corporate income tax rate to 21 percent from a top rate of 35 percent and expanded the tax rules allowing businesses to immediately deduct the value of qualifying business investments.

The decrease in 2019 may also partly reflect a continuation of unexplained weakness in income tax payments by corporations in recent years—a trend that only reversed in June, the first month in which receipts consisted predominantly of estimated payments for tax year 2019. Receipts in June 2019 rose by 35 percent compared with receipts in June 2018, and stronger payments are expected to persist through the remainder of the fiscal year. The specific reasons for the pattern of corporate receipts will become clearer as detailed information from corporate income tax returns becomes available over the next two years.

Other Revenues. CBO expects that other revenues will increase, on net, by \$7 billion (or 2 percent) in 2019. Most of that increase stems from customs duties, which are anticipated to climb by \$29 billion (or 70 percent) owing to new tariffs imposed by the Administration and in effect as of July 25, 2019. Partially offsetting those increases are smaller remittances from the Federal Reserve to the Treasury. Those remittances are expected to decline by \$16 billion this year, because higher short-term interest rates in the early part of the fiscal year led the central bank to pay depository institutions more interest on their reserves. Estate and gift taxes are also expected to decrease this year—by \$7 billion—largely as a result of a provision in the 2017 tax act that temporarily doubles the amount of the exemption. All other receipts are expected to increase by a combined \$1 billion, on net.


CBO's Baseline Budget Projections for 2020 Through 2029

Although both revenues and outlays are projected to grow faster than GDP over the next 10 years, CBO's baseline projections show a persistent gap between the two. Federal revenues rise, in CBO's projections, from 16.4 percent of GDP in 2020 to 18.2 percent of GDP in 2029. (The projected growth in revenues after 2025 is largely attributable to the scheduled expiration of nearly all of the individual income tax provisions of the

Figure 1-2.

Total Revenues and Outlays

Percentage of Gross Domestic Product



Source: Congressional Budget Office.

When October 1 (the first day of the fiscal year) falls on a weekend, certain payments that would have ordinarily been made on that day are instead made at the end of September and thus are shifted into the previous fiscal year. All projections presented here have been adjusted to exclude the effects of those timing shifts. Historical amounts have been adjusted as far back as the available data will allow.

2017 tax act.) Federal outlays, adjusted to exclude shifts in the timing of certain payments, are projected to climb from 21.0 percent of GDP in 2020 to 23.0 percent in 2029 (see Figure 1-2).

Deficits are projected to average 4.7 percent of GDP over the 2020–2029 period. Over the past 50 years, deficits have averaged 2.9 percent of GDP; and in years when the unemployment rate has been below 6 percent, deficits averaged just 1.5 percent of GDP.

Primary deficits—that is, deficits excluding net outlays for interest—are projected to decrease over time, averaging 2.7 percent of GDP from 2020 through 2024 and 2.2 percent from 2025 through 2029. At the same time, because of projected increases in interest rates and federal borrowing, net interest outlays grow steadily, from 1.8 percent of GDP in 2020 to 2.6 percent in 2029 (see Figure 1-3 on page 14).

Those deficits are projected to boost federal debt held by the public, which consists mostly of the securities that the Treasury issues to raise cash to fund federal activities and pay off the government’s maturing liabilities. The

net amount that the Treasury borrows by issuing those securities (calculated as the amounts that are sold minus the amounts that have matured) is influenced primarily by the annual budget deficit.

Consequently, under current law, debt held by the public would increase in upcoming years. In CBO’s baseline, after accounting for all of the government’s borrowing needs, debt held by the public rises from \$17.8 trillion at the end of 2020 to \$29.3 trillion at the end of 2029 (see Table 1-3 on page 15). As a percentage of GDP, that debt would increase from 79 percent in 2019 to 95 percent by the end of the projection period (see Figure 1-4 on page 16). At that point, such debt would be the largest since 1946 and more than twice the 50-year average.

Outlays

Over the coming decade, CBO projects, federal outlays would grow at an average annual rate of 5 percent, reaching \$7.1 trillion in 2029 (adjusted to exclude the effects of timing shifts). Outlays for Social Security, Medicare, and net interest account for about two-thirds of that \$2.7 trillion increase.

Box 1-1.**Recent Data About the Effects of the 2017 Tax Act on Revenues**

In December 2017, major tax legislation, originally titled the Tax Cuts and Jobs Act and referred to here as the 2017 tax act, was enacted. The Congressional Budget Office, as part of its regular process of updating its baseline budget projections, has been monitoring the Treasury's implementation of that act and assessing its effects on revenues.

Currently, only limited information is available about tax returns filed this year for income earned in 2018—the first returns that reflect most of the changes made by the tax act. That information does not give a clear indication about whether the act's effects differed from those estimated by CBO and the staff of the Joint Committee on Taxation (JCT) when the Congress was considering the act in December 2017.¹ Even when more information becomes available, assessing the act's effect on receipts may not be possible, because it will be difficult to disentangle changes in revenues caused by the tax act from changes driven by other factors.

Receipts in 2018 and 2019

Data about revenues in fiscal year 2018 and the first 10 months of fiscal year 2019 are available, so those amounts can be compared with CBO's projections. CBO and JCT estimated in December 2017 that in fiscal years 2018 and 2019, the tax act would reduce revenues by \$144 billion and \$271 billion, respectively. In April 2018, CBO incorporated those projected reductions into its baseline budget projections, estimating that revenues would total \$3,338 billion in fiscal year 2018 and \$3,490 billion in fiscal year 2019.² The April 2018 projections of revenues also incorporated changes to the economic outlook that had taken place between June 2017 and early 2018, some of which reflected the effects of the tax act and some of which were driven by unrelated factors.

Actual revenues in 2018 totaled \$3,330 billion, or \$8 billion less than CBO projected in April 2018. Receipts from individual income taxes were 3 percent higher than CBO had projected,

and receipts from corporate income taxes were 16 percent lower. As for fiscal year 2019, collections so far this year—and especially collections of corporate income taxes—have been lower than CBO expected in April 2018, so the agency now projects that 2019 revenues will total \$3,451 billion, about 1 percent less than the estimate made in April 2018.

One likely reason for the lower-than-expected receipts is that some parts of the economy have been weaker than CBO projected in April 2018—but in CBO's assessment, that difference has not stemmed from errors in projecting the effects of the 2017 tax act on the economy. Some parts of the economy that CBO expected to be boosted by the tax act, such as investment in 2018, have proved consistent with CBO's April 2018 projections. CBO estimated that the tax act would increase the growth of real (inflation-adjusted) business fixed investment in 2018 by 2.1 percentage points. Incorporating that effect, CBO projected that investment would grow by 5.9 percent in 2018, and current data show that it did grow by 5.9 percent. And although investment in 2019 has been weaker so far than CBO had projected, a number of developments other than the tax act appear to have contributed to that weakness, including increases in tariffs, greater uncertainty about trade policy, and slower economic growth in the rest of the world.

Recent Data About Individual and Corporate Income Taxes

A full accounting of net individual income taxes that can be attributed to income earned in calendar year 2018 (including withholding in 2018 and payments and refunds in 2019) is consistent with the projections that CBO made in April 2018. Preliminary data related to one of the most significant changes resulting from the 2017 tax act are also consistent with CBO's expectations. CBO projected that itemized deductions would be reduced after the tax law was enacted, and the Internal Revenue Service's tabulations of tax returns filed through May 2019 have borne out that projection.³ However, those preliminary tabulations do not help CBO assess the total effect of the tax act because they do not include the full population of tax filers; in particular, filers with high income and complicated tax returns are less likely to be included.

Tax receipts from withholding for individual income and payroll taxes in the first half of calendar year 2019 have been lower

1. See Congressional Budget Office, cost estimate for the conference agreement on H.R. 1 (December 15, 2017), www.cbo.gov/publication/53415.

2. For those projections, see Congressional Budget Office, *The Budget and Economic Outlook: 2018 to 2028* (April 2018), www.cbo.gov/publication/53651. For an explanation of the changes made by the 2017 tax act and their effects, see Appendix B of that report. The most significant changes of the 2017 tax act took effect after December 31, 2017, and therefore did not begin to influence receipts until partway through fiscal year 2018. The current fiscal year—fiscal year 2019—is thus the first to be covered largely by the new rules.

3. See Internal Revenue Service, "Filing Season Statistics" (June 28, 2019), www.irs.gov/statistics/filing-season-statistics.

Box 1-1.

Continued

Recent Data About the Effects of the 2017 Tax Act on Revenues

than CBO projected in April 2018, but they are consistent with the slower growth in income that CBO currently projects. Taxpayers' estimated payments of individual income taxes have similarly been smaller than CBO expected in April 2018, but the degree to which that difference reflects the slower growth in income is not yet known. Another possible explanation is that taxpayers may have chosen to reduce their estimated payment amounts on the basis of information that they learned from filing their 2018 tax returns. For example, taxpayers whose tax liability was lower than expected may have applied part of their refund to future taxes and reduced their estimated payments in 2019.

The lower-than-expected corporate income tax receipts in fiscal year 2018 probably reflect the continuation of a poorly understood weakness in corporate receipts that predates the 2017 tax act. (Recent revisions to data about corporate income may explain some portion of the weakness; for more information, see Box 2-1 on page 30.) Recent data suggest a strengthening of receipts, however. Net corporate tax receipts were 35 percent larger in June 2019 than they were in June 2018. Those June 2019 receipts generally reflect 2019 income, and CBO's current projections of revenues in 2019 reflect that strengthening of receipts. But it is difficult to interpret recent data on corporate receipts, in part because corporations may calculate and pay taxes for a 12-month period other than the calendar year. As a result, provisions of the 2017 tax act became effective for different corporations at different times, so there is variation in when their payments began to fully reflect the changes made by the 2017 tax act.

Other Sources of Data

One provision of the 2017 tax act that affected some tax returns for 2017 was a onetime tax on previously untaxed foreign profits. Some corporations had to submit information to the Treasury about their total liability for that tax, along with the first installment of the tax, with their 2017 return. However, the information collected by the Treasury may not be complete—which would make it difficult to interpret the information in the 2017 returns.⁴ Furthermore, other corporations did not have to

submit information about their liability and their first installment until they filed their 2018 returns, so until information about those returns becomes available, it will not be possible to estimate the total amount of liability for the onetime tax.

Corporations' financial reports also provide some information about how the 2017 tax act affected them. The reports suggest that many corporations experienced a reduction in their effective tax rate—as calculated for financial reporting purposes—after the tax act was enacted.⁵ Such reductions would be consistent with the effects of the act that CBO projected in April 2018, but because they are based on financial accounting rules rather than tax rules, they cannot be used to calculate the precise change in a company's federal tax payments. Companies also provide some information in their financial reports about how specific provisions affected their taxes, but for many reasons, that information cannot be used to estimate the effect of a provision on federal tax revenues.⁶

Considerations for the Future

CBO will be able to better assess the effects of the 2017 tax act as the Treasury continues to issue guidance and regulations and as more information about 2018 returns becomes available. The earliest that detailed information about those returns will be available to CBO is late 2020.

However, even as more data become available, challenges will remain. For example, how taxpayers responded to the new law in filing their 2018 tax returns may not accurately indicate how they will respond in 2019 and beyond. Also, part of the way in which the 2017 tax act affects the federal budget is through its effects on the economy. But the performance of the economy reflects not just the economic effects of the tax act but also the effects of other changes. As time passes, additional policy changes and unexpected economic developments that are unrelated to the tax act will occur, making it increasingly difficult to estimate the effects of the tax act on the economy.

4. See Treasury Inspector General for Tax Administration, *Implementation of the Tax Cuts and Jobs Act Deemed Repatriation Tax Presented Significant Challenges*, 2019-34-033 (May 2019), <https://go.usa.gov/xytRA> (PDF, 1.6 MB).


5. See, for example, Theo Francis and Richard Rubin, "After U.S. Tax Overhaul, Corporate Rates Fall but Unevenly," *Wall Street Journal* (July 21, 2019), <https://tinyurl.com/yycvtwj>.

6. One important reason is that it accounts for only the effects directly attributed to that provision, not the resulting change in a company's total tax payments (for example, if actions taken by the company to reduce its liability under that provision wind up increasing its liability under other provisions).

Figure 1-3.

Total Deficit, Primary Deficit, and Net Interest

Percentage of Gross Domestic Product



Source: Congressional Budget Office.

When October 1 (the first day of the fiscal year) falls on a weekend, certain payments that would have ordinarily been made on that day are instead made at the end of September and thus are shifted into the previous fiscal year. All projections presented here have been adjusted to exclude the effects of those timing shifts. Historical amounts have been adjusted as far back as the available data will allow.

Primary deficits or surpluses exclude outlays for net interest.

Relative to the size of the economy, federal outlays over the 2020–2029 period are projected to average 22.1 percent of GDP, higher than their 50-year average of 20.3 percent. That increase over the historical average is largely attributable to growth in mandatory spending; that spending (net of offsetting receipts) is expected to equal 12.9 percent of GDP in 2020 and grow to 14.7 percent of GDP by 2029 (compared with an average of 9.9 percent over the 1969–2018 period). In contrast, from 2020 to 2029, discretionary outlays are projected to decline from 6.4 percent of GDP to 5.6 percent, compared with an average of 8.4 percent over the previous 50 years. In CBO’s projections, net outlays for interest in 2020 are equal to 1.8 percent of GDP, below their 50-year average of 2.0 percent, but they grow over the next decade, reaching 2.6 percent of GDP in 2029 (see Figure 1-5 on page 17).

Mandatory Spending. From 2020 to 2029, outlays for mandatory programs (net of offsetting receipts) are projected to rise by an average of about 5 percent per year, reaching \$4.5 trillion by the end of the period (see Table 1-4 on page 18).

Much of the projected growth in mandatory spending over the coming decade is attributable to two factors. First, the share of the U.S. population that is age 65 or older, which has more than doubled over the past 50 years, is expected to expand by about one-third by 2029.

Second, although growth in the costs of health care (per person, adjusted to account for the aging of the population) has slowed in recent years, that growth is faster than projected growth in the economy over the long term. The reasons for that slowdown are not clear. In CBO’s projections, per-enrollee spending in federal health care programs grows more rapidly over the coming decade, although it does not return to the higher rates of growth that were experienced previously.

The effects of those two long-term trends on federal spending are already apparent over the 10-year baseline period—especially for Social Security and Medicare—and will persist beyond that period (see Figure 1-6 on page 20).

Table 1-3.

CBO's Baseline Projections of Federal Debt

Billions of Dollars

	Actual, 2018	2019	2020	2021	2022	2023	2024	2025	2026	2027	2028	2029
Debt Held by the Public at the Beginning of the Year	14,665	15,750	16,685	17,755	18,841	20,042	21,264	22,457	23,784	25,102	26,407	27,917
Changes in Debt Held by the Public												
Deficit	785	960	1,008	1,034	1,159	1,181	1,151	1,284	1,274	1,260	1,479	1,378
Other means of financing ^a	299	-25	63	52	42	41	41	43	44	44	32	27
Total	1,084	935	1,070	1,086	1,201	1,222	1,193	1,328	1,318	1,305	1,510	1,405
Debt Held by the Public at the End of the Year												
In billions of dollars	15,750	16,685	17,755	18,841	20,042	21,264	22,457	23,784	25,102	26,407	27,917	29,322
As a percentage of GDP	77.8	78.9	80.7	82.4	84.5	86.4	88.0	89.7	91.2	92.4	94.0	95.1
Memorandum:												
Debt Held by the Public Minus Financial Assets ^b												
In billions of dollars	13,975	14,934	15,942	16,976	18,135	19,316	20,467	21,752	23,026	24,286	25,765	27,143
As a percentage of GDP	69.1	70.6	72.4	74.2	76.4	78.5	80.2	82.0	83.7	85.0	86.8	88.0
Gross Federal Debt ^c	21,462	22,525	23,688	24,833	26,023	27,249	28,436	29,681	30,937	32,054	33,280	34,415
Debt Subject to Limit ^d	21,475	22,540	23,703	24,849	26,040	27,267	28,455	29,701	30,958	32,076	33,302	34,438
Average Interest Rate on Debt Held by the Public (Percent)	2.3	2.5	2.5	2.5	2.5	2.6	2.7	2.8	2.8	2.9	2.9	3.0

Source: Congressional Budget Office.

GDP = gross domestic product.

- Factors not included in budget totals that also affect the government's need to borrow from the public. Those factors include cash flows associated with federal credit programs such as student loans (because only the subsidy costs of those programs are reflected in the budget deficit), as well as changes in the government's cash balances.
- Debt held by the public minus the value of outstanding student loans and other credit transactions, cash balances, and various financial instruments.
- Federal debt held by the public plus Treasury securities held by federal trust funds and other government accounts.
- The amount of federal debt that is subject to the overall limit set in law. Debt subject to limit differs from gross federal debt mainly in that it excludes debt issued by the Federal Financing Bank and includes certain other adjustments that are excluded from gross debt. The debt limit was most recently set at \$22.0 trillion but has been suspended through July 31, 2021. On August 1, 2021, the debt limit will be raised to its previous level plus the amount of federal borrowing that occurred while the limit was suspended. For more on the debt limit, see Congressional Budget Office, *Federal Debt and the Statutory Limit, February 2019* (February 2019), www.cbo.gov/publication/54987.

Social Security and the Major Health Care Programs.

Outlays for Social Security and the major health care programs (Medicare, Medicaid, subsidies offered through the health insurance marketplaces established under the Affordable Care Act and related spending, and the Children's Health Insurance Program) account for more than 90 percent of the projected growth in nominal mandatory spending through 2029. Under current law,


spending for those programs, net of offsetting receipts, would grow at an average annual rate of 6 percent over the coming decade, CBO estimates, increasing from 10.3 percent of GDP in 2020 to 12.5 percent in 2029.⁸

8. Offsetting receipts primarily include payments of premiums, recoveries of overpayments made to providers, and amounts paid by states from savings on Medicaid's prescription drug costs.

Figure 1-4.

Federal Debt Held by the Public

Percentage of Gross Domestic Product



As a percentage of gross domestic product, federal debt held by the public would increase from 79 percent in 2019 to 95 percent in 2029. At that point, such debt would be the largest since 1946 and more than twice the 50-year average.

Source: Congressional Budget Office.

Specifically, in CBO's current baseline:

- Outlays for Social Security total 5.0 percent of GDP in 2020 and then rise steadily thereafter, reaching 5.9 percent of GDP in 2029.
- Outlays for Medicare remain close to 3.0 percent of GDP through 2020 and then grow in each year through 2029, when they total 4.0 percent.
- Federal outlays for Medicaid are relatively stable as a percentage of GDP over the coming decade, averaging about 2 percent each year.
- Outlays for subsidies for health insurance purchased through the marketplaces and related spending are projected to average 0.2 percent of GDP per year through 2029.

Other Mandatory Programs. Aside from spending on Social Security and the major health care programs, all other mandatory spending is projected to decline as a share of GDP, falling from 2.6 percent in 2020 to 2.3 percent in 2029. That category includes spending on income support programs (such as unemployment compensation and the Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program), military and civilian retirement programs,

most veterans' benefits, and major agriculture programs. The projected decline in spending occurs in part because benefit amounts for many of those programs are adjusted for inflation each year, and inflation in CBO's economic forecast is estimated to be below the rate of growth in nominal GDP. (For more details about CBO's economic forecast, see Chapter 2.)

Discretionary Spending. Projections of discretionary spending for the 2020–2029 period are based on funding provided in 2019 (adjusted for inflation), taking into account limits on such funding required by law. The recently enacted Bipartisan Budget Act of 2019 (P.L. 116-37) raised the limits (or caps) on discretionary appropriations by a total of \$171 billion for 2020 and by \$153 billion for 2021.⁹ CBO's baseline projections for

9. Most discretionary funding is limited by caps on annual discretionary appropriations that were originally specified in the Budget Control Act of 2011 (P.L. 112-25) and modified by subsequent legislation. Under current law, separate caps exist for defense and nondefense funding through 2021. If the total amount of discretionary funding provided in appropriation acts for a given year exceeds the cap for either category, the President must sequester—or cancel—a sufficient amount of budgetary resources (following procedures specified in the Budget Control Act) to eliminate the breach. See Congressional Budget Office, *CBO Estimate for the Bipartisan Budget Act of 2019* (July 2019), www.cbo.gov/publication/55478.

Figure 1-5.**Changes in Projected Outlays From 2019 to 2029**

Percentage of Gross Domestic Product

	Outlays		Change (Percentage points)	Major Reasons for Change
	2019	2029		
Social Security	4.9	5.9	1.0	Aging of the population
Major Health Care Programs ^a	5.3	6.6	1.3	Aging of the population; rising costs of health care
Other Mandatory Spending	2.6	2.3	-0.4	Inflation rate is less than nominal GDP growth
Discretionary Spending	6.3	5.6	-0.7	Caps on funding; inflation rate is less than nominal GDP growth
Net Interest	1.8	2.6	0.9	Accumulating debt; rising interest rates

Source: Congressional Budget Office.

When October 1 (the first day of the fiscal year) falls on a weekend, certain payments that would have ordinarily been made on that day are instead made at the end of September and thus are shifted into the previous fiscal year. Outlays have been adjusted to exclude the effects of those shifts.

GDP = gross domestic product.

a. Consists of outlays for Medicare (net of premiums and other offsetting receipts), Medicaid, and the Children's Health Insurance Program, as well as outlays to subsidize health insurance purchased through the marketplaces established under the Affordable Care Act and related spending.

those two years incorporate the new limits, and funding for those two years is projected to be at or slightly below those new caps (see Table 1-5 on page 21). For 2022 and later years, those projections reflect the assumption that funding constrained by the caps keeps pace with inflation. Some elements of discretionary funding are not constrained by the caps—in particular, appropriations designated for OCO, activities designated as emergency requirements, and some or all funding for disaster relief and some efforts to reduce overpayments in benefit programs.¹⁰ In addition, in accordance with the 21st Century Cures Act, a portion of funding for certain authorized activities—up to amounts specified in law—is exempt from the caps. For those elements, funding

is generally assumed to grow with inflation from the amounts provided in 2019.¹¹

The Bipartisan Budget Act of 2019 raised the caps on discretionary appropriations subject to the limits to \$1,288 billion in 2020. Discretionary funding is projected to grow at the rate of inflation, unless constrained by the caps; and between 2019 and 2020, projected inflation for defense funding is less than the rate of growth of the cap on such funding. Thus, in CBO's baseline, discretionary budget authority constrained by the caps is just below that amount, at \$1,286 billion in 2020. By 2021, in CBO's baseline, discretionary budget authority constrained by the caps equals the combined defense and nondefense limits of \$1,298 billion. The caps expire in 2021, so all budget authority after that

10. The caps are adjusted to accommodate funding for those activities. Beginning in 2020, funding for wildfire suppression and activities related to the 2020 census also will lead to an increase in the nondefense cap, subject to specified limits.

11. Spending for certain transportation programs is controlled by obligation limitations, which also are not constrained by the caps on discretionary spending.

Table 1-4.

Mandatory Outlays Projected in CBO's Baseline, Adjusted to Exclude the Effects of Timing Shifts

Billions of Dollars

	Actual,												Total	
	2018	2019	2020	2021	2022	2023	2024	2025	2026	2027	2028	2029	2020–2024	2020–2029
Social Security														
Old-Age and Survivors Insurance	838	893	950	1,008	1,072	1,139	1,209	1,282	1,356	1,435	1,522	1,610	5,377	12,583
Disability Insurance	144	145	147	152	158	165	173	180	189	198	203	210	795	1,774
Subtotal	982	1,038	1,097	1,160	1,230	1,304	1,381	1,462	1,545	1,633	1,725	1,820	6,172	14,356
Major Health Care Programs														
Medicare ^{a,b}	728	768	815	872	937	1,007	1,083	1,161	1,244	1,343	1,424	1,514	4,713	11,399
Medicaid	389	404	418	436	462	490	519	549	582	616	652	691	2,325	5,415
Health insurance subsidies and related spending ^c	49	57	55	56	58	61	63	67	70	71	72	75	293	647
Children's Health Insurance Program	17	18	16	14	14	15	16	16	17	18	18	19	76	164
Subtotal ^b	1,184	1,247	1,304	1,378	1,471	1,573	1,680	1,794	1,913	2,048	2,167	2,299	7,406	17,626
Income Security Programs														
Earned income, child, and other tax credits ^d	81	98	95	94	93	93	94	94	95	82	82	82	468	902
Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program	68	63	63	62	63	64	65	65	66	67	69	71	317	656
Supplemental Security Income ^a	55	56	57	58	60	61	63	65	67	70	72	74	299	648
Unemployment compensation	29	28	29	33	38	46	50	50	52	54	56	58	196	465
Family support and foster care ^e	32	32	33	33	33	34	34	34	34	35	35	35	166	339
Child nutrition	24	24	26	27	28	29	30	31	33	34	36	37	139	310
Subtotal	290	301	302	306	314	327	335	340	347	341	349	357	1,585	3,320
Federal Civilian and Military Retirement														
Civilian ^f	103	106	109	114	118	122	126	129	133	137	141	145	587	1,273
Military ^a	59	61	63	65	67	68	70	72	74	76	78	79	332	711
Other	6	4	5	6	7	8	9	5	10	7	7	7	35	71
Subtotal	168	170	177	184	191	198	205	206	217	220	226	231	955	2,055
Veterans' Programs														
Income security ^{a,g}	93	100	104	107	109	114	120	123	127	131	135	141	553	1,210
Other	16	15	19	17	18	17	17	18	19	20	21	20	88	187
Subtotal	109	116	123	123	127	131	137	141	146	151	156	162	641	1,397
Other Programs														
Agriculture	16	23	29	16	15	16	16	16	16	16	17	16	91	172
Deposit insurance	-16	-9	-6	-6	-6	-6	-6	-7	-7	-8	-8	-8	-29	-67
MERHCF	10	10	11	11	12	13	13	14	15	15	16	17	60	137
Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac ^h	4	0	2	2	3	3	3	4	4	4	4	4	13	33
Higher education	-6	35	3	4	5	6	6	6	6	6	6	6	23	53
Other	82	57	70	70	72	71	69	69	68	68	68	69	352	694
Subtotal	90	116	108	97	101	102	101	101	101	101	103	105	510	1,021
Mandatory Outlays, Excluding the Effects of Offsetting Receipts^a														
	2,822	2,988	3,110	3,249	3,435	3,635	3,839	4,045	4,269	4,494	4,725	4,973	17,269	39,775

Continued

Source: Congressional Budget Office.

Data on outlays for benefit programs in this table generally exclude administrative costs, which are discretionary.

MERHCF = Department of Defense Medicare-Eligible Retiree Health Care Fund (including TRICARE for Life); n.a. = not applicable;

* = between -\$500 million and \$500 million.

Table 1-4.

Continued

Mandatory Outlays Projected in CBO's Baseline, Adjusted to Exclude the Effects of Timing Shifts

Billions of Dollars

	Actual,												Total	
	2018	2019	2020	2021	2022	2023	2024	2025	2026	2027	2028	2029	2020–2024	2020–2029
Offsetting Receipts														
Medicare ⁱ	-123	-133	-141	-151	-161	-174	-188	-202	-218	-237	-253	-271	-815	-1,996
Federal share of federal employees' retirement														
Civil service retirement and other	-36	-37	-39	-41	-42	-44	-46	-47	-49	-50	-52	-53	-212	-463
Military retirement	-18	-20	-22	-22	-23	-23	-24	-24	-25	-25	-26	-26	-113	-239
Social Security	-18	-18	-18	-19	-20	-20	-21	-22	-22	-23	-24	-24	-99	-214
Subtotal	-72	-75	-79	-82	-85	-87	-90	-93	-96	-99	-101	-104	-423	-916
Receipts related to natural resources ^a	-11	-14	-12	-12	-13	-12	-12	-13	-13	-13	-13	-14	-61	-126
MERHCF	-8	-8	-8	-9	-9	-10	-10	-11	-11	-12	-12	-13	-45	-104
Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac ^h	-13	-24	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Other	-32	-28	-32	-33	-32	-32	-31	-44	-32	-32	-29	-29	-160	-327
Subtotal	-259	-281	-273	-287	-300	-315	-331	-362	-369	-392	-409	-431	-1,505	-3,469
Total Mandatory Outlays, Net of Offsetting Receipts^a	2,563	2,707	2,838	2,962	3,135	3,321	3,509	3,682	3,900	4,101	4,317	4,542	15,764	36,306

Mandatory Outlays That Are Shifted in CBO's Baseline

Medicare	-24	0	0	0	38	4	-41	0	0	0	64	-64	n.a.	n.a.
Supplemental Security Income	-4	0	0	0	5	0	-5	0	0	0	5	-5	n.a.	n.a.
Military retirement	-5	0	0	0	5	0	-5	0	0	0	6	-6	n.a.	n.a.
Veterans' income security	-7	0	0	0	10	1	-11	0	0	0	12	-12	n.a.	n.a.
Outer Continental Shelf	*	0	0	0	0	*	*	0	0	0	*	*	n.a.	n.a.
Total	-40	0	0	0	57	5	-63	0	0	0	88	-87	n.a.	n.a.
Total Mandatory Outlays Projected in CBO's Baseline	2,523	2,707	2,838	2,962	3,192	3,326	3,446	3,682	3,900	4,101	4,405	4,454	15,764	36,306

Memorandum:

Outlays Adjusted to Remove the Effects of Timing Shifts, Net of Offsetting Receipts


Medicare ^a	605	636	673	721	776	833	895	959	1,026	1,106	1,171	1,243	3,899	9,403
Major health care programs	1,061	1,114	1,163	1,226	1,310	1,399	1,493	1,591	1,695	1,811	1,914	2,028	6,591	15,630

- a. When October 1 (the first day of the fiscal year) falls on a weekend, certain payments that would have ordinarily been made on that day are instead made at the end of September and thus are shifted into the previous fiscal year. Outlays presented in this table for programs affected by such timing shifts have been adjusted to exclude the effects of those shifts.
- b. Excludes the effects of Medicare premiums and other offsetting receipts. (Net Medicare spending, which includes those offsetting receipts, is shown in the memorandum section of the table.)
- c. Consists of outlays to subsidize health insurance purchased through the marketplaces established under the Affordable Care Act and provided through the Basic Health Program, as well as spending to stabilize premiums for health insurance purchased by individuals and small employers.
- d. Includes outlays for the American Opportunity Tax Credit and other credits.
- e. Includes Temporary Assistance for Needy Families, Child Support Enforcement, Child Care Entitlements to States, and other programs that benefit children.
- f. Includes benefits for retirement programs in the civil service, foreign service, and Coast Guard; benefits for smaller retirement programs; and annuitants' health care benefits.
- g. Includes veterans' compensation, pensions, and life insurance programs. (Outlays for veterans' health care are classified as discretionary.)
- h. Cash payments from Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac to the Treasury are recorded as offsetting receipts in 2018 and 2019. Beginning in 2020, CBO's estimates reflect the net lifetime costs—that is, the subsidy costs adjusted for market risk—of the guarantees that those entities will issue and of the loans that they will hold. CBO counts those costs as federal outlays in the year of issuance.
- i. Includes premium payments, recoveries of overpayments made to providers, and amounts paid by states from savings on Medicaid's prescription drug costs.

Figure 1-6.

CBO’s Baseline Projections of Outlays and Revenues, Compared With Actual Values 25 and 50 Years Ago

Percentage of Gross Domestic Product



Source: Congressional Budget Office.

In 2028, October 1 (the first day of fiscal year 2029) falls on a weekend, so certain payments that are due on that date will instead be made in September, thus boosting outlays in fiscal year 2028 and reducing them in 2029. Such shifts affect projections of outlays for the major health care programs, other mandatory outlays, defense discretionary outlays, total outlays, and the deficit. A similar shift boosted outlays in those categories in 1994. The data presented here have been adjusted to exclude the effects of those timing shifts.

a. Consists of outlays for Medicare (net of premiums and other offsetting receipts), Medicaid, and the Children’s Health Insurance Program, as well as outlays to subsidize health insurance purchased through the marketplaces established under the Affordable Care Act and related spending.

year is assumed to grow with inflation for the duration of the baseline projection period.

In addition to budget authority constrained by the caps, CBO projects funding of \$121 billion in 2020 and in 2021 for overseas contingency operations and other activities not constrained by the caps. Included in those totals are amounts for emergency requirements—\$25 billion in 2020 and \$26 billion in 2021.¹² Those

amounts are based on the \$25 billion appropriated for emergencies in 2019, which is assumed to grow with inflation for the rest of the projection period. (For comparison, emergency funding averaged \$25 billion per year from 2012 to 2018.)

Between 2020 and 2029, total discretionary budget authority is projected to rise by about 2 percent a year, on average. Measured in dollar terms, total discretionary outlays would climb from \$1.4 trillion in 2020 to \$1.7 trillion in 2029, for an average yearly increase of

12. See Congressional Budget Office, cost estimate for S. 1900, the Emergency Supplemental Appropriations for Humanitarian Assistance and Security at the Southern Border Act, 2019 (June 21, 2019), www.cbo.gov/publication/55389, and cost estimate for Senate Amendment 250 to H.R. 2157, the

Additional Supplemental Appropriations for Disaster Relief Act, 2019 (May 23, 2019), www.cbo.gov/publication/55289.

Table 1-5.

CBO's Baseline Projections of Discretionary Spending, Adjusted to Exclude the Effects of Timing Shifts

Billions of Dollars

	Actual, 2018 ^a	2019 ^a	2020 ^b	2021	2022	2023	2024	2025	2026	2027	2028	2029	Total	
													2020– 2024	2020– 2029
Budget Authority														
Defense	701	719	737	746	764	783	802	822	842	862	883	905	3,833	8,147
Nondefense	722	658	669	672	689	706	724	741	760	779	798	818	3,460	7,356
Total	1,423	1,377	1,407	1,419	1,453	1,489	1,526	1,563	1,602	1,641	1,681	1,722	7,293	15,502
Outlays^c														
Defense	627	670	700	721	740	758	776	795	814	834	854	874	3,695	7,866
Nondefense	639	662	700	724	737	755	771	789	808	827	846	868	3,686	7,825
Total	1,266	1,332	1,400	1,446	1,476	1,512	1,548	1,584	1,622	1,661	1,700	1,742	7,382	15,690
Memorandum:														
Caps in the Budget Control Act of 2011 (As Amended)														
Defense	629	647	667	672	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.
Nondefense	579	597	622	627	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.
Total	1,208	1,244	1,288	1,298	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.
Adjustments to the Caps ^d														
Defense	72	72	73	75	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.
Nondefense	125	44	48	46	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.
Total	197	116	121	121	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.

Source: Congressional Budget Office.

CBO's current baseline projections incorporate the assumption that the caps on discretionary budget authority and the automatic enforcement procedures specified in the Budget Control Act of 2011 (as amended) remain in effect through 2021.

Nondefense discretionary outlays are usually greater than budget authority because of spending from the Highway Trust Fund and the Airport and Airway Trust Fund that is subject to obligation limitations set in appropriation acts. The budget authority for such programs is provided in authorizing legislation and is considered mandatory.

n.a. = not applicable.

- The amount of budget authority for 2018 and for 2019 in CBO's baseline does not match the sum of the caps on funding plus adjustments to the caps, mostly because changes to mandatory programs included in appropriation acts for those years (including those assumed to be enacted for 2019) are credited against the caps. In the baseline, those changes (which reduce mandatory budget authority in both years) appear in their normal mandatory accounts.
- The amount of budget authority for 2020 in CBO's baseline is less than the sum of the caps on funding plus adjustments to the caps because discretionary funding is projected to grow at the rate of inflation unless constrained by the caps; projected inflation for defense funding between 2019 and 2020 is less than the rate of growth of the cap on such funding.
- When October 1 (the first day of the fiscal year) falls on a weekend, certain payments—mainly for military pay—that would have ordinarily been made on that day are instead made at the end of September and thus are shifted into the previous fiscal year.
- Some or all of the discretionary funding related to five types of activities is not constrained by the caps; for most of those activities, the caps are adjusted to accommodate such funding, up to certain limits. Specifically, appropriations designated for overseas contingency operations and activities designated as emergency requirements are assumed to grow with inflation after 2019, and the caps are adjusted accordingly. For two other activities—disaster relief and certain efforts to reduce overpayments in benefit programs—the extent to which the caps can be adjusted is subject to annual constraints, as specified in law. (Beginning in 2020, funding for wildfire suppression and the 2020 census also will lead to an increase in the nondefense caps, subject to specified limits.) Finally, CBO follows a similar approach in projecting a portion of funding to carry out the 21st Century Cures Act (Public Law 114-255), which requires that discretionary funding for certain authorized activities—up to amounts specified in law—be excluded from calculations of the caps.

about 2½ percent. Measured as a share of GDP, though, discretionary outlays would drop from 6.4 percent in 2020 to 5.6 percent in 2029. That 2029 percentage would be the smallest in any year since 1962 (the earliest year for which such data have been reported); by comparison, discretionary outlays averaged 8.4 percent of GDP over the past 50 years, although they were as low as 6.0 percent of GDP in 1999.

Defense. Budget authority for defense programs—including funding for OCO—is projected to equal \$737 billion in 2020, which is \$19 billion (or 3 percent) greater than it was in 2019.¹³ After 2020, funding is estimated to grow by 2 percent a year, on average, reaching \$905 billion in 2029. Outlays for defense programs are projected to be \$670 billion in 2019 and \$700 billion in 2020. They then grow at a rate similar to that of budget authority, rising to \$874 billion in 2029. Despite that growth, discretionary defense outlays as a percentage of GDP are projected to fall from 3.2 percent in 2019 to 2.8 percent in 2029.

Nondefense. Budget authority for nondefense programs is also projected to rise in 2020. In CBO’s projections, nondefense discretionary budget authority is \$669 billion in that year, an increase of \$11 billion (or 2 percent) over 2019 amounts. After 2020, funding is projected to grow by 2 percent a year, on average, reaching \$818 billion in 2029. Discretionary outlays for nondefense programs are estimated to total \$662 billion in 2019 and projected to be \$700 billion in 2020; they would then follow the same trajectory as budget authority, increasing to \$868 billion in 2029. Relative to the size of the economy, outlays for nondefense discretionary programs are projected to fall from 3.1 percent of GDP in 2019 to 2.8 percent of GDP in 2029.

Net Interest. In the budget, net interest outlays primarily encompass the government’s interest payments on federal debt, offset by interest income that the government receives. Net outlays for interest are dominated by the interest paid to holders of the debt that the Treasury Department issues to the public. The Treasury also pays interest on debt issued to trust funds and other government accounts, but such payments are intragovernmental transactions that have no effect on the budget deficit.

In CBO’s projections, net outlays for interest increase from \$372 billion in 2019 to more than double that amount—\$807 billion—by 2029. As a result, under current law, outlays for net interest are projected to grow from 1.8 percent of GDP in 2019 to an average of 2.5 percent from 2025 to 2029 (see Table 1-6). That amount is 0.5 percentage points higher than their 50-year average as a share of economic output. The primary factors that affect the federal government’s net interest costs are the amount of debt held by the public and interest rates on Treasury securities.

The increase in federal borrowing projected in the baseline is the most significant factor affecting the projected growth in net interest costs. Those costs are also boosted by higher interest rates on federal borrowing as Treasury securities that were issued when interest rates were relatively low mature and are rolled over and as interest rates on Treasury securities rise over the next decade. In 2018, the average interest rate on debt held by the public was 2.3 percent; that rate is estimated to reach 3.0 percent in 2029. As a result, debt held by the public is projected to rise by 86 percent (in nominal terms) over the next 11 years, increasing from \$15.8 trillion, or 78 percent of GDP, at the end of 2018 to \$29.3 trillion, or 95 percent of GDP, in 2029.

Revenues

Under current law, revenues are projected to grow by \$2.2 trillion over the projection period—an average annual increase of 5 percent, nearly the same rate of increase that CBO projects for outlays through 2029 (after adjusting for the timing of certain payments). As a share of GDP, total revenues are projected to rise from 16.3 percent this year to 18.2 percent in 2029. That growth mainly reflects an increase in revenues relative to GDP from individual income taxes and, to a lesser extent, from corporate income taxes. Other sources of revenues are projected to grow at the same pace as GDP (see Figure 1-7). The largest movements over the next decade are the following:

- Individual income tax receipts are projected to increase relative to GDP in each year from 2019 to 2029 because of the expiration of provisions of the 2017 tax act that have temporarily lowered receipts relative to taxable personal income, because of real bracket creep, and from other factors (explained in more detail, below).

13. If budget authority for defense programs was equal to the cap in 2020 and not slightly below it, funding in that year would be \$21 billion (or 2.9 percent) greater than it was in 2019.

Table 1-6.

Key Projections in CBO's Baseline

Percentage of Gross Domestic Product

	2019	2020	Projected Annual Average	
			2021–2024	2025–2029
Revenues				
Individual income taxes	8.0	8.2	8.4	9.3
Payroll taxes	5.9	5.8	5.9	5.9
Corporate income taxes	1.1	1.1	1.3	1.4
Other	1.3	1.3	1.3	1.3
Total Revenues	16.3	16.4	16.9	18.0
Outlays				
Mandatory				
Social Security	4.9	5.0	5.2	5.7
Major health care programs ^a	5.3	5.3	5.6	6.3
Other	2.6	2.6	2.5	2.3
Subtotal	12.8	12.9	13.4	14.3
Discretionary	6.3	6.4	6.2	5.8
Net interest	1.8	1.8	2.0	2.5
Total Outlays	20.8	21.0	21.5	22.6
Deficit	-4.5	-4.6	-4.7	-4.7
Debt Held by the Public at the End of the Period	79	81	88	95
Memorandum:				
Social Security				
Revenues ^b	4.5	4.5	4.5	4.6
Outlays ^c	4.9	5.0	5.2	5.7
Contribution to the Federal Deficit ^d	-0.4	-0.5	-0.8	-1.2
Medicare				
Revenues ^b	1.4	1.4	1.5	1.5
Outlays ^c	3.6	3.7	4.0	4.7
Offsetting receipts	-0.6	-0.6	-0.7	-0.8
Contribution to the Federal Deficit ^d	-1.6	-1.6	-1.9	-2.3
Gross Domestic Product at the End of the Period (Trillions of dollars)	21.2	22.0	25.5	30.8

Source: Congressional Budget Office.

This table satisfies a requirement specified in section 3111 of S. Con. Res. 11, the Concurrent Resolution on the Budget for Fiscal Year 2016.

- a. Consists of outlays for Medicare (net of premiums and other offsetting receipts), Medicaid, and the Children's Health Insurance Program, as well as outlays to subsidize health insurance purchased through the marketplaces established under the Affordable Care Act and related spending.
- b. Includes payroll taxes other than those paid by the federal government on behalf of its employees; those payments are intragovernmental transactions. Also includes income taxes paid on Social Security benefits, which are credited to the trust funds.
- c. Does not include outlays related to administration of the program, which are discretionary. For Social Security, outlays do not include intragovernmental offsetting receipts stemming from the employer's share of payroll taxes paid to the Social Security trust funds by federal agencies on behalf of their employees.
- d. The net increase in the deficit shown in this table differs from the change in the trust fund balance for the associated program. It does not include intragovernmental transactions, interest earned on balances, or outlays related to administration of the program.

Figure 1-7.

Changes in Projected Revenues From 2019 to 2029

Percentage of Gross Domestic Product

	Revenues		Change (Percentage points)	Major Reasons for Change
	2019	2029		
Individual Income Taxes	8.0	9.6	1.6	Expiration of temporary tax provisions after 2025; real bracket creep ^a
Payroll Taxes	5.9	5.9	*	Not applicable
Corporate Income Taxes	1.1	1.3	0.3	Scheduled changes in tax rules enacted in the 2017 tax act; dissipation of temporary weakness in recent tax collections
Other Sources of Revenue	1.3	1.3	*	Not applicable

Source: Congressional Budget Office.

* = between zero and 0.05 percent of gross domestic product.

a. Real bracket creep occurs when more income is pushed into higher tax brackets because people's income is rising faster than inflation.

- Corporate income tax receipts are projected to increase relative to GDP in each year from 2019 to 2025 and then gradually decline. Those receipts are boosted over the next decade by scheduled changes in tax rules enacted by the 2017 tax act, as well as the expectation that recent unexplained weakness in collections will slowly dissipate. After 2025, corporate income taxes are projected to shrink as a share of the economy, mostly because of the end of the scheduled payments for a onetime tax on previously untaxed foreign profits.
- Estate and gift tax receipts are projected to increase slightly relative to GDP through 2026 and then increase greatly, as the provision in the 2017 tax act that doubled the exemption amount expires.

Individual Income Taxes. If current laws remain generally unchanged, receipts from individual income taxes would rise by 1.6 percentage points as a share of economic output over the next decade—from 8.0 percent in 2019 to 9.6 percent by 2029—CBO estimates.

Expiration of Temporary Tax Provisions After 2025. The most significant factor pushing up taxes relative to income is the scheduled expiration, after tax year 2025,

of nearly all the individual income tax law changes made by the 2017 tax act. The provisions that are scheduled to expire include lower statutory tax rates, the higher standard deduction, the repeal of personal exemptions, and the expansion of the child tax credit. Those expirations would cause tax liabilities to rise in calendar year 2026, boosting individual income tax receipts relative to GDP by 0.8 percentage points.

Real Bracket Creep and Related Factors. The second most significant factor pushing up taxes relative to income arises from the way certain parameters of the tax system are scheduled to change over time in relation to growth in income, which reflects the effects of both real (inflation-adjusted) economic activity and inflation. The most important component of that effect, real bracket creep, occurs because the income tax brackets are indexed only to inflation. If income grows faster than inflation, as generally occurs when the economy is expanding, more income is pushed into higher tax brackets. Still other parameters of the tax system, including the amount of the child tax credit, are fixed in nominal dollars and are not adjusted for inflation. In CBO's baseline, those factors cause projected revenues measured as a percentage

of GDP to rise by 0.5 percentage points from 2019 to 2029.¹⁴

Other Factors. Over the next decade, other factors would raise projected receipts as a share of GDP by 0.3 percentage points, on net, in CBO's estimation. Several factors would boost individual income tax receipts relative to GDP. According to CBO's projections, taxable personal income, which includes wages and salaries, and taxable distributions from tax-deferred retirement accounts would both grow faster than GDP through 2029. CBO also expects wages and salaries to increase faster for people with higher earnings than for others during the next decade—as has been the case for the past several decades—pushing a larger share of income into higher tax brackets. Finally, in addition to the individual income tax provisions that are scheduled to expire after 2025, rules allowing accelerated depreciation deductions for certain business investments are scheduled to phase out between 2022 and 2027. Partially offsetting those tax increases is a projected decline in realizations of capital gains relative to the size of the economy. Those realizations are projected to gradually return to levels consistent with their historical average share of GDP (after accounting for differences in applicable tax rates) by 2029.

Corporate Income Taxes. Under current law, corporate income tax receipts would rise from 1.1 percent of GDP in 2019 to 1.5 percent of GDP in 2025 and then decline to 1.3 percent of GDP by 2029.

Provisions of the 2017 Tax Act. A number of provisions of the 2017 tax act will affect corporate taxes over the next decade, raising receipts as a share of GDP by 0.2 percentage points between 2019 and 2029, on net. Most significantly, provisions allowing firms to immediately deduct from their taxable income 100 percent of their investments in equipment are scheduled to phase out between 2023 and 2026. Several other provisions of the tax act will alter how businesses calculate their tax liability over the next decade and, as a result, will boost receipts. Among those provisions is a change in how taxable income is calculated, which results from new limits on the deductibility of interest expenses that take effect in 2022. Also in 2022, firms will be required to capitalize and amortize certain expenditures for research and experimentation as they are incurred over a five-year period,

rather than immediately deducting them. Rules related to the taxation of profits abroad will also change in 2026, increasing revenues in subsequent years. Provisions with such rules include the tax on Global Intangible Low-Taxed Income, the deduction for Foreign-Derived Intangible Income, and the Base Erosion and Anti-Abuse Tax.¹⁵

Receipts will be further affected over the next decade by the end of the scheduled payments for a onetime tax on previously untaxed foreign profits. Taxes on those earnings, which are based on the value of those profits as of late 2017 (and which are unrelated to future business activity), can be paid in installments over the next eight years. Because the required installments are not equal in size, the effect of those receipts in CBO's baseline varies over the 2019–2026 period. As a result, those payments are projected to boost receipts to varying degrees from 2019 through 2026 but not in subsequent years, thereby contributing to the reduction in receipts in relation to GDP through 2029.

Temporary Weakness in Recent Tax Collections. Corporate tax collections in 2018 and early 2019 were weaker than can be explained by the available data on business activity. (After this analysis was completed, the Bureau of Economic Analysis released its annual revisions of historical economic data. Those revisions included significant reductions in estimated corporate profits for 2017 and 2018, which probably explain part of the weakness in observed collections. For a discussion of those revisions, see Box 2-1 on page 30.) The full set of factors responsible for that weakness, and the extent to which they relate to the 2017 tax act or other factors, will not become apparent until detailed information from tax returns becomes available over the next few years. Depending on the source, the effects of those factors on receipts might be expected to persist permanently, end abruptly, or even reverse. In CBO's projections, unexplained weakness is anticipated to continue temporarily and gradually dissipate over the next few years, boosting corporate income tax receipts by 0.1 percent of GDP from 2020 to 2029.

Estate and Gift Taxes. As a result of a provision in the 2017 tax act that temporarily doubles the amount of the estate and gift tax exemption through tax year 2025,

14. See Congressional Budget Office, “How Income Growth Affects Tax Revenues in CBO's Long-Term Budget Projections” (presentation, June 2019), www.cbo.gov/publication/55368.

15. For additional explanation of the tax provisions included in the 2017 tax act, see Congressional Budget Office, *The Budget and Economic Outlook: 2018 to 2028* (April 2018), pp. 108–110, www.cbo.gov/publication/53651.

revenues from that source are projected to drop in 2019 to less than 0.1 percent of GDP. In 2027 and later years, projected revenues from estate and gift taxes rise to just above 0.1 percent.

Receipts From Other Sources. Receipts from all other sources are expected to remain at about the same share of GDP over the next decade.

- Between 2019 and 2029, receipts from payroll taxes, which fund social insurance programs, are projected to rise only slightly as a share of the economy. Those receipts are expected to remain close to 5.9 percent of GDP throughout the next decade because workers' earnings, which constitute most of the payroll tax base, remain relatively stable as a share of GDP.
- Customs duties, which are assessed on certain imports, are projected to remain between 0.3 percent and 0.4 percent of GDP throughout the next decade. Those duties include tariffs implemented by the Administration during 2018 and 2019.¹⁶ For example, in May 2019, tariffs were raised from 10 percent to 25 percent on \$164 billion of imports from China. CBO's baseline incorporates the assumption that tariffs, along with any subsequent exemptions provided by the Administration, continue throughout the projection period at the rates in effect as of July 25, 2019.¹⁷
- The federal government also collects revenues in the form of excise taxes, remittances from the Federal

16. The Administration's recent actions on tariffs were taken under authority granted in section 232 of the Trade Expansion Act of 1962 and sections 201 and 301 of the Trade Act of 1974.

17. Specifically, the baseline projections incorporate the assumption that, in cases in which the Administration exercises its broad authority to impose tariffs without legislative action, the tariffs in effect when the analysis was completed would continue permanently without planned or unplanned changes. The tariffs imposed during the past two years include those on imports of solar panels and certain appliances, which took effect on February 7, 2018; on steel and aluminum imports from most countries, which took effect on March 23, 2018; and on a range of products imported from China, the first of which took effect on July 6, 2018. On August 1, 2019, the President announced that tariffs would be imposed on an additional \$300 billion of Chinese imports beginning on September 1, 2019; on August 13, the U.S. Trade Representative announced that those tariffs would be delayed on certain products. Those scheduled changes to tariffs are not included in CBO's current baseline projections.

Reserve, and miscellaneous fees and fines. CBO projects that, under current law, revenues from each of those sources would grow at the same pace as GDP through 2029.

Tax Expenditures. The tax rules that form the basis for CBO's projections include an array of exclusions, deductions, preferential rates, and credits. Those provisions reduce revenues for any given level of tax rates in both the individual and corporate income tax systems. Many of those provisions are called tax expenditures because, like government spending programs, they provide financial assistance for particular activities as well as to certain entities or groups of people.

Tax expenditures have a major effect on the federal budget. In fiscal year 2019, the value of the more than 200 tax expenditures in the individual and corporate income tax systems will total about \$1.6 trillion—or 7.8 percent of GDP—if their effects on payroll as well as income taxes are included.¹⁸ That amount, which was calculated by CBO on the basis of estimates prepared by the staff of the Joint Committee on Taxation, equals almost half of all federal revenues projected to be collected in 2019 and exceeds all projected discretionary outlays combined.¹⁹

Uncertainty in Budget Projections

CBO's baseline budget projections are intended to show what would happen to federal spending, revenues, and deficits and debt if current laws governing spending and taxes generally remained the same. Changes to laws—particularly those affecting fiscal policies—that cause them to differ from the laws underlying CBO's baseline projections could lead to budgetary outcomes that diverge considerably from those in the baseline.


Even if federal laws remained the same for the next decade, actual budgetary outcomes would differ from

18. Most estimates of tax expenditures include only their effects on individual and corporate income taxes. However, tax expenditures can also reduce the amount of income subject to payroll taxes. Tax expenditures that reduce the tax base for payroll taxes will eventually decrease spending for Social Security by reducing the earnings base on which Social Security benefits are calculated.

19. For more information on how that total was determined, as well as estimates of the size of the 10 largest tax expenditures in 2019, see Congressional Budget Office, *The Budget and Economic Outlook: 2019 to 2029* (January 2019), pp. 99–102, www.cbo.gov/publication/54918.

Figure 1-8.**The Uncertainty of CBO's Baseline Projections of the Budget Deficit**

Percentage of Gross Domestic Product



Source: Congressional Budget Office.

When October 1 (the first day of the fiscal year) falls on a weekend, certain payments that would have ordinarily been made on that day are instead made at the end of September and thus are shifted into the previous fiscal year. All projections presented here have been adjusted to exclude the effects of those timing shifts. Historical amounts have been adjusted as far back as the available data will allow.

CBO's baseline projections because of unanticipated changes in economic conditions and in other factors that affect federal spending and revenues. CBO's projections of outlays and revenues and, therefore, of deficits and debt depend in part on the agency's economic projections for the coming decade, which include forecasts for such variables as interest rates, inflation, and growth in productivity. Discrepancies between those forecasts and actual economic outcomes can cause significant differences between baseline budget projections and budgetary outcomes. Such differences might also be caused by unanticipated developments, such as new trends in spending on health care or a crisis in the financial sector. CBO aims for its projections to be in the middle of the distribution of possible outcomes, given the baseline assumptions about federal tax and spending policies, and recognizes that actual outcomes will typically differ to some degree from any such projections.

Historical experience gives some indication of the magnitude of the uncertainty of budget projections. On the basis of an analysis of its past projections, CBO estimates that there is approximately a two-thirds chance that in 2020 the deficit under current law would be between

3.5 percent and 5.6 percent of GDP. The range in 2024 would be larger: CBO estimates that, under current law, there is approximately a two-thirds chance that the deficit would be between 2.9 percent and 6.7 percent of GDP in that year (see Figure 1-8).

Errors in the projections of debt tend to compound over time, so the uncertainty surrounding those projections is greater. For example, in CBO's baseline, federal debt held by the public is projected to equal 88 percent of GDP in 2024. After analyzing its past projections, CBO estimates that there is approximately a two-thirds chance that, under current law, federal debt would be between 79 percent and 97 percent of GDP in that year.

The Long-Term Outlook for the Budget

Beyond the coming decade, the fiscal outlook is more challenging. Although long-term budget projections are highly uncertain, the aging of the population and growth in per capita spending on health care would almost certainly boost federal outlays significantly relative to GDP after 2029 if current laws generally remained in effect. Outlays would be further boosted by sizably higher interest costs, driven by projected increases in federal

borrowing. Although federal revenues would continue to rise relative to GDP under current law, they would not keep pace with outlays. As a result, CBO estimates, public debt would reach a higher percentage of GDP by 2049 (taking into account the effects of the rising debt on the economy) than has been previously recorded in the United States.²⁰ Moreover, debt is on track to grow even larger after 2049. If federal debt as a percentage of GDP continues to rise at the pace that CBO projects it would under current law, the economy would be affected in two significant ways:

- That debt path would dampen economic output over time, and
- Rising interest costs associated with that debt would increase interest payments to foreign debt holders and thus reduce the income of U.S. households by increasing amounts.

20. For more information, see Congressional Budget Office, *The 2019 Long-Term Budget Outlook* (June 2019), www.cbo.gov/publication/55331. CBO will next update its long-term projections in 2020.

That debt path would also pose significant risks to the fiscal and economic outlook, although those risks are not currently apparent in financial markets. In particular, the significant increase in federal borrowing would elevate the risk of a fiscal crisis and would limit lawmakers' ability to adopt deficit-financed fiscal policies to respond to unforeseen events or for other purposes. Negative economic and financial effects that were less abrupt but still significant—such as higher inflation expectations or an increased burden of financing public and private activity in international markets—would also have a greater chance of occurring. Those effects would worsen the consequences associated with high and rising federal debt.

To put debt on a sustainable path, lawmakers will have to make significant changes to tax and spending policies—increasing revenues more than they would under current law, reducing spending below projected amounts, or adopting some combination of those approaches.

The Economic Outlook

Overview

If current laws governing federal taxes and spending generally remained in place, the economy would expand by 2.3 percent this year and then grow at an average annual rate of 1.8 percent over the next decade, the Congressional Budget Office projects. The current pace of job gains remains solid, the unemployment rate is near its lowest point in five decades, and wage growth has been strong. In CBO's projections, from 2019 to 2023, economic growth gradually slows as the growth of consumer spending subsides; as growth in purchases by federal, state, and local governments ebbs; and as trade policies weigh on economic activity, particularly business investment. From 2024 to 2029, economic growth is largely determined by underlying trends in the growth of the labor force and productivity.

The agency's economic forecast, which underlies its baseline budget projections, includes projections of real (inflation-adjusted) gross domestic product (GDP; also referred to as output or actual output), inflation, interest rates, and other key variables for 2019 through 2029. Considerable uncertainty stemming from recent and prospective policy changes and non-policy-related factors surrounds those projections. (CBO's economic projections were completed in late July and do not reflect subsequently released economic data; see Box 2-1.)

Fiscal and Trade Policies

Federal fiscal and trade policies under current law affect CBO's economic outlook in a variety of ways. CBO's economic projections incorporate the assumptions that new limits on discretionary funding contained in the Bipartisan Budget Act of 2019 (Public Law 116-37) will boost federal discretionary outlays and that many temporary provisions of the 2017 tax act (P.L. 115-97, originally called the Tax Cuts and Jobs Act) will phase out or expire. The increase in federal spending is projected to boost economic growth by providing fiscal stimulus over the next few years. In later years, the agency projects that high and rising levels of federal borrowing would reduce private investment activity. In addition, the expiration of

the temporary provisions of the 2017 tax act—including the expiration of most of the provisions affecting individual income taxes at the end of 2025 and the phaseout of bonus depreciation by the end of 2026—is projected to temporarily slow economic growth.

CBO's economic projections also incorporate the assumption that U.S. tariffs imposed by the Administration and in effect as of July 25, 2019 (the day the agency completed its economic projections), and tariff increases on U.S. exports implemented by other countries will remain in place through 2029. Those tariffs affect CBO's projections of trade flows, prices, and U.S. output over the next decade. On balance, tariffs are projected to lower economic output, primarily by making consumer goods and investment goods (such as structures and equipment) more expensive. Uncertainty about future trade policies also reduces business investment. Those economic effects wane after 2020 as businesses make adjustments to their supply chains to mitigate the costs associated with the tariffs.

Projections for 2019 to 2023

In CBO's projections for the next five years, real GDP initially exceeds its maximum sustainable level and then falls below that level because of slower but still positive economic growth. That sustained economic growth continues to support the demand for labor, driving up employment and wages. After falling in 2019, interest rates are expected to increase in 2020 as wage growth, inflation, and foreign economic growth pick up.

Output. Compared with the 2.5 percent pace of growth in 2018, output growth under current law is expected to slow. Real GDP is projected to grow by 2.3 percent in 2019 and then by 1.8 percent per year, on average, over the 2020–2023 period (see Figure 2-1 on page 32).

The slowdown in growth this year largely results from slower growth of business fixed investment as the positive effects of the 2017 tax act on investment growth wane, lower oil prices than in 2018 reduce drilling activity,

Box 2-1.**Revisions to the National Income and Product Accounts**

In late July, the Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA) released its annual revision of the national income and product accounts (NIPAs), as well as new data about economic growth during the first half of 2019. The revision incorporated new data from various sources, as well as some changes in statistical methodology.

BEA revised its estimates of the annual growth of real gross domestic product (GDP) from 2014 to 2018, although the average annual growth rate over that entire period was unchanged. In addition, BEA increased its estimates of personal income in recent years and decreased its estimates of corporate income. The Congressional Budget Office completed its forecast before BEA released that new information, but an initial review does not suggest a substantial change to CBO's projections of economic growth.

Revisions to Historical Data

The largest change to GDP growth for an individual year (measured on a fourth-quarter-to-fourth-quarter basis) was a downward revision to the rate of growth in 2018 to 2.5 percent from the previously published 3.0 percent. Because BEA increased its estimates of GDP growth in 2014, 2016, and 2017, there was no net reduction in the average annual growth rate for the 2014–2018 period.

BEA's estimates of total national income were little changed, but significant revisions occurred for domestic corporate profits and for wages and salaries, which together make up the bulk of taxable income. In particular, domestic corporate profits were revised downward by \$99 billion for 2017 and by \$205 billion for 2018; wages and salaries were revised upward

by \$67 billion for 2018. In addition, BEA increased its estimate of disposable personal income for 2018 by \$220 billion, in part because of the revision to wages and salaries and also because of an upward revision of \$86 billion to personal interest receipts. As a result of the higher estimates of disposable personal income, the personal saving rate was also revised upward.

Key price indexes in the NIPAs—including for GDP, personal consumption expenditures (PCE), and core PCE (which excludes changes in food and energy prices)—were largely unchanged.

Growth in 2019

BEA also revised its estimate of GDP for the first quarter of 2019 and released its initial estimate of growth for the second quarter. The new data indicate that real GDP grew at an annual rate of 2.6 percent in the first half of 2019—higher than the 2.4 percent CBO incorporated into its economic forecast. That difference reflects more consumer spending and fixed investment, partly offset by lower net exports. An initial review of that new data indicates that CBO's projection of economic growth of 2.3 percent between the fourth quarter of 2018 and the fourth quarter of 2019, although made before the publication of the new data, remains a reasonable prospect.

Consistent with the revisions to income for 2017 and 2018, the new data show an upward revision of \$199 billion to wages and salaries in the first quarter of 2019 and a downward revision of \$252 billion to domestic corporate profits in that quarter. For 2019 as a whole, wages and salaries are now likely to be stronger and corporate profits weaker than in CBO's projection.

slower growth in demand reduces businesses' incentive to expand their capacity, tariffs make new structures and equipment more expensive, and uncertainty about trade policies leads some businesses to delay investments or forgo them entirely.

From 2020 to 2023, in CBO's projections, the growth of output slows further because of slower growth in consumer spending and in the purchases of goods and services by federal, state, and local governments. Increased tariffs on certain imported and exported goods, on balance, are expected to have a small negative effect on output over the next few years. Additionally, businesses'

uncertainty about trade policies is expected to continue to weigh on private investment and, thus, output.

Output Gap. CBO estimates that GDP has exceeded potential GDP since early 2018. (Potential GDP is an estimate of the maximum sustainable output of the economy.) As a result of robust economic growth throughout 2018 and early 2019, the output gap—the difference between actual and potential GDP, expressed as a percentage of potential GDP—peaked earlier this year. When GDP is above its potential (as it is now), it indicates that the demand for goods and services exceeds the economy's maximum sustainable level of production, which leads to heightened demand for labor as well as

upward pressure on inflation and interest rates. Real GDP is expected to grow more slowly than its potential over the next few years, falling below the level of real potential GDP by the end of 2022. That development would reduce the upward pressure on inflation and interest rates.

Labor Market. The labor market carried momentum from 2018 into the first half of 2019 and is expected to continue to grow at a healthy, albeit slower, pace over the next several years. In CBO’s projections, the unemployment rate averages 3.7 percent in 2019 and 2020 and then steadily rises to 4.6 percent by the end of 2023 as output growth slows. Employment rose above its potential, or maximum sustainable, level in 2018 and is expected to remain above its potential level over the entire 2019–2023 period. The labor force participation rate is projected to remain stable through 2020 before falling gradually toward its long-run trend. Wage growth has accelerated and become increasingly broad-based in recent years, with low-wage earners experiencing particularly robust gains in their hourly wages. In CBO’s projections, wage growth picks up further before slowing in 2021.

Inflation and Interest Rates. Inflation, as measured by the growth rate of the price index for personal consumption expenditures (PCE), remained below the Federal Reserve’s 2 percent long-run objective in early 2019. The Federal Reserve reduced its target range for the federal funds rate (the interest rate that financial institutions charge each other for overnight loans of their monetary reserves) in late July—at least in part because of low inflation and increased risks to U.S. economic growth stemming from international trade tensions and slower foreign economic growth.

After 2019, CBO expects a number of factors to temporarily push inflation above the Federal Reserve’s 2 percent long-run objective. CBO expects the Federal Reserve to maintain its current target range for the federal funds rate through most of 2020 and then increase that range at the end of next year, which would put upward pressure on other interest rates.

Projections for 2024 to 2029

CBO’s projections of GDP, unemployment, inflation, and interest rates for 2024 through 2029 are based mainly on the agency’s projections of underlying trends in the factors that determine those variables. Over most of that period, in CBO’s forecast, real GDP tends to

grow at the same rate as potential GDP, which is determined by factors such as the size of the labor force, the average number of labor hours per worker, capital investment, and productivity. In analyzing those factors, CBO takes into account the effects of federal tax and spending policies—as well as trade and other public policies—embodied in current law. In some cases, the agency expects that policies would change the output gap not only by affecting potential output but also by influencing the overall demand for goods and services.

In CBO’s projections, potential output grows more quickly over the next decade than it has since the 2007–2009 recession, mainly because potential labor force productivity grows more quickly than it has since then. Nevertheless, the growth of potential output is projected to be slower than its long-term historical average since 1950 because the working-age population (and hence the potential labor force) and productivity are expected to grow more slowly than they did, on average, in the past. From 2024 to 2029, growth of potential output is about 1.8 percent per year.

The agency expects inflation, as measured by the growth rate of the PCE price index, to average 2.0 percent from 2024 to 2029. Over that period, in CBO’s projections, interest rates gradually rise in response to increases in federal debt as a percentage of GDP, as well as continued improvements in the global economy.

Uncertainty


A range of developments, such as unexpected changes in international conditions, business confidence, or productivity growth, could make economic outcomes differ significantly from CBO’s projections. Prospective changes in U.S. trade policies and possible retaliatory actions by U.S. trading partners add to that uncertainty. If trade disputes were resolved such that trade barriers were lowered or removed, economic growth would be faster than CBO projects. Conversely, if trade barriers increased, economic growth would be slower than CBO projects.

The agency constructs its projections so that they represent the average of a distribution of possible outcomes under current law. For example, CBO projects that real GDP will grow at an average annual rate of 2.0 percent (on a calendar year basis) over the 2019–2023 period. However, CBO also estimates that—if the errors in the agency’s current economic forecast are similar to those in its previous forecasts—there is approximately a

Figure 2-1.


CBO's Economic Forecast in Brief

Percent




In CBO's forecast, the growth of output slows over the next few years as growth in consumer spending subsides; as growth in purchases by federal, state, and local governments ebbs; and as trade policies weigh on economic activity.

Percentage of Potential GDP



As the growth of output slows, the gap between GDP and its potential narrows, easing the upward pressure on wages and prices, and GDP ultimately falls below its potential in 2022.

Percent



Wage growth, which tends to lag movements in output growth, is expected to pick up further in the next few years before slowing.

Sources: Congressional Budget Office; Bureau of Economic Analysis; Bureau of Labor Statistics; Federal Reserve.

Real values are nominal values that have been adjusted to remove the effects of changes in prices. The growth of real GDP is measured from the fourth quarter of one calendar year to the fourth quarter of the next.

Potential GDP is CBO's estimate of the maximum sustainable output of the economy. The output gap is the difference between GDP and potential GDP, expressed as a percentage of potential GDP. A positive value indicates that GDP exceeds potential GDP; a negative value indicates that GDP falls short of potential GDP. Values for the output gap are for the fourth quarter of each year.

Wages are measured using the employment cost index for wages and salaries of workers in private industry. Growth in wages is measured from the fourth quarter of one calendar year to the fourth quarter of the next.


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
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CBO’s Economic Forecast in Brief


Percent



After 2019, CBO expects a number of factors, including strong demand for labor, to temporarily push inflation above the Federal Reserve’s 2 percent long-run objective.



CBO expects the Federal Reserve to keep the target range for the federal funds rate at its current level through most of 2020 and then increase it at the end of that year, putting upward pressure on short-term and long-term interest rates.



In the coming decade, real potential GDP—the sum of the growth of the potential labor force and the growth of potential labor force productivity—is projected to grow faster than it has since the 2007–2009 recession but slower than it has in previous periods.

Consumer price inflation is based on the price index for personal consumption expenditures and is measured from the fourth quarter of one calendar year to the fourth quarter of the next.

The federal funds rate is the interest rate that financial institutions charge each other for overnight loans of their monetary reserves. The data for interest rates are fourth-quarter values.

The potential labor force is an estimate of the size of the labor force that has been adjusted to exclude the effects of business-cycle fluctuations. Potential labor force productivity is the ratio of real potential GDP to the potential labor force. The bars show average annual growth rates over the specified periods, calculated using calendar year data.

Values for real GDP growth and inflation in consumer prices from 1999 to 2018 (the thin line in the top panel on each page) reflect revisions to the national income and product accounts that the Bureau of Economic Analysis released on July 26, 2019. Values from 2018 to 2029 (the thick lines) reflect the data available when the projections were made earlier in July.

GDP = gross domestic product.

two-thirds chance that the average annual growth rate will be between 0.7 percent and 3.3 percent.

Comparison With CBO's Previous Projections and Other Economic Projections

CBO's current economic forecast has some notable differences from the forecast the agency published in January. In particular, CBO has lowered its projections of interest rates in response to new data and recent guidance from the Federal Reserve regarding its outlook for monetary policy. Projected average annual economic growth over the 2020–2023 period was revised upward because of the Bipartisan Budget Act of 2019 (which led CBO to increase its projections of federal discretionary spending over the next decade) and recent economic developments.

CBO's economic projections in this forecast do not differ significantly from those of other forecasters. In particular, they are generally within the range of the forecasts for 2019 and 2020 by the private-sector economists who contributed to the August 2019 *Blue Chip Economic Indicators*, as well as the latest forecasts for 2019 through 2021 contained in the Federal Reserve's *Summary of Economic Projections*.

Fiscal and Trade Policies

CBO's economic projections reflect federal fiscal and trade policies under current law. Federal fiscal policies affect the economy not only through government purchases, which contribute directly to the overall demand for goods and services, but also through the federal tax code and federal transfer programs (such as Social Security and Medicare), which affect both overall demand and the supply of resources. Changes to trade policies—such as increases in tariffs on certain imported and exported goods—can also affect economic activity through changes to domestic prices and through uncertainty about future changes in trade policies, which, in turn, influence trade flows, business investment, and real output and income. (See Box 2-2 for a discussion of the effects of changes in trade policies.)

In addition, fiscal policy and tariffs both have important implications for federal deficits and debt. Changes in deficits and debt affect CBO's long-run projections of potential GDP by altering national saving (the total amount of saving by households, businesses, and governments) and, in turn, the funds that are available for

private investment in productive capital (such as office buildings, factories, and equipment).

Fiscal Policies

The fiscal stimulus created by the 2017 tax act and by the increase in federal discretionary spending now projected as a result of recent legislation is estimated to diminish over the next several years. CBO expects that the positive effects of the tax act on investment growth will moderate over time and that the projected increase in discretionary spending will boost economic growth over the next few years but that the resulting increase in federal deficits will lower growth in later years.

As noted in its April 2018 report, CBO expects the 2017 tax act to have a positive net effect on investment, employment, and output over the next decade.¹ The act lowered marginal income tax rates and increased incentives for business investment, which boosted growth in both consumption and business fixed investment in 2018 and 2019. Those positive effects are projected to diminish as households and firms adjust to the increase in their after-tax income and the incentive effects on investment growth wane. In later years, as temporary provisions of the tax act phase out or expire, growth of actual GDP is projected to temporarily fall below the growth of potential output.

The Bipartisan Budget Act of 2019 led CBO to increase its projections of federal discretionary spending over the next decade by \$1.5 trillion (see Appendix A). That law raised the caps on discretionary appropriations in fiscal years 2020 (which starts in the final quarter of calendar year 2019) and 2021 (which starts in the final quarter of calendar year 2020) by \$171 billion and \$153 billion, respectively. As a result, federal purchases of goods and services are projected to be higher than CBO previously estimated. In CBO's forecast, those additional purchases boost economic activity over the next few years. Under the assumptions that govern CBO's baseline projections, the increased spending persists over the entire projection period. Greater federal borrowing as a result of the larger deficits reduces the resources available for private investment in later years.

1. See Congressional Budget Office, *The Budget and Economic Outlook: 2018 to 2028* (April 2018), www.cbo.gov/publication/53651.

Table 2-1.

U.S. Imports Affected by Tariffs Recently Imposed by the United States

Billions of Dollars

Category of Goods	Value of Imports Affected by Tariffs							Share of Category Affected by Tariffs (Percent)
	Value of Imports in 2017	Tariff on Solar Panels	Tariff on Washing Machines	Tariff on Steel	Tariff on Aluminum	Tariffs on Chinese Goods	All Recent Tariffs	
Food, Feed, and Beverages	138	0	0	0	0	5	5	3.6
Industrial Supplies and Materials	507	0	0	14	9	34	57	11.2
Capital Goods, Except Automotive	641	6	*	2	*	116	125	19.5
Automotive Vehicles, Parts, and Engines	359	1	0	0	0	19	19	5.4
Consumer Goods	602	0	2	0	*	55	57	9.5
Other Goods	95	0	0	0	0	0	*	**
Total	2,342	7	2	16	9	229	263	11.2
Share of Total Imports (Percent)	100.0	0.3	0.1	0.7	0.4	9.8	11.2	n.a.

Source: Congressional Budget Office, using information from the Census Bureau and the Office of the U.S. Trade Representative.

n.a. = not applicable; * = between zero and \$500 million; ** = between zero and 0.05 percent.

Trade Policies

Since January 2018, the United States has imposed tariffs on 11 percent of goods imported into the country, measured as a share of the value of all U.S. imports in 2017.² Some of those tariffs apply to imports from nearly all U.S. trading partners, including tariffs on washing machines, solar panels, and steel and aluminum products (see Table 2-1). A few countries are exempted from certain tariffs. For example, Canadian and Mexican imports were granted exemptions from the tariffs on steel and aluminum products. Other tariffs affect only imports from China, covering about half of U.S. imports from China and targeting mostly intermediate goods (items used for the production of other goods and services) and capital goods (such as computers and other equipment).

In response to the tariffs, U.S. trading partners have retaliated with their own tariffs. As of July 25, 2019, retaliatory tariffs had been imposed on 7 percent of all goods exported by the United States—primarily industrial supplies and materials as well as agricultural products (see Table 2-2 on page 38).

2. The values and shares of affected goods are measured relative to their values and shares in 2017—the year before those tariffs were imposed.

CBO's analysis incorporates the assumption that the tariffs on U.S. imports and exports in effect as of July 25, 2019—the day the agency completed its economic projections—will remain in place through 2029.³

In CBO's projections, those tariffs reduce U.S. economic activity in three ways. First, they make consumer goods and capital goods more expensive, thereby reducing the purchasing power of U.S. consumers and businesses. Second, they increase businesses' uncertainty about future barriers to trade. Such uncertainty leads some U.S. businesses to delay or forgo new investments or make costly adjustments to their supply chains. Third, they prompt retaliatory tariffs by U.S. trading partners, which reduce U.S. exports by making them more expensive for foreign purchasers. All of those effects lower U.S. output. However, U.S. consumers and businesses are expected

3. The agency's economic projections incorporate the assumption that, in cases in which the Administration exercises its broad authority to impose tariffs without legislative action, the tariffs in effect when the analysis was completed would continue permanently without planned or unplanned changes. On August 1, 2019, the President announced that tariffs would be imposed on an additional \$300 billion of Chinese imports beginning on September 1, 2019; on August 13, the U.S. Trade Representative announced that those tariffs would be delayed on certain products. Those scheduled changes to tariffs are not included in CBO's current economic projections.

Box 2-2.

The Economic Effects of Changes in Trade Policies

In early 2018, the United States and its trading partners began imposing higher trade barriers—in particular, increases in tariff rates (see Table 2-1 and Table 2-2). In May 2019, the United States increased the tariff rate from 10 percent to 25 percent on a \$183 billion tranche of Chinese imports that were first targeted in September 2018. In that same month, the United States exempted Canadian and Mexican steel and aluminum products from tariffs affecting those imports. In response to those changes, China raised its tariff rates on roughly \$51 billion of imported U.S. products, whereas Canada and Mexico eliminated retaliatory tariffs they had imposed on U.S. products.¹

On balance, in the Congressional Budget Office's projections, the trade barriers imposed since January 2018 reduce the level of real (inflation-adjusted) U.S. gross domestic product (GDP) by about 0.1 percent and the level of real household income by 0.2 percent by 2029. (CBO's analysis reflects the assumption that the tariffs remain in place through 2029.) Those estimated economic effects are small because the value of imports subject to the tariffs is less than 2 percent of the value of all goods and services purchased by U.S. consumers and businesses. However, CBO's estimates of the economic effects of the trade barriers are subject to considerable uncertainty.

Evidence of the Effects of Changes in Trade Policies Since January 2018

The tariffs implemented since January 2018 have altered the pattern of U.S. trade flows. For example, between the first quarter of 2017 and the first quarter of 2019, the value of all categories of imported Chinese goods targeted by the tariffs has declined by \$46 billion, or about 22 percent. At the same time, the value of U.S. imports of those goods from other trading partners has increased by \$116 billion, or 10 percent. The increased value of imports from other trading partners is

1. The U.S. Department of Commerce also approved tariff exemption requests for a number of U.S. firms, mostly for imports of steel and aluminum products.

partly attributable to the replacement of imports that would have come from China. It also reflects an increase in the prices paid for those products.

Retaliatory tariffs imposed by U.S. trading partners have also affected U.S. export flows. For example, since the imposition of Chinese retaliatory tariffs, U.S. exports of targeted products to China have fallen by \$21 billion, or about 24 percent, and U.S. exports of those same products to other trading partners have risen by \$93 billion, or 9 percent. That increase in exports to unaffected countries partly reflects the diversion of exports that would have gone to China, in addition to other economic factors that have boosted U.S. exports.

Although the tariffs imposed since January 2018 have increased domestic prices paid for targeted goods, their effect on overall prices is less apparent. Since the tariffs have been implemented, the prices of some of the targeted products, such as washing machines and electrical equipment, have risen. However, for other targeted products and for products indirectly affected by the tariffs (such as those made with steel and aluminum), the effects on domestic prices are harder to observe.² That is because the targeted products represent a small share of all investment goods (such as computers and other equipment) and consumer goods. Moreover, in CBO's assessment, tariffs on U.S. imports strengthen the U.S. dollar, which should dampen their effect on the prices of imports.

The tariffs have probably weakened business investment in the United States. Changes in trade policies have increased businesses' uncertainty about future barriers to trade and thus their perceptions of risks associated with investment

2. See Aaron B. Flaaen, Ali Hortaçsu, and Felix Tintelnot, *The Production Relocation and Price Effects of U.S. Trade Policy: The Case of Washing Machines*, Working Paper 25767 (National Bureau of Economic Research, April 2019), www.nber.org/papers/w25767; and Mary Amiti, Stephen J. Redding, and David Weinstein, *The Impact of the 2018 Trade War on U.S. Prices and Welfare*, Working Paper 25672 (National Bureau of Economic Research, March 2019), www.nber.org/papers/w25672.

Continued

Box 2-2.

Continued

The Economic Effects of Changes in Trade Policies

in the United States and abroad.³ Uncertainty about future barriers to trade reduces the incentive for businesses to make long-term adjustments to their supply chains because changes in trade policies might affect the costs of their operations. The increased risk of such changes has probably led some businesses to delay investments or forgo them entirely. In addition, CBO estimates that the tariffs have suppressed investment growth by raising the prices of investment goods.

CBO's Estimates of the Tariffs' Effects on the U.S. Economy

CBO expects the changes in U.S. and foreign trade policies since January 2018 to reduce the level of real U.S. GDP by about 0.3 percent by 2020. Tariffs reduce domestic GDP chiefly by raising domestic prices, which reduces the purchasing power of U.S. consumers and increases the cost of business investment. In CBO's projections, the tariffs also reduce real income for the average U.S. household by 0.4 percent by 2020.

That projected reduction in U.S. output is partly explained by changes to U.S. trade flows. By 2020, in CBO's projections, the changes to tariffs since early 2018 lower real U.S. exports by 1.7 percent and lower real imports by 2.6 percent. The negative effect on output from reduced exports is partly offset by an expected boost in the production of domestic goods to replace a small portion of the forgone imports.

The remainder of the reduction in U.S. output can be explained by declines in real consumption and investment. CBO expects that higher prices for investment and consumer goods and greater business uncertainty will reduce real consumption by 0.3 percent and real private investment by 1.3 percent by 2020. Beyond 2020, CBO expects those effects to wane as businesses adjust their supply chains.

In CBO's projections, real investment continues to be dampened over the decade, which lowers potential (maximum sustainable) output. The reduction in investment is partly offset because the increase in revenues from the tariffs reduces

government deficits, boosting the resources available for private investment. It is also partly offset because CBO expects the production of some goods targeted by tariffs to be relocated from other countries to the United States. On balance, in CBO's projections, tariffs reduce the level of potential output by 0.1 percent in 2029.

Revisions to CBO's Estimates

CBO has increased its estimates of the effects of the changes in trade policies since January 2018 on the U.S. economy. CBO now expects those changes to reduce real U.S. GDP by 0.3 percent by 2020—0.1 percentage point more than the agency expected earlier this year. The revisions to the long-run effects are more modest.

The revision to the projection for 2020 is mostly attributable to a larger projected decrease in real investment. In particular, real investment is now expected to be 1.3 percent lower by 2020 in response to the tariffs, compared with 0.4 percent lower in CBO's January projections. That change in CBO's projection is the net effect of the higher tariff rates on certain Chinese imports as of May 2019, an increase in the expected size of the effects of businesses' uncertainty about future barriers to trade, and the increase in the value of imports that have been exempted from tariffs. The larger projected reduction in investment also reflects recent studies showing that a larger share of the cost of the tariffs than previously estimated is passed along to U.S. importers.

Uncertainty in CBO's Estimates

CBO's estimates of the economic effects of the tariffs implemented since January 2018 are uncertain for many reasons. The estimated short-run effects on trade flows are uncertain because it is difficult to predict how foreign exporters might adjust their prices in response to the tariffs and associated changes in the value of the dollar. Similarly, it is difficult to predict the extent to which domestic importers will pass along the increase in costs to their domestic customers. The magnitude of the long-run effects on investment is also uncertain because it is difficult to project how changes to tariffs and businesses' concerns about further changes to trade policies will affect long-run investment by companies that rely on global supply chains.

3. See David Altig and others, "Tariff Worries and U.S. Business Investment, Take Two," *Macroblog* (Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta, February 25, 2019), <https://tinyurl.com/y36oacs6>; and Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas, "Texas Business Outlook Surveys" (June 24, 2019), <https://tinyurl.com/yxbnn5vs>.

Table 2-2.

U.S. Exports Affected by Tariffs Recently Imposed by Other Countries

Billions of Dollars

Category of Goods	Value of Exports in 2017	Value of Exports Affected by Tariffs			Share of Category Affected by Tariffs (Percent)
		Tariffs Imposed by China	Tariffs Imposed by Rest of World	All Recent Tariffs	
Food, Feed, and Beverages	133	20	1	21	15.9
Industrial Supplies and Materials	465	35	2	37	8.0
Capital Goods, Except Automotive	533	23	*	23	4.3
Automotive Vehicles, Parts, and Engines	158	22	*	22	14.2
Consumer Goods	198	5	2	7	3.5
Other Goods	60	*	0	0	**
Total	1,546	104	6	110	7.1
Share of Total Exports (Percent)	100.0	6.7	0.4	7.1	n.a.

Source: Congressional Budget Office, using information from the Census Bureau and the Office of the U.S. Trade Representative.

n.a. = not applicable; * = between zero and \$500 million; ** = between zero and 0.05 percent.

to replace certain imported goods with goods produced in the United States, which would offset some of that decline. In addition, tariff revenues, by reducing the deficit, increase the resources available for private investment in later years.

On balance, CBO expects trade barriers to reduce U.S. output. The effects of the tariffs on trade flows, prices, and output are projected to rise over the next year. By 2020, in CBO's projections, those tariffs reduce the level of real U.S. GDP by roughly 0.3 percent and reduce average real household income by \$580 (in 2019 dollars). Beyond 2020, CBO expects those effects to wane as businesses adjust their supply chains. By 2029, in CBO's projections, the tariffs lower the level of real U.S. GDP by 0.1 percent.

The Economic Outlook for 2019 to 2023

CBO expects real GDP to grow by 2.3 percent in 2019 and by an average of 1.8 percent per year between 2020 and 2023 (see Table 2-3). Economic growth in CBO's forecast over the next five years is largely driven by consumer spending and, to a lesser extent, by business and residential investment.

In CBO's projections, the gap between actual GDP and potential GDP and the gap between employment and

potential employment narrow over the next few years.⁴ (Both output and employment started to exceed their potential levels in early 2018, in CBO's assessment.) Economic growth slows after this year, but actual GDP remains above potential GDP until the end of 2022, and employment, which tends to lag behind movements in output, remains above its potential level over the entire 2019–2023 period. When GDP and employment are above their potential levels, over time there is upward pressure on inflation, interest rates, and wages.

CBO's projections of the economy over the next five years reflect anticipated fluctuations in the components of final demand (such as consumption and investment), projected changes in supply-side factors (such as growth in productivity and the labor supply), and the interactions between them.⁵ In CBO's forecast, short-run fluctuations in economic activity are determined

4. Potential employment is CBO's estimate of the maximum sustainable level of employment. It is the number of people who would be employed if the unemployment rate equaled its natural rate and if the labor force participation rate—that is, the percentage of people in the civilian noninstitutionalized population who are at least 16 years old and are either working or seeking work—equaled its potential rate.

5. See Robert W. Arnold, *How CBO Produces Its 10-Year Economic Forecast*, Working Paper 2018-02 (Congressional Budget Office, February 2018), www.cbo.gov/publication/53537.

primarily by demand-side developments but are also influenced by supply-side factors. For example, if an increase in demand pushed GDP beyond its maximum sustainable level, then one would expect upward pressure on inflation and interest rates, which would limit the increase in GDP growth. However, if the increase in demand was matched by an equivalent boost to potential output, then GDP would not exceed its maximum sustainable level and there would be no additional upward pressure on inflation or interest rates and, in turn, no additional restraint on economic activity.

Output

CBO expects the growth of real GDP to slow to 2.3 percent in 2019, down from 2.5 percent in 2018, as some of the factors that supported growth in output last year begin to taper off. On the one hand, strong growth in households' real disposable income (reflecting, among other things, rising labor income) is expected to support growth in consumer spending in 2019, and real purchases by federal, state, and local governments are projected to boost real GDP growth. On the other hand, CBO expects slower growth in business fixed investment, which contributed almost one-third of the GDP growth in 2018, as the effects of the 2017 tax act on investment moderate and the growth in demand for goods and services slows.

After 2019, economic growth is expected to slow further, averaging 1.8 percent per year from 2020 through 2023. In CBO's projections, both consumer spending and business fixed investment continue to grow but at rates that are lower, on average, than their respective growth rates since the end of the last recession. Real government purchases are also projected to grow more slowly after 2019.

Consumer Spending. CBO expects modest growth in consumer spending on goods and services to be the primary contributor to the growth of GDP over the remainder of 2019. In the agency's projections, real consumer spending on goods and services grows by 2.3 percent in 2019 (down from 2.6 percent in 2018), contributing 1.6 percentage points to the 2.3 percent growth rate of real GDP this year (see Table 2-4 on page 42). The projected growth in households' real disposable income for the year, at 2.0 percent, is weaker than the growth

reported in 2018, when reductions in personal taxes provided a boost.⁶

In CBO's projections, annual growth in consumer spending slows further to an average of 2.0 percent per year from 2020 through 2023. The effects of the 2017 tax act on that growth in consumption are projected to diminish because households will have already increased their spending in response to the step up in their after-tax income. Over that same period, CBO expects higher inflation (resulting in part from an elevated output gap and the increased tariffs on imported goods) to reduce the growth of real household income. That reduction in the growth of real household income, combined with an expected slowdown in the growth of equity and housing wealth, would restrain the growth of household spending. Increases in interest rates after this year are also expected to moderate the expansion of consumer credit.

Business Investment. In CBO's projections, real growth in business fixed investment slows this year, from 5.9 percent in 2018 to 2.2 percent in 2019. Several factors supported strong investment during 2018: increased incentives for investment under the 2017 tax act; accelerated growth of output, stemming in part from the tax act and from legislated increases in federal outlays; greater incentives for oil exploration and development created by higher oil prices; rising stock prices for much of the year, which reduced the cost of capital; and the easing of regulations coupled with a slowdown in new regulatory activity, which boosted businesses' confidence in making investments.

CBO expects many of those factors to diminish or reverse in 2019. Although provisions in the 2017 tax act have continued to increase incentives for investment, that effect is expected to be smaller in 2019 than it was in 2018; as a result, CBO projects growth in investment to drop by more than a percentage point in

6. The revisions to the national income and product accounts published in late July (see Box 2-1 on page 30) showed that growth in real disposable income, including wages and salaries, has been significantly stronger than previously estimated, particularly since 2017. That new evidence, which also includes higher estimates of the personal saving rate, indicates that household finances are healthier than previously thought. Therefore, the risk of weaker consumer spending in the near term is probably smaller than CBO expected when making its projections.

Table 2-3.

CBO's Economic Projections for Calendar Years 2019 to 2029

	Actual, 2018	2019	2020	2021	Annual Average	
					2022– 2023	2024– 2029
Percentage Change From Fourth Quarter to Fourth Quarter						
Gross Domestic Product						
Real ^a	2.5	2.3	2.1	1.8	1.7	1.8
Nominal	4.9	3.9	4.0	3.8	3.7	3.9
Inflation						
PCE price index	1.9	1.8	2.1	2.0	2.1	2.0
Core PCE price index ^b	1.9	1.9	2.2	2.1	2.0	2.0
Consumer price index ^c	2.2	2.2	2.4	2.4	2.5	2.3
Core consumer price index ^b	2.2	2.3	2.6	2.6	2.4	2.3
GDP price index	2.3	1.7	1.9	2.0	2.0	2.0
Employment Cost Index ^d	3.1	3.3	3.6	3.5	3.4	3.2
Fourth-Quarter Level (Percent)						
Unemployment Rate	3.8	3.7	3.7	4.0	4.6 ^e	4.6 ^f
Percentage Change From Year to Year						
Gross Domestic Product						
Real ^a	2.9	2.6	2.1	1.8	1.7	1.8
Nominal	5.4	4.2	4.1	3.8	3.7	3.8
Inflation						
PCE price index	2.1	1.6	2.1	2.1	2.1	2.0
Core PCE price index ^b	1.9	1.7	2.2	2.1	2.0	2.0
Consumer price index ^c	2.4	1.9	2.4	2.5	2.5	2.3
Core consumer price index ^b	2.1	2.2	2.6	2.6	2.4	2.3
GDP price index	2.4	1.7	1.9	2.0	2.0	2.0
Employment Cost Index ^d	3.0	3.2	3.5	3.5	3.4	3.2

Continued

2019 compared with 2018. More moderate GDP growth and a decrease in oil prices, which rose in 2018, both slow the projected growth of business fixed investment in 2019. Higher costs of imported capital goods due to tariffs and businesses' uncertainty about trade policies are also projected to restrain investment this year.

From 2020 through 2023, in CBO's projections, slower GDP growth causes the growth of real business fixed investment to slow further to an average of 2.1 percent per year. In addition, the tax code's treatment of equipment and of research and development becomes less favorable in 2022 and 2023. However, CBO expects tariff rates and businesses' uncertainty about future trade policies to stop increasing by 2020, which would limit one factor restraining the growth of investment in 2019. To the extent that a halt to increases in tariffs reduced businesses' uncertainty about future trade policies,

investment growth would no longer be dampened by that factor in later years. In addition, CBO does not expect continued reductions in oil prices after 2021.

Residential Investment. In CBO's projections, real residential investment, which declined in 2018 and is expected to grow moderately in 2019, grows faster than overall GDP in 2020 and 2021. Specifically, real residential investment grows by 1.4 percent in 2019 (after declining by 4.4 percent in 2018) and by an average of 4.7 percent per year in 2020 and 2021 before slowing in 2022 and later years. In CBO's assessment, the decline in residential investment in 2018 resulted in part from provisions in the 2017 tax act that reduced incentives to own homes and from higher mortgage interest rates. The anticipated pickup in growth from 2019 through 2021, by contrast, mainly reflects continued strength

Table 2-3.

Continued

CBO's Economic Projections for Calendar Years 2019 to 2029

	Actual, 2018	2019	2020	2021	Annual Average	
					2022– 2023	2024– 2029
			Calendar Year Average			
Unemployment Rate (Percent)	3.9	3.7	3.7	3.9	4.4	4.7
Payroll Employment (Monthly change, in thousands) ⁹	221	148	100	50	21	46
Interest Rates (Percent)						
Three-month Treasury bills	1.9	2.2	2.1	2.3	2.3	2.5
Ten-year Treasury notes	2.9	2.3	2.2	2.5	2.9	3.1
Tax Bases (Percentage of GDP)						
Wages and salaries	43.0	42.8	43.1	43.4	43.6	43.8
Domestic corporate profits ^h	8.7	8.4	8.5	8.5	8.3	8.1

Sources: Congressional Budget Office; Bureau of Economic Analysis; Bureau of Labor Statistics; Federal Reserve.

GDP = gross domestic product; PCE = personal consumption expenditures.

- a. Real values are nominal values that have been adjusted to remove the effects of changes in prices.
- b. Excludes prices for food and energy.
- c. The consumer price index for all urban consumers.
- d. The employment cost index for wages and salaries of workers in private industry.
- e. Value for the fourth quarter of 2023.
- f. Value for the fourth quarter of 2029.
- g. The average monthly change in the number of employees on nonfarm payrolls, calculated by dividing by 12 the change in payroll employment from the fourth quarter of one calendar year to the fourth quarter of the next.
- h. Adjusted to remove distortions in depreciation allowances caused by tax rules and to exclude the effects of changes in prices on the value of inventories.

in household formation, lower mortgage interest rates than in 2018, and further easing of mortgage lending standards.

Government Purchases. If current laws governing federal taxes and spending generally remained in place, real purchases of goods and services by federal, state, and local governments would increase by 2.8 percent in 2019—up from 1.5 percent in 2018—and then by 0.7 percent per year, on average, from 2020 through 2023, CBO estimates.

Those estimates reflect an increase in federal purchases in fiscal years 2020 (which starts in the final quarter of calendar year 2019) and 2021 (which starts in the final quarter of calendar year 2020). Specifically, in CBO's projections, real purchases by the federal government grow by 3.5 percent in 2019 and by 1.8 percent in 2020.

CBO's baseline projections for federal purchases beyond fiscal year 2021 incorporate the assumption that discretionary funding will grow at the rate of inflation.⁷

Real purchases by state and local governments are projected to increase by 2.4 percent this year, led by a surge in infrastructure investment. From 2020 through 2023, they are expected to grow by an average of 0.7 percent per year as state and local investment moderates.

Net Exports. Real net exports, which have declined since 2014, are projected to continue falling in 2019 as the growth of both real imports and real exports slows.

7. CBO's projections are made in accordance with provisions set forth in the Balanced Budget and Emergency Deficit Control Act of 1985 (P.L. 99-177) and the Congressional Budget and Impoundment Control Act of 1974 (P.L. 93-344). See Chapter 1 for a discussion of the agency's discretionary funding projections.

Table 2-4.

Projected Growth of Real GDP and Its Components

	Actual, 2018	2019	2020	2021	Annual Average	
					2022– 2023	2024– 2029
Projected Growth of Real GDP and Its Components (Percent)						
Real GDP	2.5	2.3	2.1	1.8	1.7	1.8
Components of Real GDP						
Consumer spending ^a	2.6	2.3	1.9	1.9	2.0	2.0
Business investment ^b	9.8	0.5	3.1	1.9	1.5	2.7
Business fixed investment ^c	5.9	2.2	3.2	2.1	1.5	2.7
Residential investment ^d	-4.4	1.4	5.5	4.0	1.7	0.5
Purchases by federal, state, and local governments ^e	1.5	2.8	1.1	0.5	0.6	0.6
Federal	2.7	3.5	1.8	0.1	0.4	0.5
State and local	0.9	2.4	0.7	0.7	0.7	0.6
Exports	0.4	2.1	3.2	2.9	2.8	2.6
Imports	3.2	1.1	3.2	2.4	2.7	2.7
Contributions to Growth of Real GDP (Percentage points)						
Components of Real GDP						
Consumer spending ^a	1.8	1.6	1.3	1.3	1.4	1.4
Business investment ^b	1.1	0.1	0.4	0.3	0.2	0.4
Business fixed investment ^c	0.8	0.3	0.4	0.3	0.2	0.4
Residential investment ^d	-0.2	0.1	0.2	0.2	0.1	*
Purchases by federal, state, and local governments ^e	0.3	0.5	0.2	0.1	0.1	0.1
Federal	0.2	0.2	0.1	*	*	*
State and local	0.1	0.3	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1
Exports	*	0.3	0.4	0.4	0.3	0.3
Imports	-0.5	-0.2	-0.5	-0.4	-0.4	-0.4

Source: Congressional Budget Office.

Real values are nominal values that have been adjusted to remove the effects of changes in prices.

Data are annual. Changes are measured from the fourth quarter of one calendar year to the fourth quarter of the next.

GDP = gross domestic product; * = between zero and 0.05 percentage points.

a. Personal consumption expenditures.

b. Business fixed investment and investment in inventories.

c. Purchases of equipment, nonresidential structures, and intellectual property products.

d. The construction of single-family and multifamily structures, manufactured homes, and dormitories; spending on home improvements; and brokers' commissions and other ownership-transfer costs.

e. Based on data from the national income and product accounts.

In CBO's projections, growth of real imports slows in 2019 for two reasons. The first reason is slower growth of domestic consumption and investment, which reduces the demand for imported consumption goods and investment goods. Because that decline in the growth of imports is a direct result of slower growth in domestic purchases, U.S. output growth is unaffected. (In other

circumstances, a slowdown in the growth of imports might contribute to stronger GDP growth.)

The second reason import growth is projected to slow in 2019 is tariffs imposed since January 2018 (see Box 2-2 on page 36). In CBO's assessment, those tariffs raised the prices that consumers and businesses pay for imported goods. CBO expects those higher prices to lead to some

reduction in domestic purchases but also to encourage U.S. consumers and businesses to replace the imports subject to the tariffs with domestically sourced goods, boosting domestic output, all else being equal. That substitution explains a small portion of the projected weakness in import growth.

After 2019, growth of real imports is expected to rebound, albeit only slightly, as businesses begin making adjustments to their global supply chains in response to tariffs, increasing imports from unaffected countries. For example, CBO expects some manufacturing to shift from China to other trading partners.

The growth of real exports in 2019 is also expected to be weak relative to historical rates, reflecting slow growth in the economies of major U.S. trading partners, which reduces the demand for U.S. exports, and the strength of the U.S. dollar, which makes U.S. exports less competitive in foreign markets.⁸ Moreover, tariffs imposed by some of the United States' trading partners in 2018 are expected to reduce the growth of real exports in the near term by making certain U.S. goods more costly for foreign purchasers. After 2019, the growth of real exports is expected to rebound slightly as the dollar falls, making U.S. exports more competitive.

CBO's projection of real export growth is based partly on the expected pace of economic activity among the United States' leading trading partners. CBO expects growth in those economies to be lower in 2019 than it was in 2017 and 2018. In 2020 and beyond, growth in the economies of the United States' leading trading partners is expected to rebound but remain slow relative to the (trade-weighted) average rates of growth in those economies over the past 20 years. That slow rate of growth abroad is expected to reduce demand for U.S. goods and services and to contribute to slow growth in real U.S. exports relative to average real U.S. export growth over the past 20 years.

Also contributing to CBO's projection of real export growth, the exchange value of the dollar rose substantially during 2018 and is expected to remain relatively high in 2019 and fall only gradually over the following years. The strength of the dollar in 2018 and 2019 can

be attributed to a relatively strong U.S. economy, to tighter monetary policy in the United States than in its major trading partners, and to an increase in the demand for dollars resulting from increases in tariff rates. As U.S. economic growth ebbs after 2019, demand for dollar-denominated assets and the value of the dollar are projected to fall slightly.

Potential Output and the Output Gap

In the agency's projections, potential output—a measure of the economy's fundamental capacity to supply goods and services—grows by an average of 2.1 percent per year from 2019 through 2023 (see Figure 2-2). That projected growth is still faster than the average rate of growth since the end of 2007, mostly because of a projected acceleration in the growth of total factor productivity in the nonfarm business sector.⁹ However, it is slower than the average rate of growth of potential output since 1950, largely because of the aging of the population.

CBO's estimates imply that the output gap reached a cyclical peak of 0.8 percent of potential GDP earlier this year. Starting in 2020, in CBO's projections, the output gap declines steadily, turning negative in 2022 and reaching its long-run average of -0.5 percent of potential GDP after 2023.

The Labor Market

Strong demand for goods and services over the past several years boosted the demand for labor and caused labor market conditions to strengthen steadily. As of mid-2019, many indicators point to a healthy labor market:


- Growth in employment has maintained a healthy pace. In CBO's estimation, employment reached its potential level by early 2018 and has since risen above it (see Figure 2-3).
- The labor force participation rate among prime-age workers (those between the ages of 25 and 54) has rebounded since 2015, adding about 1.5 million workers to the labor force and offsetting downward pressure on labor force participation from the retirement of baby boomers (those born between 1945 and 1960).

8. CBO's measure of the exchange value of the dollar is an export-weighted average of the exchange rates between the dollar and the currencies of leading U.S. trading partners.

9. The growth of total factor productivity is the growth of real output that is not explained by the growth of inputs of labor and capital services—the services provided by capital goods that constitute the actual input in the production process.

Figure 2-2.

The Growth of GDP and Potential GDP



Sources: Congressional Budget Office; Bureau of Economic Analysis.

Real values are nominal values that have been adjusted to remove the effects of changes in prices. Potential GDP is CBO's estimate of the maximum sustainable output of the economy. The growth of real GDP and of real potential GDP is measured from the fourth quarter of one calendar year to the fourth quarter of the next.

Values for real GDP growth from 1999 to 2018 (the thin line) reflect revisions to the national income and product accounts that the Bureau of Economic Analysis released on July 26, 2019. Values from 2018 to 2029 (the thick line) reflect the data available when the projections were made earlier in July.

GDP = gross domestic product.

- The number of initial claims for unemployment insurance benefits is at its lowest level since the 1970s. The U-6 unemployment rate—which includes not only unemployed workers but also marginally attached workers (those who are not looking for work now but have looked for it in the past 12 months) and workers employed part time for economic reasons—is the lowest it has been since late 2000.¹⁰
- Wage growth has picked up meaningfully over the past few years, and the gains have been increasingly broad-based, with low-wage earners seeing particularly robust growth in their hourly wages.

10. The U-6 measure, which is reported by the Bureau of Labor Statistics, is the number of unemployed workers, marginally attached workers, and workers employed part time for economic reasons as a percentage of the labor force plus all marginally attached workers. By contrast, the unemployment rate that is generally reported in the news—the U-3 unemployment rate—is the number of unemployed workers as a percentage of the labor force.

Some aspects of the labor market still show signs of slack, supporting an outlook of further job gains. For example, the share of the long-term unemployed (workers who have been out of work for 27 weeks or longer) among all unemployed workers remains elevated relative to its prerecession level.


In CBO's projections, the demand for goods and services continues to boost the demand for labor and employment continues to grow, although the pace of that growth slows down, particularly after 2020. As the labor market remains relatively tight (as indicated by employment being above its potential), employers are expected to bid up the price of labor to recruit and retain workers, putting further upward pressure on wages and salaries and other forms of labor compensation in the coming years.

From 2020 to 2023, in CBO's projections, employment remains above its potential level, unemployment remains below its natural rate, and labor force participation

Figure 2-3.


The Labor Market

Millions of People




The employment gap is expected to narrow after 2020 as the growth of output slows. By the end of 2024, employment is projected to fall below its maximum sustainable amount.

Percent




The unemployment rate is expected to rise steadily, reaching and surpassing its natural rate of 4.5 percent in 2023 before settling into its long-term trend in later years.

Percent



The labor force participation rate is expected to respond more slowly to the projected slowdown in output growth, remaining above its potential for the next five years.

Percent



Wage growth is expected to peak in 2020 before slowing thereafter.

Sources: Congressional Budget Office; Bureau of Labor Statistics.

The employment gap is the difference between the number of employed people and the number who would be employed in the absence of fluctuations in the overall demand for goods and services.

The unemployment rate is the number of jobless people who are available for and seeking work, expressed as a percentage of the labor force. The natural unemployment rate is CBO's estimate of the rate of unemployment arising from all sources except fluctuations in the overall demand for goods and services.

The labor force participation rate is the percentage of people in the civilian noninstitutionalized population who are at least 16 years old and either working or seeking work. The potential labor force participation rate is the rate that has been adjusted to exclude the effects of business-cycle fluctuations.

For the labor force participation and unemployment rates, data are fourth-quarter values.

Wages are measured using the employment cost index for wages and salaries of workers in private industry. Growth in wages is measured from the fourth quarter of one calendar year to the fourth quarter of the next.

remains above its potential rate. (The natural rate of unemployment is the rate arising from all sources other than fluctuations in the overall demand for goods and services, including normal job turnover and the structural mismatch between the skills that jobs require and those that job seekers possess.) Over that period, employment growth slows as labor compensation rises and the growth of output moderates.

Employment. Job growth in the first half of 2019 was slower than in 2018 but still relatively strong. Specifically, nonfarm payroll employment grew by an average of 165,000 jobs per month in the first half of 2019, an increase that was below the average of 223,000 jobs gained per month in 2018 but well above the growth of potential nonfarm payroll employment, in CBO's estimation. In CBO's projections, nonfarm payroll employment continues to grow by an average of 116,000 jobs per month in the second half of 2019 and by 100,000 jobs per month in 2020.¹¹ After 2020, job growth is expected to slow sharply, averaging just 31,000 jobs per month between 2021 and 2023, as labor compensation rises further and output growth slows.

CBO expects employment to remain above its long-run potential level over the entire 2019–2023 period. In CBO's projections, the number of people employed exceeds its potential level by an average of 1.4 million in 2019 and 1.7 million in 2020. After 2020, the gap between employment and its long-run potential starts to narrow as higher wages and slower output growth dampen the demand for labor, causing employment to grow more slowly than its potential.

Unemployment. After a temporary uptick in the first quarter of 2019—owing largely to the five-week partial shutdown of the federal government that ended on January 25 and to slightly above-trend labor force participation—the unemployment rate resumed its downward trend in the second quarter of this year. As of July 2019, it stands at 3.7 percent, near its lowest point since the 1960s and about a percentage point below the agency's estimate of the natural rate of unemployment.

One reason for the relatively low unemployment rate is a decline in the natural rate of unemployment. In

CBO's estimation, the natural rate of unemployment has fallen from more than 6.0 percent in the early 1980s to 4.6 percent now. That decline has occurred because the workforce has shifted toward older workers, who tend to have lower unemployment rates, and away from less-educated workers, who tend to have higher unemployment rates. Because the natural rate of unemployment has fallen, the cyclical strength of the current labor market—and the amount of inflationary pressure it implies—is less pronounced than the historically low unemployment rate would otherwise suggest.

In CBO's projections, the unemployment rate remains low—around 3.7 percent—for the rest of this year and next year. After 2020, as economic growth slows further, the unemployment rate is expected to rise steadily, reaching and surpassing its natural rate of 4.5 percent in 2023 before settling into its long-term trend (roughly a quarter of a percentage point higher than the natural rate) in later years.

Labor Force Participation. The labor force participation rate, which has hovered around 62.8 percent since 2014, remains close to that rate through the next year or so, in CBO's projections. That continued stability reflects the balancing of two opposing forces: sustained economic growth, which encourages additional workers to enter and existing workers to stay in the labor force, and long-run shifts in demographics (particularly the aging of the population), which have led to a downward trend in the potential labor force participation rate. (In CBO's estimation, the potential labor force participation rate fell from 64.0 percent in 2014 to 63.0 percent in 2018.) Because the actual rate of labor force participation has been stable while the potential rate has continued to fall, the gap between the two rates has narrowed steadily in recent years. In CBO's projections, that gap closes this year and then turns positive in subsequent years because of continued strength in overall demand.

Starting in 2021, as the pace of economic growth drops below the growth of potential output, downward pressure from demographic shifts is expected to dominate, pushing down the labor force participation rate. In CBO's projections, the labor force participation rate falls from 62.9 percent in 2020 to 62.3 percent by 2023, in line with its potential rate, which falls from 62.7 percent to 62.1 percent during that period. Driven by the decline of labor force participation, the share of employed workers in the civilian noninstitutionalized population

11. Part of the strength in nonfarm payroll growth in 2020 is associated with the temporary increase in federal employees needed to conduct the 2020 Census.

also falls, from 60.6 percent in 2019 and 60.5 percent in 2020 to 59.4 percent by the end of 2023.

Labor Compensation. Wage growth has accelerated in the past year or so. As the labor market remains relatively strong, employers are expected to bid up the price of labor to recruit and retain workers, putting further upward pressure on wages and salaries and other forms of labor compensation in the coming years.

In CBO's projections, the annual increase in the employment cost index for wages and salaries of workers in private industry is 3.3 percent in 2019, 3.6 percent in 2020, and 3.5 percent from 2021 to 2023—slightly greater than its 3.1 percent pace in 2018 and considerably greater than the 2.0 percent average from 2009 to 2017. Other measures of labor compensation, such as the average hourly earnings of production and nonsupervisory workers in private industry, are also expected to grow more rapidly than in recent years. The faster pace of wage growth is expected to restrain the demand for labor, slowing the pace of wage growth in later years.

In addition to accelerated growth in overall measures of wages, data from surveys show that recent gains in hourly wages have become increasingly broad-based. For low-wage earners in particular, wage growth has been especially strong since late 2016. That development is consistent with historical experience, which indicates that further strengthening of an already strong labor market tends to confer extra benefits—in terms of higher wages and more opportunities for employment—to people in lower income groups.¹² (Another factor that may have contributed to wage growth among low-wage earners is recent increases in minimum wages at the state and local level.) Strong and more broad-based wage growth supports a healthy outlook for consumption and output growth.

Inflation and Interest Rates

The growth rate of the price index for personal consumption expenditures—the measure that the Federal Reserve uses to define its 2 percent long-run objective for inflation—slipped below that objective in late 2018 and

early 2019. The traditional measure of core PCE price inflation, which excludes food and energy prices because they tend to be volatile, also fell below 2 percent.

Many analysts have been surprised that core inflation has remained below the Federal Reserve's long-run objective despite a strong labor market. The strength in the labor market has raised wage growth, but that higher wage growth has not led to higher inflation. However, evidence suggests that the recent decline in the traditional measure of core inflation is probably the result of temporary factors. Alternative measures of core inflation that are designed to eliminate the effects of short-lived factors (other than food and energy prices) remain close to 2 percent.¹³ CBO expects the effects of those factors to wear off over the remainder of the year.

In response, at least in part, to muted inflationary pressures and to increased risks to U.S. economic growth stemming from international trade tensions and slower foreign economic growth, the Federal Reserve reduced the target range for the federal funds rate in late July. CBO expects the Federal Reserve to raise the target range late next year as inflationary pressures and foreign growth pick up.

Over the next few years, a number of factors are expected to continue putting upward pressure on prices and wages. Those factors include the recent reduction in the federal funds rate, continued tight labor market conditions, and—particularly in 2019 and 2020—tariffs. On balance, in CBO's estimation, tariffs increase the core PCE price index by 0.3 percent from the beginning of 2018 to the end of 2020. That effect on prices is expected to be somewhat drawn out as businesses respond to recently imposed tariffs only gradually, in part because of uncertainty about future changes in trade policies.

In CBO's projections, growth in the core PCE price index rises from 1.9 percent in 2019 to 2.2 percent in 2020 (see Figure 2-4). The core consumer price index for urban households (CPI-U), which tends to grow faster than the PCE price index, rises by 2.3 percent in 2019 and 2.6 percent in 2020. The agency expects the


12. For example, see Arthur Okun, "Upward Mobility in a High-Pressure Economy," *Brookings Papers on Economic Activity* (Spring 1973), <https://tinyurl.com/y4h7fvtz>. For a more recent study, see Stephanie Aaronson and others, "Okun Revisited: Who Benefits Most From a Strong Economy?" *Brookings Papers on Economic Activity* (Spring 2019), <https://tinyurl.com/ydy6zjn9>.

13. For an assessment of the relative strengths of such measures, see Jim Dolmas and Evan F. Koenig, *Two Measures of Core Inflation: A Comparison*, Working Paper 1903 (Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas, February 2019), www.dallasfed.org/research/papers/2019/wp1903.


Figure 2-4.

Inflation and Interest Rates

Percent



In CBO's projections, a number of factors, including strong labor market conditions, cause growth in the core PCE price index to rise from 1.9 percent in 2019 to 2.2 percent in 2020.



CBO expects both short-term and long-term interest rates to remain near their current levels through most of 2020 and then to rise gradually as inflation stabilizes at 2 percent—the Federal Reserve's long-run objective.

Sources: Congressional Budget Office; Bureau of Economic Analysis; Federal Reserve.

The overall inflation rate is based on the price index for personal consumption expenditures; the core rate excludes prices for food and energy.

Values for inflation from 1999 to 2018 (the thin lines in the top panel) reflect revisions to the national income and product accounts that the Bureau of Economic Analysis released on July 26, 2019. Values from 2018 to 2029 (the thick lines) reflect the data available when the projections were made earlier in July.

Inflation is measured from the fourth quarter of one calendar year to the fourth quarter of the next.

For interest rates, data are fourth-quarter values.

Federal Reserve to increase its target range for the federal funds rate late in 2020 partly in response to a pickup in inflation during that year, thereby putting downward pressure on inflation in later years; for that reason, in CBO's projections, core PCE inflation stabilizes at about 2.0 percent after 2020. CBO expects the average federal

funds rate to rise from 2.2 percent in 2020 to 2.5 percent by the end of 2023.

The interest rate on 3-month Treasury bills is expected to fall slightly in the second half of 2019, partly in response to the reduction of the federal funds rate and partly in

response to a deceleration in economic growth. In CBO's projections, the interest rate on 3-month Treasury bills falls from 2.3 percent in the first half of 2019 to 2.1 percent by the end of the year. CBO expects short-term interest rates to remain at their current levels through most of 2020 and then to rise again as foreign economic growth improves and the Federal Reserve raises rates at the end of next year. The interest rate on 3-month Treasury bills is projected to rise to 2.4 percent by the end of 2023.

CBO expects long-term interest rates to remain near their current levels through early 2020 and then to rise for several reasons. First, long-term interest rates reflect investors' expectations about short-term interest rates. Second, CBO expects the term premium (the premium paid to bondholders for the extra risk associated with holding longer-term bonds) to increase over the next few years as a number of factors that have recently pushed it to historically low levels dissipate. Two such factors are investors' heightened concerns about relatively weak global economic growth and the increased demand for long-term bonds as a hedge against unexpectedly low inflation.

In CBO's projections, as foreign economic growth improves and the rate of inflation reaches the Federal Reserve's 2 percent long-run objective, investors' demand for long-term bonds weakens slightly, putting upward pressure on long-term interest rates. CBO also expects faster foreign growth to put upward pressure on the interest rates on foreign governments' debt. (Many of those interest rates were negative during the first half of 2019.) That would lessen the demand for, and therefore push up the interest rates on, U.S. Treasury securities. The interest rate on 10-year Treasury notes is projected to rise to 3.0 percent by the end of 2023.

The Economic Outlook for 2024 to 2029

CBO's projections of the economy for 2024 through 2029 are based mainly on its projections of underlying trends in key variables, such as the size of the labor force, the average number of labor hours per worker, capital investment, and productivity.¹⁴ In addition, CBO considers how the federal tax and spending policies—as well

as trade and other public policies—embodied in current law would affect those variables.

In some cases, policies might be projected not only to affect potential output but also to influence overall demand for goods and services, causing the gap between actual output and potential output to change. For example, the expiration of temporary provisions in current law—including the expiration of most of the provisions affecting individual income taxes at the end of 2025 and the phaseout of bonus depreciation by the end of 2026—is projected to slow real GDP growth and to lower real GDP in relation to its potential in those years.

Potential Output and Actual Output

In CBO's projections, potential output grows at an average rate of 1.8 percent per year over the 2024–2029 period, driven by average annual growth of about 0.4 percent in the potential labor force and about 1.4 percent in potential labor force productivity (see Table 2-5). That annual 1.8 percent growth of potential output is nearly one-quarter of a percentage point slower than the expected growth of more than 2.0 percent per year from 2019 to 2023. About two-fifths of that slowdown results from slower growth of the potential labor force; the remaining three-fifths results from slower growth in potential labor force productivity.

The slowdown in growth is expected to be slightly more pronounced in the nonfarm business sector, which produces roughly three-quarters of domestic output, than in other sectors of the economy. Annual growth of potential output in that sector is projected to slow by about a quarter of a percentage point, from more than 2.3 percent over the 2019–2023 period to about 2.1 percent over the 2024–2029 period. The contribution to potential output growth from potential hours worked falls from nearly 0.4 percentage points per year, on average, in the first half of the projection period to 0.2 percentage points in the second half. The contribution from capital services drops from an average of more than 0.9 percentage points per year to about 0.7 percentage points. (By itself, that reduction would lead to slower growth in labor force productivity.)

The slower growth of potential hours worked and capital services reflects underlying long-run trends—such as the aging of the population and other demographic shifts—as well as the expiration of temporary tax provisions under current law. (Changes in trade policies are

14. See Robert Shackleton, *Estimating and Projecting Potential Output Using CBO's Forecasting Growth Model*, Working Paper 2018-03 (Congressional Budget Office, February 2018), www.cbo.gov/publication/53558.

Table 2-5.

Key Inputs in CBO's Projections of Real Potential GDP

Percent

	Average Annual Growth							Projected Average Annual Growth		
	1950– 1973	1974– 1981	1982– 1990	1991– 2001	2002– 2007	2008– 2018	Total, 1950– 2018	2019– 2023	2024– 2029	Total, 2019– 2029
Overall Economy										
Real Potential GDP	4.0	3.2	3.4	3.2	2.5	1.6	3.2	2.1	1.8	1.9
Potential Labor Force	1.6	2.5	1.6	1.2	1.0	0.6	1.4	0.5	0.4	0.4
Potential Labor Force Productivity ^a	2.4	0.6	1.7	2.0	1.5	1.0	1.7	1.6	1.4	1.5
Nonfarm Business Sector										
Real Potential Output	4.1	3.5	3.6	3.6	2.8	1.8	3.4	2.4	2.1	2.2
Potential Hours Worked	1.4	2.3	1.8	1.2	0.4	0.5	1.3	0.6	0.3	0.4
Capital Services ^b	3.7	3.8	3.5	3.8	2.9	2.3	3.4	2.7	2.2	2.4
Potential Total Factor Productivity ^c	1.9	1.0	1.3	1.5	1.6	0.7	1.4	1.0	1.1	1.1
Contributions to the Growth of Real Potential Output (Percentage points)										
Potential hours worked	1.0	1.6	1.2	0.8	0.2	0.3	0.9	0.4	0.2	0.3
Capital input	1.2	0.9	1.1	1.3	0.9	0.8	1.1	1.0	0.7	0.8
Potential total factor productivity	1.9	1.0	1.3	1.5	1.6	0.7	1.4	1.0	1.1	1.1
Total Contributions	4.0	3.5	3.6	3.6	2.8	1.8	3.4	2.4	2.1	2.2
Potential Labor Productivity ^d	2.7	1.2	1.8	2.3	2.4	1.3	2.1	1.8	1.8	1.8

Source: Congressional Budget Office.

Real values are nominal values that have been adjusted to remove the effects of changes in prices. Potential GDP is CBO's estimate of the maximum sustainable output of the economy.

The table shows average annual growth rates over the specified periods, calculated using calendar year data.

GDP = gross domestic product.

- a. The ratio of potential GDP to the potential labor force.
- b. The services provided by capital goods (such as computers and other equipment) that constitute the actual input in the production process.
- c. The average real output per unit of combined labor and capital services, excluding the effects of business cycles.
- d. The ratio of potential output to potential hours worked in the nonfarm business sector.

expected to have a small negative effect on potential output in the long run, although considerable uncertainty surrounds that assessment. See Box 2-2 on page 36 for more details.)

Unlike the growth of potential hours worked and capital services, the annual growth of potential total factor productivity (the average real output per unit of combined labor and capital services, excluding the effects of business cycles) in the nonfarm business sector accelerates in CBO's forecast, from slightly more than 1.0 percent in the first half of the projection period to over 1.1 percent in the second half. That acceleration somewhat offsets

the slowdown in the growth of other inputs to production. The increase in potential total factor productivity growth also plays a key role in making potential output grow faster than its estimated average rate of nearly 1.6 percent per year since 2007, when the last recession began.

Typically, in CBO's forecasts, the growth of actual output and the growth of potential output converge in the second half of the 11-year projection period, and the level of actual output stays about 0.5 percent below that of potential output, which is consistent with the

long-term relationship between the two measures.¹⁵ However, that convergence is interrupted in the current forecast because the expiration of temporary provisions of the 2017 tax act not only diminishes the growth of potential output by reducing the supply of labor but also temporarily slows the growth of overall demand.

As a consequence, actual output temporarily falls relative to potential output. It then rises until the relationship between actual and potential output reaches its long-run average in the final years of the projection period. Correspondingly, the average growth of actual output during the 2024–2029 period is close to, but slightly slower than, that of potential output.

The Labor Market

CBO expects the natural rate of unemployment to decline slowly over the next decade, from 4.6 percent in 2019 to 4.4 percent by 2029. That slow decline reflects the continuing shift in the composition of the workforce toward older workers, who tend to have lower rates of unemployment (when they participate in the labor force), and away from less-educated workers, who tend to have higher ones.

In CBO's projections, the unemployment rate reaches 4.7 percent in 2024, and the difference between the unemployment rate and the natural rate reaches its long-term average of about 0.25 percentage points in 2025.¹⁶ As the natural rate of unemployment declines slowly from 2024 to 2029, the unemployment rate also falls, except in 2025 and 2026, when it rises slightly. That temporary increase occurs because the slowdown in the growth of demand for goods and services caused by the expiration of certain provisions of the 2017 tax act also slows the growth in the demand for labor. The projected unemployment rate is 4.6 percent in 2029, slightly below its level of 4.7 percent in 2024.

CBO expects the labor force participation rate to follow its long-term trend and fall to about 61 percent by 2029,

roughly a percentage point below the agency's projection for 2024. CBO attributes most of the decline from 2024 to 2029 to the aging of the population (because older people tend to participate less in the labor force than younger people do).¹⁷

The growth in employment and wages is projected to be moderate over the 2024–2029 period. In particular, nonfarm payroll employment increases by an average of 46,000 jobs per month during those years, in CBO's projections. The employment-to-population ratio (the share of employed workers as a percentage of the civilian noninstitutionalized population) falls from 59.1 percent in 2024 to 58.0 percent in 2029, primarily reflecting the decline in potential labor force participation. Real compensation per hour in the nonfarm business sector, a measure of labor costs that is a useful gauge of longer-term trends, grows at an average annual rate of 1.9 percent from 2024 to 2029—the same rate as projected growth in labor productivity in that sector.

Inflation and Interest Rates

Between 2024 and 2029, in CBO's forecast, the overall and core PCE price indexes increase by an average of 2.0 percent per year, which is in line with the Federal Reserve's long-run objective for inflation. Inflation in the overall and core CPI-U measures averages 2.3 percent annually in those years. Those projections reflect the historical difference between the growth rates of the PCE price indexes and CPI-U measures.

CBO projects that the interest rates on 3-month Treasury bills and 10-year Treasury notes will average 2.5 percent and 3.1 percent, respectively, over the 2024–2029 period. Those projected rates are below the securities' average rates from 1990 to 2007, a period that CBO uses for comparison because expectations about inflation during that time were fairly stable and there were no significant financial crises or severe economic downturns.

In CBO's analysis, a number of factors act to push interest rates on Treasury securities below their averages from 1990 to 2007: lower average inflation, slower growth of the labor force (which reduces the return on capital), slightly slower growth of productivity (which

15. See Congressional Budget Office, *Why CBO Projects That Actual Output Will Be Below Potential Output on Average* (February 2015), www.cbo.gov/publication/49890. Actual output is below potential output, on average, in the latter part of the projection period so that inputs to the budget projections (such as income and interest rates) are consistent with historical averages.

16. That projected gap is consistent with the long-term relationship between actual GDP and potential GDP.

17. See Joshua Montes, *CBO's Projections of Labor Force Participation Rates*, Working Paper 2018-04 (Congressional Budget Office, March 2018), www.cbo.gov/publication/53616.

also reduces the return on capital), a greater share of total income among high-income households (which tends to increase saving), and a higher risk premium on risky assets (which increases the relative demand for risk-free Treasury securities, boosting their prices and thereby lowering their interest rates). Other factors offset some of that downward pressure on interest rates: a larger amount of federal debt as a percentage of GDP; smaller net inflows of capital from other countries as a percentage of GDP (which reduce the supply of funds available for borrowing); and a higher share of income going to the owners of capital (which increases the return on capital assets with which Treasury securities compete, reducing the demand for those securities). On balance, interest rates on Treasury securities are projected to be lower, on average, over the 2024–2029 period than they were between 1990 and 2007.

Nevertheless, interest rates are projected to rise over the 2024–2029 period. In particular, rising federal debt in relation to GDP and an improving global economy are projected to exert upward pressure on short- and long-term interest rates. CBO expects the federal funds rate to rise from 2.5 percent in 2024 to 2.7 percent in 2029. Similarly, the rates for 3-month Treasury bills and 10-year Treasury notes are expected to rise from 2.4 percent and 3.1 percent to 2.5 percent and 3.2 percent, respectively, over that period. CBO expects the term premium on long-term bonds to increase slightly over that period as global economic growth continues to improve and the risk of unexpectedly low inflation continues to diminish.

Projections of Income for 2019 to 2029

Economic activity and federal tax revenues depend not only on the amount of total income in the economy but also on how that income is divided among labor income, domestic profits, proprietors' income, income from interest and dividends, and other categories. (Labor income includes wages and salaries as well as other forms of compensation, such as employer-paid benefits and a fraction of proprietors' income.) The shares for wages and salaries and for domestic profits are of particular importance for projecting federal revenues because those types of income are taxed at higher rates than others.

Labor income as a share of GDP fell from 58.6 percent in 2008 to 57.1 percent in 2010 but rebounded to 57.8 percent in 2017. CBO expects labor income as a share of GDP to continue its recovery over the entire projection period, consistent with the agency's forecasts

for employment and compensation, and to ultimately reach 58.5 percent by the end of 2029 (see Figure 2-5). In particular, wages and salaries are expected to grow more quickly than other kinds of income throughout the 11-year projection period; their share of total income rises from 43.2 percent of GDP in 2018 to 43.8 percent in 2029 in CBO's projections.

Longer-term factors have depressed labor income as a share of GDP, however, and CBO expects those factors to continue to have an influence. Since the early 2000s, labor income as a share of GDP has fallen below 60.4 percent—its average between 1947 and 2000. In CBO's assessment, factors contributing to that decline include technological change, which may have increased returns to capital more than it has increased returns to labor, and globalization, which has increased international competition in goods-producing industries, putting downward pressure on workers' compensation.¹⁸ Some income has also gone toward the returns on intangible capital, such as brand identity arising from advertising, which may have reduced the share of income that has gone toward labor.¹⁹ Increased market power might also have allowed some firms to raise their prices relative to their labor costs, possibly reflecting the rise in many industries of "superstar" firms with higher efficiency and hence lower costs than their competitors.²⁰ The relative importance and persistence of the factors that have depressed labor income as a share of GDP remain unclear, but some of them are expected to persist.


18. The role of technological change has been examined by some economists who investigated the role of information technology in lowering the cost of capital goods, which may have induced firms to shift away from the use of labor toward the use of capital. See, for example, Loukas Karabarbounis and Brent Neiman, "The Global Decline of the Labor Share," *Quarterly Journal of Economics*, vol. 129, no. 1 (October 2013), pp. 61–103, <https://bit.ly/2SHF5SH>. The role of globalization was examined by Michael Elsby, Bart Hobijn, and Aysegül Sahin, "The Decline of the U.S. Labor Share," *Brookings Papers on Economic Activity* (Fall 2013), <https://brook.gs/2VCVbyx>.

19. For a discussion about determining the value of intangible assets, see Congressional Budget Office, *How Taxes Affect the Incentive to Invest in New Intangible Assets* (November 2018), www.cbo.gov/publication/54648.

20. On the rise in market power, see Jan De Loecker and Jan Eeckhout, *The Rise of Market Power and the Macroeconomic Implications*, Working Paper 23687 (National Bureau of Economic Research, August 2017), www.nber.org/papers/w23687. On the rise of superstar firms, see David Autor and others, *The Fall of the Labor Share and the Rise of Superstar Firms*, Working Paper 23396 (National Bureau of Economic Research, May 2017), www.nber.org/papers/w23396.

Figure 2-5.**Labor Income**

Percentage of GDP



CBO expects labor income as a share of GDP to rise over the projection period, consistent with the agency's forecasts for employment and compensation. However, that share is not expected to reach previous historical averages.

Sources: Congressional Budget Office; Bureau of Economic Analysis.

Labor income is the sum of employees' compensation and CBO's estimate of proprietors' income that is attributable to labor.

Values for labor income from 1999 to 2018 (the thin line) reflect revisions to the national income and product accounts that the Bureau of Economic Analysis released on July 26, 2019. Values from 2018 to 2029 (the thick line) reflect the data available when the projections were made earlier in July.

Data are fourth-quarter values.

GDP = gross domestic product.

As a result, CBO does not expect that share to reach its previous historical average.

Domestic corporate profits as a share of GDP average 8.3 percent over the projection period, falling about 0.3 percentage points in the early years to reach 8.1 percent in 2026 and thereafter. That decline mostly reflects the projected rise in wages and salaries, but it also reflects an increase in corporate interest payments stemming from rising interest rates.

Some Uncertainties in the Economic Outlook

Significant uncertainty surrounds CBO's economic forecast, which the agency constructed to be the average of the distribution of possible outcomes if, through 2029, the federal policies embodied in current law were generally unchanged and the trade policies in effect when CBO completed its projections remained in place. If federal fiscal policies or trade policies changed, then

economic outcomes would probably differ from CBO's economic projections.

Even if no changes were made to federal fiscal policies or trade policies, economic outcomes would still probably differ from CBO's projections because of non-policy-related factors. Some uncertainty surrounds fundamental aspects of the economy (such as underlying trends in productivity and labor force growth), and some uncertainty surrounds households' and businesses' responses to policies under current law. Changes to trade policies since January 2018 and the prospect of further changes compound that uncertainty because it is particularly difficult to project how businesses will alter their investment activity or adjust their global supply chains in response.

Uncertainties for 2019 to 2023

Many developments—such as unexpected changes in the labor market, business confidence, the housing market, and international conditions—could cause economic

growth and other variables to differ considerably from CBO's projections. In the agency's view, CBO's economic forecast balances the risks of those potential developments, on average, over the 2019–2023 period, so that outcomes could differ from the forecast in either direction.

On the one hand, the agency's current forecast of employment and output for the near term may be too pessimistic. For example, data on employment through the first half of 2019 show that hiring remains strong; moreover, many newly hired workers were previously not classified as being in the labor force, so the labor force participation rate has increased without an increase in the unemployment rate. Moreover, although wage growth has accelerated, inflation remains relatively low. If the combination of strong hiring, robust wage growth, and subdued inflation continued longer than in CBO's projections, real income and household consumption would increase by more than CBO expects.

On the other hand, CBO's forecast for 2019 through 2023 may be too optimistic. A number of international factors pose significant risks to CBO's economic outlook over the next five years. For instance, a disorderly exit of the United Kingdom from the European Union or a government debt crisis in Europe could weaken the U.S. economic outlook by disrupting the international financial system, interfering with international trade, and weakening domestic business and consumer confidence. Slower growth in China—relating to the ongoing trade disputes with the United States and other issues within the country—could worsen China's credit markets, sparking even larger declines in the demand for U.S. exports.

Recent actions related to U.S. trade policy, particularly increases in tariffs, create further uncertainty about the current economic outlook. Because broad tariff increases in developed economies have been rare in recent history, existing empirical research sheds little light on how businesses and consumers in the United States and its trading-partner countries might respond.

Changes in trade policies have increased the risks associated with investments made by U.S. exporters and businesses that rely heavily on imported goods. To make investment decisions, businesses need to predict how trade policies might change in the future and how those changes will affect the cost of production and

demand for their products in the United States and abroad. Uncertainty stemming from the possibility of additional changes in trade policies makes it difficult for businesses to plan long-term investments and may cause them to postpone or reduce their investments. Because there is little recent evidence on how businesses react to uncertainty about future barriers to trade, CBO's projections of those reactions are inherently uncertain. (See Box 2-2 on page 36 for details on how changes in trade policies affect the economy.)

CBO's projections of the economic effects of those trade-policy changes may prove too pessimistic. If the tariffs facilitated new trade agreements that lowered trade barriers between the U.S. and its trading partners, domestic inflation would probably decline, trade flows and investment would rise, and GDP growth would be faster than projected. If those agreements also established stronger protections for intellectual property among U.S. trading partners, U.S. corporate profits and investment in research would probably increase. In addition, if the cost increases associated with the tariffs turned out to be smaller than expected or if trade tensions eased, then domestic inflation would be lower and the tariffs' negative effect on trade and GDP growth would be less than CBO currently projects.


Conversely, CBO's projections of the economic effects of changes in trade policies may be too optimistic. If businesses were less able to absorb the cost increases and therefore had to pass a greater share of them on to consumers, then domestic inflation would be higher and the negative effect on trade and GDP growth would be greater than CBO currently projects. If trade barriers rose further, domestic investment and output would probably be weaker than projected.

The outlook for monetary policy and interest rates is also uncertain, particularly in light of unexpectedly low inflation and interest rates. If the factors holding inflation below the Federal Reserve's 2 percent long-run objective were more persistent than expected, or if expectations about future inflation were to decline, then the Federal Reserve would probably respond by lowering its target range for the federal funds rate further and keeping it lower for longer than expected. Consequently, short- and long-term interest rates would probably be lower than in CBO's projections. Conversely, a sudden jump in inflation would probably prompt the Federal Reserve to increase the target range for the federal funds rate sooner

Figure 2-6.

The Spread Between Long-Term and Short-Term Interest Rates

Percentage Points



The spread between long-term and short-term interest rates on Treasury securities is near zero, probably in part because of market participants' concerns about weak future economic growth.

Sources: Congressional Budget Office; Federal Reserve.

The interest rate spread is defined as the 10-year Treasury note rate minus the 3-month Treasury bill rate.

Data are quarterly values.

than CBO currently expects, causing short- and long-term interest rates to be higher than projected.

Over the next few years, in CBO's projections, economic growth moderates but remains positive as actual GDP moves closer to its potential. But there have been some recent signs of elevated short-run risks to the economy. For example, the spread between long-term and short-term interest rates on Treasury securities is near zero, which probably reflects market participants' concerns about weakness in future economic growth, among other factors (see Figure 2-6). The current baseline projections account for such indicators, reflecting the agency's consideration of the risks and effects of possible recessions in both the near and the long term.

In particular, in CBO's assessment, there is a significant chance that output growth will be slower than projected in the near term, and that assessment includes the possibility of a recession over the next few years. However, there is also a significant chance that output growth will be faster than projected. The agency has constructed its baseline projection of economic growth in the near term to reflect the average of those possible outcomes.

Uncertainties for 2024 to 2029

Recent and prospective policy changes, as well as non-policy-related factors, add to the uncertainty in the economic outlook for the later years in CBO's projection period. The scheduled expiration of key provisions of the 2017 tax act is one source of such uncertainty. Individuals and businesses could respond more (or less) to those changes than CBO anticipates, resulting in slower (or faster) economic growth after 2024 than the agency forecasts.

If federal debt as a percentage of GDP continued to rise at the pace that CBO projects it would under current law, that debt path would ultimately pose significant risks to the fiscal and economic outlook, although those risks are not currently apparent in financial markets. In particular, that path would increase the risk of a fiscal crisis in which the interest rate on federal debt rose abruptly because investors lost confidence in the U.S. government's fiscal position. It would also increase the likelihood of less abrupt, but still significant, negative economic and financial effects, such as expectations of higher inflation and more difficulty financing public and private activity in international markets.

Other policy-related factors include recent shifts toward deregulation and a looser regulatory environment, which are expected to boost investment in the near term and thus potential output in the long term. For instance, a shift toward deregulation in the energy sector has resulted in the approval of pipeline applications that had been pending and increased access to oil and gas exploration in the Gulf of Mexico. Similarly, prohibitions against drilling for oil and gas in the Arctic National Wildlife Refuge have been eliminated. If the effects of deregulation are greater (or less) than CBO expects, then economic growth could be stronger (or weaker) than projected.

How businesses respond to changes in trade policies could also affect CBO's longer-term projections through effects on business investment and potential output. If businesses concluded that the recent escalation of trade tensions had subsided or if trade policies otherwise stopped weighing on investment activity, then business investment, and thus potential output, would be higher than CBO projects. If, however, businesses felt that trade tensions were escalating, then their uncertainty about future barriers to trade would probably increase, and investment, and thus potential output, would be lower than projected.

Economic growth in the later years of the projection period could also be faster or slower than CBO projects for reasons unrelated to policy. If, for example, the labor force grew more quickly than expected—say, because older workers chose to stay in the labor force longer or immigration was greater than anticipated—the economy could grow more quickly than projected.²¹ By contrast, if the growth of labor productivity did not exceed its average pace since the end of the 2007–2009 recession, as it does in CBO's projections, the growth of GDP might be weaker than the agency projects.

Further, substantial uncertainty exists about the growth of overall total factor productivity and related prospects for long-run growth. If growth of total factor productivity remained close to its estimated trend since the end

21. As birth rates in the native-born population have declined over time, immigration has become an increasingly important part of growth in the total U.S. population and labor force. In 2018, immigration accounted for over 40 percent of the growth in the U.S. population and labor force. Foreign-born people accounted for 17.4 percent of the U.S. civilian labor force in 2018, compared with 13.3 percent in 2000.

of the last recession, about 0.7 percent per year, annual growth of output would be about 0.3 percentage points slower than CBO projects. Conversely, if it returned to its more rapid longer-run average rate of growth, annual growth of output would be about one-quarter of a percentage point faster.

Estimates of the long-run neutral rate of interest—the rate at which inflation is stable and monetary policy is neither boosting nor constraining economic growth—underpin CBO's projection of interest rates in the latter years of the projection period. Those estimates are highly uncertain. A higher or lower rate would imply higher- or lower-than-projected short- and long-term interest rates. Forecasts of the term premium, which affects long-term interest rates, are also highly uncertain. For reasons detailed above, CBO expects the term premium to rise from its current historically low level but to remain lower than its level over the previous three decades. A higher or lower term premium would imply higher or lower long-term interest rates than CBO projects.


CBO expects little change in income inequality over the projection period. However, unexpectedly strong and persistent income gains at the bottom or the top of the income distribution could cause income inequality to increase or decline by more than CBO projects.

Income inequality's effect on economic growth, an issue on which economists' theories and empirical results have been mixed, is another source of uncertainty in CBO's longer-run projections.²² Some studies have concluded that income inequality leads to faster growth, others that it slows growth, and still others that it does not affect growth. Moreover, the effect could work in the opposite direction: Economic growth could directly increase or decrease income inequality. When a study concludes

22. See, for example, Pedro C. Neves, Óscar Afonso, and Sandra T. Silva, "A Meta-Analytic Reassessment of the Effects of Inequality on Growth," *World Development*, vol. 78 (February 2016), pp. 386–400, <https://bit.ly/2LveOOc>; Jonathan Ostry, Andrew Berg, and Charalambos Tsangarides, *Redistribution, Inequality, and Growth* (International Monetary Fund, 2014), <https://bit.ly/13kLuIN> (PDF, 1.34 MB); Stephen Knowles, "Inequality and Economic Growth: The Empirical Relationship Reconsidered in the Light of Comparable Data," *Journal of Development Studies*, vol. 41, no.1 (September 2005), pp. 135–159, <https://bit.ly/2BYP9Q2>; and Mark D. Partridge, "Is Inequality Harmful for Growth? Comment," *American Economic Review*, vol. 87, no. 5 (December 1997), pp. 1019–1032, www.jstor.org/stable/2951339.

Figure 2-7.**The Uncertainty of CBO's Projections of Real GDP**

Trillions of 2012 Dollars



Sources: Congressional Budget Office; Bureau of Economic Analysis.

Real values are nominal values that have been adjusted to remove the effects of changes in prices. The shaded area around CBO's baseline projection of real GDP illustrates the uncertainty of that projection. The area is based on the errors in CBO's one-, two-, three-, four-, and five-year projections of the average annual growth rate of real GDP for calendar years 1976 through 2018.

Values for real GDP from 1999 to 2018 (the thin line) reflect revisions to the national income and product accounts that the Bureau of Economic Analysis released on July 26, 2019. Values from 2018 to 2029 (the thick line) reflect the data available when the projections were made earlier in July. GDP = gross domestic product.

that a relationship exists between inequality and growth, that conclusion usually depends on factors specific to the time and place being studied. Economists continue to examine the issue, and CBO will update its analysis if research yields a more definitive conclusion.

Quantifying the Uncertainty in CBO's Projections

To quantify the uncertainty surrounding its projections for the next five years, CBO analyzed its past forecasts of real GDP growth.²³ On the basis of that analysis, CBO estimates that—if the errors in the agency's current economic forecast are similar to those in its previous forecasts—there is approximately a two-thirds chance that the average annual rate of real GDP growth (on a calendar year basis) will be between 0.7 percent and 3.3 percent over the next five years (see Figure 2-7).²⁴

23. See Congressional Budget Office, *CBO's Economic Forecasting Record: 2019 Update* (forthcoming).

24. The root mean square error of CBO's five-year projections of the average annual growth rate of real GDP since 1976 is

That range reflects some of the uncertainty inherent in CBO's estimates of the growth in real potential GDP, given that the errors in CBO's longer-horizon forecasts of real GDP growth are partly due to the agency's past underestimates (for example, during the late 1990s) or overestimates (for example, during the early 2010s) of potential GDP growth. To illustrate how changes in the factors underlying potential GDP might contribute to growth averaging 0.7 percent or 3.3 percent over the next five years, CBO examined scenarios in which the growth rates of total factor productivity and the size of the labor force varied.

For example, CBO estimates that if total factor productivity in the nonfarm business sector grew, on average, 1.1 percentage points slower than projected over the next five years (and thus remained roughly unchanged)

1.3 percentage points. For more on the inherent uncertainty underlying economic forecasts, see Congressional Budget Office, *CBO's Economic Forecasting Record: 2019 Update* (forthcoming).

and the labor force grew, on average, 0.8 percentage points slower than projected (and thus shrank), then real GDP growth would be 1.3 percentage points lower, on average, than the 2.0 percent growth (on a calendar year basis) in CBO's economic projections.²⁵ Conversely, if productivity in the nonfarm business sector grew, on average, 1.1 percentage points faster over the next five years and the labor force grew, on average, 0.8 percentage points faster, then real GDP growth would be 1.3 percentage points higher, on average, than CBO projects.

Comparison With CBO's January 2019 Projections

CBO's current economic projections have some notable differences from the set of projections the agency published in January (see Table 2-6).²⁶ In particular, CBO's current projections of interest rates over the 2019–2029 period are markedly lower. In the near term, those differences are driven by developments in financial markets and guidance from the Federal Reserve regarding its outlook for monetary policy. In the latter years of the projection period, the downward revisions are mainly due to CBO's reassessment of factors that influence the long-run neutral rate of interest and the premium on longer-term Treasury securities. The agency also raised its projection of economic growth in the near term as a result of the recent increases to the caps on federal discretionary funding. In addition, CBO's projections of inflation and wage growth have been lowered as a result of weakness indicated by recent data.

The agency now expects short- and long-term interest rates over the coming decade to be lower, on average, by 0.5 percentage points and 0.8 percentage points, respectively. The downward revision to short-term interest rates partly reflects the agency's expectation that the Federal

Reserve will maintain the current target range for the federal funds rate until late 2020 and then gradually increase it in later years. CBO decreased its projections of the federal funds rate in the near term in response to lower inflation in its forecast, lower foreign economic growth, and greater uncertainty about future trade barriers affecting the United States and its trading partners. That revision to the federal funds rate was also informed by statements from Federal Reserve officials, as well as changes in financial markets and outside forecasts.

CBO also lowered its forecast of the federal funds rate over the latter years of the projection period. That revision stemmed from CBO's reassessment of the long-run neutral rate of interest. Since January, CBO has lowered its estimate of that rate because of slower anticipated global growth, which CBO expects to reduce global demand for investment and put downward pressure on interest rates. Downward revisions to projections of the long-run neutral rate by the Federal Reserve and outside forecasters were additional factors in CBO's downward revision.

The downward revision to long-term interest rates in CBO's projections partly reflects the downward revision to short-term interest rates. In addition, CBO now expects the premium on risky assets, which has been elevated since the 2007–2009 recession, to decline more slowly than previously expected, remaining elevated throughout the coming decade. In general, a higher premium on risky assets implies lower rates of return on Treasury securities. The downward revision to long-term interest rates also reflects an updated assessment of the size of the Federal Reserve's holdings of Treasury and other securities. In March of this year, the Federal Reserve announced that it would continue to hold more of those securities than previously expected. That larger balance is expected to push the term premium below previous expectations. For that reason, CBO's downward revision to long-term interest rates is larger than its revision to short-term interest rates and extends throughout the projection period.

CBO also reduced its projection of average CPI and PCE inflation over the early years of the projection period because of data indicating lower-than-expected inflation. However, in CBO's assessment, the weakness in inflation was mainly caused by transitory factors. In CBO's forecast, that downward revision to consumer price inflation was partly offset by an upward revision to the estimated

25. Because the nonfarm business sector produces roughly three-quarters of domestic output, the 1.1 percentage points slower total factor productivity growth in that sector would, on its own, reduce the growth in potential labor force productivity by 0.8 percentage points each year. By contrast, the reduction in the growth of the labor force would, on its own, boost potential labor force productivity. On balance, growth in potential labor force productivity would be roughly 0.5 percentage points lower than in CBO's baseline projection. That reduction, along with the 0.8 percentage-point reduction in labor force growth, underlies the 1.3 percentage-point reduction in real GDP growth.

26. See Congressional Budget Office, *The Budget and Economic Outlook: 2019 to 2029* (January 2019), www.cbo.gov/publication/54918.

effect of tariffs on the prices of consumer goods. The estimate of those effects was increased because a higher tariff rate was imposed on certain Chinese imports in May 2019 and because recent research suggested that a larger share of the cost of the tariffs on U.S. imports are passed along to U.S. consumers and businesses. (See Box 2-2 on page 36 for more details.)

CBO's projection of real GDP growth in 2019 is unchanged but reflects offsetting effects. CBO now expects slower growth of real consumption than it did in January, in part because wages have been rising more slowly than expected given the strength of the labor market; less real business investment, primarily because of increased uncertainty about future trade policies and higher tariffs on imported capital goods; and weaker export growth as a result of slower projected economic growth in major U.S. trading partners. However, those downward revisions are offset by an upward revision to real government purchases, primarily because of an increase in projected federal discretionary spending, and a downward revision to real imports resulting from consumers' and businesses' expected substitution of domestically produced goods for imported consumption and investment goods.

CBO's projection of average annual real GDP growth over the 2020–2023 period has been revised upward for two main reasons. First, CBO projects more purchases by the federal government. Second, the agency anticipates greater growth of business fixed investment as a result of downward revisions to the cost of corporate debt and equity, which more than offsets the negative effects on investment from recent increases in tariffs. The stronger projected output growth led the agency to reduce its projections of the unemployment rate over the 2020–2023 period.

In the current forecast, the size of the potential labor force over the 2019–2029 period is slightly smaller—and its growth rate is slightly slower—than the agency projected in January. In the near term, the projected potential labor force is smaller mainly because the agency lowered the projected size of the population as a result of recent population data. After 2024, the projected potential labor force is smaller mainly because the agency reduced the potential labor force participation rate after reassessing trends in participation rates for each demographic group.

Despite CBO's projection of a smaller potential labor force, the agency now expects overall growth in potential output over the 2019–2029 period to increase slightly faster than in the January forecast. That more rapid growth is due to a number of minor technical adjustments in the projection. Those adjustments resulted in faster projected growth of capital services in nonfarm businesses and in owner-occupied housing, which more than offset slightly slower growth of potential total factor productivity in the nonfarm business sector.

CBO's projections of total national income have been reduced by an average of 0.2 percent per year over the 2019–2029 period, reflecting downward revisions to projections of various types of income, including total labor compensation and proprietors' income—downward revisions that were partly offset by upward revisions to the agency's projections of corporate profits and net income from foreign assets. Because of data showing that hourly compensation growth in the last quarter of 2018 and the first quarter of 2019 was lower than CBO expected, the agency lowered its projections of hourly compensation growth in 2019 without projecting a strong rebound in later years. That revision, along with other factors, led the agency to lower its projections of total labor compensation over the entire 2019–2029 period. Changes to other components of national income result from revised projections of other key economic variables. For example, CBO lowered its estimates of net interest paid by domestic businesses over most of the projection period as a result of downward revisions to interest rates. Higher estimates of corporate profits result from lower projections of interest costs and total labor compensation.

Comparison With Other Economic Projections

CBO's projections of the economy for the next two years are slightly more optimistic than the consensus view of the private-sector economists whose forecasts were published in the August 2019 *Blue Chip Economic Indicators* but are within the range of those forecasts (see Figure 2-8). In particular, CBO's projections of real GDP growth are above the middle two-thirds of the range of *Blue Chip* forecasts for 2019 and at the high end of that range for 2020. CBO's projections of the unemployment rate are in line with the consensus view of private-sector economists, but the agency's projections of GDP price inflation are lower than the consensus for 2019 and at the lower end of the middle two-thirds of

Table 2-6.

Current and Previous Economic Projections for 2019 to 2029

	2019	2020	2021	Annual Average		Total, 2019–2029
				2019–2023	2024–2029	
Percentage Change From Fourth Quarter to Fourth Quarter						
Real GDP ^a						
August 2019	2.3	2.1	1.8	1.9	1.8	1.8
January 2019	2.3	1.7	1.6	1.8	1.8	1.8
Nominal GDP						
August 2019	3.9	4.0	3.8	3.8	3.9	3.8
January 2019	4.3	3.8	3.6	3.9	3.9	3.9
PCE Price Index						
August 2019	1.8	2.1	2.0	2.0	2.0	2.0
January 2019	2.0	2.2	2.1	2.1	2.0	2.0
Core PCE Price Index ^b						
August 2019	1.9	2.2	2.1	2.0	2.0	2.0
January 2019	2.2	2.2	2.1	2.1	2.0	2.0
Consumer Price Index ^c						
August 2019	2.2	2.4	2.4	2.4	2.3	2.4
January 2019	2.2	2.6	2.5	2.5	2.3	2.4
Core Consumer Price Index ^b						
August 2019	2.3	2.6	2.6	2.5	2.3	2.4
January 2019	2.6	2.7	2.6	2.5	2.3	2.4
GDP Price Index						
August 2019	1.7	1.9	2.0	1.9	2.0	2.0
January 2019	2.0	2.0	2.0	2.0	2.1	2.0
Employment Cost Index ^d						
August 2019	3.3	3.6	3.5	3.4	3.2	3.3
January 2019	3.5	3.7	3.5	3.5	3.1	3.3
Real Potential GDP ^a						
August 2019	2.1	2.1	2.1	2.1	1.8	1.9
January 2019	2.2	2.1	2.0	2.0	1.8	1.9

Continued

the range for 2020. The agency's projections of consumer price inflation and interest rates for both 2019 and 2020 are within the full range of the *Blue Chip* forecasts, although CBO's forecasts for consumer price inflation and the interest rate for 3-month Treasury bills are both above the middle two-thirds of the *Blue Chip* forecasts' range for 2020.

Compared with the middle two-thirds of the range of forecasts made by Federal Reserve officials and reported at the June 2019 meeting of the Federal Open Market Committee, CBO's projections suggest a slightly stronger economic outlook for 2019, a similar outlook for 2020, and a slightly weaker outlook for 2021 and the longer

term (see Figure 2-9).²⁷ The full range of Federal Reserve forecasts is based on the highest and lowest forecasts made by the members of the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System and the presidents of the Federal Reserve Banks. CBO's projections of real GDP growth and the federal funds rate are within the range of the forecasts by Federal Reserve officials for 2019, 2020, 2021, and the longer term. However, the agency's projection of PCE price inflation is above the range for 2019, and the agency's projection of the unemployment rate is above the range for the longer term. In addition,

27. See Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, "Economic Projections of Federal Reserve Board Members and Federal Reserve Bank Presidents Under Their Individual Assessments of Projected Appropriate Monetary Policy, June 2019" (June 19, 2019), <https://go.usa.gov/xV3Pe>.

Table 2-6.

Continued

Current and Previous Economic Projections for 2019 to 2029

	2019	2020	2021	Annual Average		Total, 2019–2029
				2019–2023	2024–2029	
	Calendar Year Average					
Unemployment Rate (Percent)						
August 2019	3.7	3.7	3.9	4.0	4.7	4.4
January 2019	3.5	3.7	4.2	4.2	4.8	4.5
Interest Rates (Percent)						
Three-month Treasury bills						
August 2019	2.2	2.1	2.3	2.3	2.5	2.4
January 2019	2.8	3.2	3.2	3.1	2.8	2.9
Ten-year Treasury notes						
August 2019	2.3	2.2	2.5	2.6	3.1	2.9
January 2019	3.4	3.6	3.7	3.6	3.7	3.7
Tax Bases (Percentage of GDP)						
Wages and salaries						
August 2019	42.8	43.1	43.4	43.3	43.8	43.6
January 2019	43.3	43.6	43.7	43.6	44.1	43.9
Domestic corporate profits ^e						
August 2019	8.4	8.5	8.5	8.4	8.1	8.3
January 2019	8.9	8.4	8.1	8.2	8.0	8.1

Sources: Congressional Budget Office; Bureau of Labor Statistics; Federal Reserve.

GDP = gross domestic product; PCE = personal consumption expenditures.

- a. Real values are nominal values that have been adjusted to remove the effects of changes in prices.
- b. Excludes prices for food and energy.
- c. The consumer price index for all urban consumers.
- d. The employment cost index for wages and salaries of workers in private industry.
- e. Adjusted to remove distortions in depreciation allowances caused by tax rules and to exclude the effects of changes in prices on the value of inventories.

CBO's projections of core PCE price inflation are above the range in both 2019 and 2020.

At least part of the discrepancy between CBO's projections and those of other forecasters is probably attributable to differences in the economic data available when the forecasts were completed and to differences in the economic and statistical models used to prepare them. In addition, other forecasters may assume that certain changes in federal policies or trade policies will occur, whereas CBO's projections are based on current law and incorporate the assumption that the trade policies in


effect when CBO completed its projections will remain in place through 2029.

A key difference between CBO's economic projections and those made by Federal Reserve officials is that CBO reports the average of a distribution of possible outcomes under current law. Each individual Federal Reserve official, by contrast, reports the mode—the most likely outcome—of a distribution of possible outcomes under each official's individual assessment of appropriate monetary policy.

Figure 2-8.

Comparison of CBO’s Economic Projections With Those From the *Blue Chip* Survey

CBO’s projections for the next two years are slightly more optimistic than the consensus view of the private-sector economists in the *Blue Chip* survey.
Percent



Sources: Congressional Budget Office; Wolters Kluwer, *Blue Chip Economic Indicators* (August 9, 2019).

The full range of forecasts from the *Blue Chip* survey is based on the highest and lowest of the roughly 50 forecasts. The middle two-thirds of that range omits the top one-sixth and the bottom one-sixth of the forecasts.

Real values are nominal values that have been adjusted to remove the effects of changes in prices. Consumer price inflation is based on the consumer price index for all urban consumers. The growth of real GDP and inflation rates are measured from the average of one calendar year to the next.

The unemployment rate is the number of jobless people who are available for and seeking work, expressed as a percentage of the labor force. The unemployment rate and interest rates are calendar year averages.


GDP = gross domestic product.

Figure 2-9.

Comparison of CBO’s Economic Projections With Those by Federal Reserve Officials

Compared with the forecasts made by Federal Reserve officials, CBO’s projections suggest a slightly stronger economic outlook for 2019, a similar outlook for 2020, and a slightly weaker outlook for 2021 and the longer term.

Percent



Sources: Congressional Budget Office; Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, “Economic Projections of Federal Reserve Board Members and Federal Reserve Bank Presidents Under Their Individual Assessments of Projected Appropriate Monetary Policy, June 2019” (June 19, 2019), <https://go.usa.gov/xVq34>.

The full range of forecasts from the Federal Reserve is based on the highest and lowest of the 15 projections by the Board of Governors and the presidents of the Federal Reserve banks. (One Federal Reserve official did not submit longer-run projections for the change in real GDP, the unemployment rate, or the federal funds rate.) The central tendency is, roughly speaking, the middle two-thirds of the full range, formed by removing the 3 highest and 3 lowest projections.

Each of the data points for the federal funds rate represents a forecast made by one of the members of the Federal Reserve Board or one of the presidents of the Federal Reserve banks in June 2019. The Federal Reserve officials’ forecasts of the federal funds rate are for the rate at the end of the year, whereas CBO’s forecasts are fourth-quarter values.

For CBO, longer-term projections are values for 2029. For the Federal Reserve, longer-term projections are described as the value at which each variable would settle under appropriate monetary policy and in the absence of further shocks to the economy.

Real values are nominal values that have been adjusted to remove the effects of changes in prices.

The unemployment rate is the number of jobless people who are available for and seeking work, expressed as a percentage of the labor force.

The growth of real GDP and inflation rates are measured from the fourth quarter of one calendar year to the fourth quarter of the next. The unemployment rate is a fourth-quarter value.

GDP = gross domestic product; PCE = personal consumption expenditures.

a. For PCE price inflation in the longer term, the range and central tendency equal 2 percent.

Changes in CBO's Baseline Projections

Overview

The Congressional Budget Office estimates that if no new legislation affecting spending and revenues is enacted, the budget deficit for fiscal year 2019 will total \$960 billion. That amount is \$63 billion larger than the \$896 billion deficit the agency estimated in May 2019, when it last updated its baseline budget projections.¹ CBO also now projects that if current laws generally remained in place, the cumulative deficit for the 2020–2029 period would be about \$12.2 trillion—\$0.8 trillion more than the \$11.4 trillion in the agency's May 2019 baseline projections. All told, outlays over that period are about 0.6 percent larger in CBO's current projections than they were in May, and revenues are about 1.0 percent smaller.

That increase in the cumulative deficit is primarily the net result of three changes in CBO's baseline projections. First, to account for the Bipartisan Budget Act of 2019 (Public Law 116-37), CBO added a total of \$1.7 trillion to its projection of the 10-year deficit (see Figure A-1). That law increased discretionary funding limits for 2020 and 2021, and CBO's baseline projections reflect the assumption that the increased funding in 2021 will continue and grow at the rate of inflation in future years. Second, supplemental appropriations for disaster relief and border security for this year, which are also projected to grow with inflation in future years, added \$255 billion to the cumulative deficit for 2020 to 2029. Partially offsetting those increases was a third change: Downward revisions to CBO's forecast of interest rates reduced the agency's projections of interest costs for the period (including the debt-service savings from the resulting reductions in deficits and debt), and thus its projections of deficits, by a total of \$1.4 trillion.

When CBO updates its baseline budget projections, it groups the revisions it makes into three categories:

- Legislative changes, which result from laws enacted since the agency published its previous baseline projections and which generally reflect the budgetary effects reported in CBO's cost estimates when the legislation was enacted;
- Economic changes, which arise from changes the agency has made to its economic forecast (including those made to incorporate the macroeconomic effects of recently enacted legislation); and
- Technical changes, which are revisions to projections that are neither legislative nor economic.

Of the \$63 billion increase in the projected deficit for 2019, \$6 billion is attributable to legislative changes, \$29 billion to economic changes, and \$29 billion to technical changes. The legislative and economic revisions that CBO has made to its projections for the 2020–2029 period were largely offsetting: Legislative changes increased projected deficits by a total of \$1.9 trillion, while economic changes reduced deficits by \$1.4 trillion. On net, technical updates to the agency's projections of revenues and outlays increased* deficits over the period by a total of \$250 billion.


As a result of those changes, over the 2020–2029 period, *primary* deficits—that is, deficits excluding net outlays for interest—are now projected to be a total of \$1.9 trillion greater than they were in CBO's May 2019 baseline projections. That increase in projected primary deficits is offset by a reduction of \$1.1 trillion in the agency's projections of interest costs over that same period. Because projected interest rates are now lower than they were in May, debt held by the public in CBO's projections has not risen as much as it would have if the economic forecast had not changed. In May, the agency projected that debt held by the public would be \$28.5 trillion (or 92 percent of gross domestic product, or GDP) at the end of 2029; CBO now projects that the debt would reach \$29.3 trillion (or 95 percent of GDP) that year if current laws generally remained unchanged.

1. See Congressional Budget Office, *Updated Budget Projections: 2019 to 2029* (May 2019), www.cbo.gov/publication/55151.

Figure A-1.

Changes in CBO's Baseline Projection of the 10-Year Deficit Since May 2019

Trillions of Dollars



Source: Congressional Budget Office.

The amounts shown include the costs or savings in debt service resulting from the changes in deficits.

Legislative Changes

The largest changes CBO has made since May to its projections of deficits over the 2019–2029 period stem from recently enacted legislation. Almost all of those changes—\$6 billion this year and \$1.9 trillion over the 2020–2029 period—were to projected outlays (see Table A-1). The largest change was an increase in projections of discretionary outlays that stemmed from the higher limits on discretionary funding put in place by the Bipartisan Budget Act of 2019. Additional appropriations for disaster relief and border security also led CBO to increase its projections of outlays. Other legislation enacted since May has had a minor effect on CBO's projections.

Bipartisan Budget Act of 2019

Of the 10-year increase in projected outlays attributable to new legislation, \$1.7 trillion stems from the enactment of the Bipartisan Budget Act of 2019 (see Table A-2 on page 70). That law raised the caps on defense and nondefense discretionary appropriations for fiscal year 2020 by \$171 billion and for fiscal year

2021 by \$153 billion.² CBO's projections of discretionary outlays reflect the assumption that funding in 2020 and 2021 will be at or just below the new, higher caps set for those years and that it will grow with inflation thereafter.³ (In accordance with section 257 of the Deficit Control Act, CBO projects funding for individual accounts in future years by applying the specified inflation rate to the most recent appropriations for those accounts.) As a result, CBO now projects higher discretionary funding through 2029. Accordingly, CBO raised its projections of outlays for the entire 2020–2029 period by \$1.5 trillion—\$0.3 trillion resulting directly from the additional appropriations projected under the new caps for 2020 and 2021, and \$1.2 trillion stemming from the higher projections for 2022 to 2029, which are based on the new 2021 funding limits.

2. The caps on discretionary appropriations were originally set by the Budget Control Act of 2011 (P.L. 112-25), as amended.
3. CBO projects that discretionary budget authority will be just below the caps in 2020. That authority is not projected to reach the new limits because inflation for defense funding from 2019 to 2020 is projected to be less than the rate of growth of the cap on such funding. For a detailed explanation, see "CBO's Baseline Budget Projections for 2020 Through 2029" on page 10.

CBO estimated that the Bipartisan Budget Act of 2019 would also reduce mandatory outlays for 2027 to 2029 by \$55 billion.⁴ Most of that reduction—\$39 billion—is attributable to the extension of a set of across-the-board reductions (known as sequestration) on spending for certain mandatory programs (primarily Medicare) that are required under current law. The law extended that mandatory sequestration, which was set to expire in 2027, through fiscal year 2029. The rest of the reduction in projected mandatory outlays stems from a \$16 billion increase in estimated collections of customs user fees for the 2027–2029 period. Collections of those fees—which apply to vessels, vehicles, and passengers and include a merchandise processing fee—are recorded as reductions in direct spending. The fees were set to expire in 2026, but the law extended them through September 30, 2029.

All told, before debt service is taken into account, the changes that CBO made to its projections to account for the enactment of the Bipartisan Budget Act of 2019 increased the cumulative deficit for the 2020–2029 period by \$1.5 trillion. The additional federal borrowing stemming from the larger annual deficits added \$200 billion to CBO's projection of total outlays for interest on federal debt over that period.

Supplemental Appropriations for Disaster Relief and Border Security

Two other laws enacted since May had a significant effect on CBO's projections of outlays. Those two laws provided funding for 2019 that was not constrained by the caps on discretionary funding because it was designated as an emergency requirement. Although those laws provided funding only for this year, in accordance with the statutory rules that govern CBO's projections of discretionary outlays, the agency projects that funding equal to the amount provided by those appropriations (adjusted for inflation) will continue to be provided each year from 2020 to 2029.

The first law, the Additional Supplemental Appropriations for Disaster Relief Act, 2019 (P.L. 116-20), provided \$19 billion in additional emergency funding in 2019 for several federal agencies to respond to natural disasters.⁵ As a result of that funding increase, CBO

raised its estimate of discretionary outlays for 2019 by \$5 billion and its projections for the 2020–2029 period by a total of \$171 billion. That law also will result in \$1 billion in additional spending on mandatory programs between 2019 and 2029, primarily on the Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program (SNAP, which helps people in low-income households to purchase food).

The second law, the Emergency Supplemental Appropriations for Humanitarian Assistance and Security at the Southern Border Act, 2019 (P.L. 116-26), provided \$5 billion in emergency funding this year to expand federal agencies' capacity to respond to foreign nationals who attempt to enter the United States through the southern border and to provide them humanitarian assistance—including food, shelter, and medical services.⁶ To account for that increase in funding, CBO raised its estimate of discretionary outlays for 2019 by \$1 billion and its projections for the 2020–2029 period by a total of \$52 billion.

All told, as a result of those two laws, CBO increased its projection of outlays for the 2020–2029 period by a total of \$224 billion. The increase in federal borrowing stemming from those two laws would add a total of \$31 billion to outlays for interest on federal debt over the 10-year period, CBO estimates.

Economic Changes

The economic forecast that underlies CBO's baseline budget projections includes the agency's projections of GDP, income, the unemployment rate, interest rates, inflation, and other factors that affect federal spending and revenues. The current projections are based on the latest economic forecast, which was completed in July 2019; the agency's May 2019 budget projections were based on the economic forecast published in January 2019. The current economic forecast includes the agency's estimates of the effects of the Bipartisan Budget Act of 2019 on the economy.

4. Mandatory spending is governed by statutory criteria and is not normally controlled by the annual appropriation process.

5. See Congressional Budget Office, cost estimate for Senate Amendment 250 to H.R. 2157, the Additional Supplemental

Appropriations for Disaster Relief Act, 2019 (May 23, 2019), www.cbo.gov/publication/55289.

6. See Congressional Budget Office, cost estimate for S. 1900, the Emergency Supplemental Appropriations for Humanitarian Assistance and Security at the Southern Border Act, 2019 (June 21, 2019), www.cbo.gov/publication/55389.

Table A-1.

Changes in CBO's Baseline Projections of the Deficit Since May 2019

Billions of Dollars

	2019	2020	2021	2022	2023	2024	2025	2026	2027	2028	2029	Total	
												2020–2024	2020–2029
Deficit in CBO's May 2019 Baseline	-896	-892	-962	-1,116	-1,122	-1,071	-1,189	-1,179	-1,162	-1,399	-1,310	-5,162	-11,399
Legislative Changes													
Changes in Revenues	0	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*
Changes in Outlays													
Mandatory outlays	*	1	*	*	*	*	*	*	6	-24	-37	1	-54
Discretionary outlays													
Defense	1	52	69	77	83	86	89	91	93	96	98	367	834
Nondefense	5	56	77	86	91	94	97	99	102	105	107	404	914
Subtotal, discretionary	6	108	147	163	173	180	185	191	195	200	205	771	1,748
Debt service	*	1	4	8	13	18	24	30	37	44	50	45	232
Total Change in Outlays	6	110	151	171	186	198	210	221	239	220	218	817	1,926
Increase (-) in the Deficit From Legislative Changes	-6	-110	-151	-171	-186	-198	-210	-221	-239	-220	-218	-817	-1,926
Economic Changes													
Changes in Revenues													
Payroll taxes	-11	-11	-9	-8	-10	-11	-13	-14	-15	-15	-16	-50	-123
Individual income taxes	-20	-9	6	12	14	10	5	5	5	4	4	33	55
Corporate income taxes	-8	-8	-3	-1	-2	-4	-5	-3	-1	-1	*	-18	-28
Other	2	10	-1	-6	-9	-13	-14	-15	-14	-14	-14	-19	-90
Total Change in Revenues	-38	-19	-7	-3	-7	-18	-28	-27	-25	-25	-26	-54	-186
Changes in Outlays													
Mandatory outlays													
Social Security	0	-2	-6	-8	-9	-10	-10	-11	-12	-12	-13	-35	-93
Student loans	0	-5	-5	-4	-4	-4	-4	-4	-4	-5	-4	-22	-43
Medicare	*	*	*	*	1	2	3	3	4	5	6	3	24
Medicaid	-1	-1	-1	-2	-2	-2	-2	-2	-2	-3	-2	-8	-20
Unemployment compensation	1	*	-5	-8	-1	1	-1	-1	-1	-1	-1	-12	-17
Other	1	1	*	*	-1	-1	-1	-2	-2	-2	-2	*	-9
Subtotal, mandatory	1	-7	-16	-21	-15	-14	-16	-17	-18	-18	-17	-74	-158
Discretionary outlays	0	-1	-1	*	*	*	*	-1	-1	-1	-1	-2	-5
Net interest													
Effect of interest rates and inflation	-10	-69	-103	-127	-135	-136	-131	-130	-131	-133	-136	-570	-1,231
Debt service	*	*	-2	-5	-9	-13	-17	-21	-26	-30	-35	-30	-159
Subtotal, net interest	-10	-69	-105	-132	-145	-150	-148	-152	-156	-163	-171	-599	-1,389
Total Change in Outlays	-9	-76	-122	-153	-160	-164	-165	-169	-174	-182	-189	-675	-1,553
Increase (-) or Decrease in the Deficit From Economic Changes	-29	57	115	150	153	145	137	142	149	156	162	621	1,367

Continued

Table A-1.

Continued

Changes in CBO's Baseline Projections of the Deficit Since May 2019

Billions of Dollars

	2019	2020	2021	2022	2023	2024	2025	2026	2027	2028	2029	Total	
												2020–2029	2020–2029
Technical Changes													
Changes in Revenues													
Corporate income taxes	-9	-21	-22	-21	-21	-24	-23	-15	-10	-17	-13	-108	-186
Individual income taxes	-33	-23	-18	-17	-16	-14	-13	-16	-16	-18	-20	-88	-172
Payroll taxes	25	12	12	11	10	11	14	14	15	16	16	56	131
Other	-4	-10	-7	-4	-2	-2	-2	-2	-2	-2	-2	-26	-37
Total Change in Revenues	-22	-42	-35	-30	-29	-29	-24	-19	-14	-22	-18	-166	-263
Changes in Outlays													
Mandatory outlays													
Medicare	5	2	-5	-12	-7	-7	-8	-10	-12	-13	-13	-28	-84
Student loans	0	3	4	3	3	3	3	3	4	4	4	16	34
Other	5	13	*	-2	-1	-1	-2	-2	-3	-4	-4	8	-5
Subtotal, mandatory	10	19	-1	-12	-6	-5	-7	-8	-11	-13	-13	-4	-56
Discretionary outlays	-3	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	-1
Net interest													
Debt service	*	1	2	3	4	5	5	6	6	7	7	15	47
Other	*	1	*	-1	-1	-1	*	*	*	*	-1	-2	-4
Subtotal, net interest	*	2	2	2	3	4	5	6	6	7	7	13	44
Total Change in Outlays	7	21	1	-9	-3	-2	-2	-2	-5	-6	-6	9	-13
Increase (-) in the Deficit From Technical Changes	-29	-63	-36	-21	-26	-28	-22	-17	-9	-16	-12	-174	-250
All Changes													
Increase (-) in the Deficit	-63	-116	-72	-42	-60	-81	-95	-96	-98	-80	-68	-371	-809
Deficit in CBO's August 2019 Baseline	-960	-1,008	-1,034	-1,159	-1,181	-1,151	-1,284	-1,274	-1,260	-1,479	-1,378	-5,533	-12,208
Memorandum:													
Changes in Revenues and Outlays													
Revenues	-60	-61	-42	-33	-37	-48	-52	-46	-39	-48	-44	-220	-449
Outlays	4	55	31	9	23	33	43	50	60	32	24	151	360
Changes in Primary Deficit and Net Interest													
Primary deficit	-73	-181	-171	-164	-188	-208	-214	-211	-211	-192	-182	-912	-1,923
Net interest	10	65	98	121	128	127	119	115	113	113	114	541	1,114

Source: Congressional Budget Office.

* = between -\$500 million and \$500 million.

The changes that CBO has made to its economic forecast since January have increased its estimate of the deficit for 2019 by \$29 billion and decreased its projections of deficits for the 2020–2029 period by a total of \$1.4 trillion.

A decrease in projected net interest outlays, slightly offset by a decrease in projected revenues, accounts for most of the latter change.

Table A-2.

Effects of the Bipartisan Budget Act of 2019 on CBO's Baseline Projections of the Deficit

Billions of Dollars

	2019	2020	2021	2022	2023	2024	2025	2026	2027	2028	2029	Total		
												2020–2029	2020–2029	
Increase in the Caps on Discretionary Funding														
Defense outlays	0	51	68	27	11	7	3	0	0	0	0	0	164	167
Nondefense outlays	0	45	60	27	10	6	3	0	0	0	0	0	148	151
Subtotal	0	95	128	54	22	13	6	0	0	0	0	0	312	318
Increase in Projected Funding After 2021														
Defense outlays	0	0	0	48	69	76	83	88	90	93	95	193	642	
Nondefense outlays	0	0	0	39	60	68	73	78	80	82	84	167	565	
Subtotal	0	0	0	87	129	144	156	166	171	175	179	360	1,207	
Mandatory Outlays														
Extension of customs user fees	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	-1	-7	-8	0	-16	
Extension of mandatory sequestration	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	7	-17	-29	0	-39	
Subtotal	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	6	-24	-37	0	-55	
Increase in Debt-Service Costs	0	1	4	7	11	16	21	26	32	38	44	39	200	
Increase in the Deficit	0	97	132	149	162	173	183	192	209	189	186	711	1,670	

Source: Congressional Budget Office.

Changes in Outlays

The revisions that CBO made to its economic forecast lowered its estimate of outlays for the current year by \$9 billion and decreased its projections of outlays for the 2020–2029 period by \$1.6 trillion (or 3 percent). Most of the reduction in outlays over that period stems from the downward revision in the agency's forecast of interest rates, which reduced its projections of net interest costs by \$1.2 trillion before the change in debt service associated with the smaller projected deficits is accounted for. When those debt-service savings are included, the revisions to the economic forecast lowered net interest costs by \$1.4 trillion.

Mandatory Outlays. Because of changes the agency made to its economic forecast, CBO increased its estimate of mandatory spending for 2019 by \$1 billion and decreased its projections for the 2020–2029 period by \$158 billion. The largest economic changes were in CBO's projections for Social Security.

Social Security. Projected outlays for Social Security over the 2020–2029 period declined by a total of \$93 billion

(or 1 percent), primarily because CBO reduced its estimates of the cost-of-living adjustments (COLAs) that will be made to beneficiaries' payments each January over that period. Social Security's COLAs are based on changes in the consumer price index for urban wage earners and clerical workers (CPI-W). Because of changes CBO made to its inflation forecast, it reduced its projections of the COLAs for 2020 and 2021 by 0.3 percentage points (or roughly 14 percent and 12 percent, respectively) and its projection for 2022 by 0.1 percentage point (or 4 percent). CBO also reduced its projection of wages, which led to lower projected Social Security benefits for new recipients.

Student Loans. CBO reduced its projection of the costs of student loans for the 2020–2029 period by a total of \$43 billion because it now forecasts lower interest rates on federal borrowing than it did in January. As prescribed by the Federal Credit Reform Act of 1990 (FCRA), CBO estimates the net cost of student loans to the federal government by discounting the value of expected future loan payments to express the value of those payments in today's dollars and then subtracting

that present-value amount from the loan disbursement.⁷ Those values are computed using interest rates on federal borrowing as the discount rates.⁸ When those interest rates go down, the value of future payments to the federal government increases, thus reducing the net cost of the loans. (That reduction was largely offset by a \$34 billion increase in costs for student loans that stems from technical changes; that increase is discussed below.)

Medicare. CBO increased its projections of Medicare spending for the 2020–2029 period by \$24 billion (or 0.3 percent) because of revisions it made to its economic forecast. Under current law, payment rates for much of Medicare's fee-for-service sector (such as hospital care and services provided by home health agencies and skilled nursing facilities) are updated automatically. Those updates are based on changes in the prices of the labor, goods, and services that health care providers purchase and include an adjustment to account for economywide gains in productivity (the ability to produce the same output using fewer inputs, such as hours of labor) over a 10-year period. CBO now anticipates slightly larger updates between 2020 and 2029 than it did previously—a change that increases Medicare outlays in CBO's baseline projections.

Medicaid. The agency lowered its projections of federal Medicaid spending for the 2020–2029 period by \$20 billion because it reduced its forecasts of unemployment and of inflation. The unemployment rate in CBO's current forecast is lower than it was in the agency's January forecast in every year of the 2020–2029 period, and especially in 2022 and 2023. In those years, the unemployment rate is now projected to be 4.1 percent and 4.4 percent instead of 4.5 percent and 4.8 percent, respectively. CBO also revised downward its projections of growth in the consumer price index for urban

households (CPI-U) and in the employment cost index (ECI) over the first few years of the projection period because new data indicate that inflation will be weaker than previously anticipated. Fewer people are expected to enroll in Medicaid when unemployment is lower, and average benefit costs are projected to be smaller as a result of lower inflation.

Unemployment Compensation. CBO lowered its projection of spending on unemployment benefits for the 2020–2029 period by \$17 billion primarily because it reduced its projections of the unemployment rate.

Other Mandatory Programs. The agency updated its projections of outlays for a number of other mandatory programs to reflect changes it made to its economic forecast that resulted in both upward and downward adjustments to such outlays. On net, those changes decreased projected outlays for the 2020–2029 period by a total of \$9 billion.

Discretionary Outlays. CBO's baseline projections generally reflect the assumption that funding for discretionary programs keeps pace with inflation. Changes to the measures of inflation that CBO is required to use to develop its baseline projections of discretionary funding drove the economic changes in discretionary outlays. For discretionary funding related to federal personnel, the agency uses the employment cost index for wages and salaries to prepare its projections; for other types of discretionary funding, the agency uses the GDP price index. As a result of reductions in the agency's forecasts of those measures, discretionary funding over the 2020–2029 period is now projected to be slightly lower than previously projected, and outlays for that period are \$5 billion less in the agency's current baseline projections than they were in the May 2019 projections.

Net Interest. Economic changes have reduced CBO's baseline projections of net interest costs for the 2020–2029 period by \$1.4 trillion. The main reason for that reduction is that CBO has lowered its forecasts of both short- and long-term interest rates on Treasury securities since January. CBO decreased projected interest rates for 2020 to 2024 in its economic forecast by an average of nearly 100 basis points (or nearly 30 percent) each year. The agency also lowered projected interest rates for the 2025–2029 period, though by smaller amounts; on average, rates projected for those years decreased by about 50 basis points (or roughly 15 percent). (For further

7. See Justin Humphrey, analyst, Congressional Budget Office, "How the Government Budgets for Student Loans" (presentation at the Postsecondary National Policy Institute, January 25, 2018), www.cbo.gov/publication/53511.

8. An alternative method would be to use market-based discount rates; such an approach is referred to as a fair-value method. The discount rate is higher under the fair-value method, so the value of future payments is lower and the estimated costs of student loans higher than under the FCRA method. In CBO's view, the fair-value approach provides a more comprehensive measure than FCRA estimates of the costs of student loans. See Congressional Budget Office, *Fair-Value Estimates of the Cost of Federal Credit Programs in 2020* (May 2019), www.cbo.gov/publication/55278.

explanation of those revisions, see “Comparison With CBO’s January 2019 Projections” on page 58.) As a result, CBO lowered the projected average interest rate on debt held by the public over the 2020–2029 period by roughly 70 basis points. Primarily because of the lower projected interest rates, CBO decreased its projection of net interest outlays (and thus of deficits) for the 2020–2029 period by \$1.2 trillion before accounting for the resulting change in the amount of federal debt. Those debt-service savings associated with the smaller projected deficits are estimated to amount to \$159 billion, bringing the total reduction in net interest outlays for the 2020–2029 period from economic changes to \$1.4 trillion.

Changes in Revenues

As a result of revisions the agency made to its economic forecast, CBO reduced its estimate of revenues for 2019 by \$38 billion (or 1 percent) and its projections for 2020 through 2029 by a total of \$186 billion (or less than 1 percent). The reduction in revenues for 2019 stems primarily from lower estimates of wages and salaries and of proprietors’ income, which brought down projections of individual income and payroll taxes. In addition, CBO reduced its estimate of corporate tax receipts for the year because it lowered its projection of domestic economic profits in 2019.

The \$186 billion reduction in projected revenues for 2020 through 2029 stems mostly from lower projections of the growth of GDP and of associated taxable incomes—primarily wages and salaries and proprietors’ income. In addition, CBO lowered its projections of interest rates and of imports and increased its projections of domestic and foreign profits; those updates to the agency’s economic forecast also affected the baseline revenue projections. Over the next decade, the total percentage reduction in CBO’s projections of revenues that is attributable to economic factors (0.4 percent) is about the same as the downward revision in the agency’s GDP forecast (0.4 percent).

Payroll Taxes. Incorporating the latest economic forecast in its budget projections, CBO lowered its projection of payroll tax revenues for the 2020–2029 period by \$123 billion (or less than 1 percent). Nearly all of that reduction stems from the agency’s lowering its projections of wages and salaries and of proprietors’ income for the next 10 years by \$1.7 trillion.

Individual Income Taxes. Economic changes raised CBO’s projection of total individual income tax revenues

over the next decade by \$55 billion (or less than 1 percent). The largest sources of the revisions to individual income taxes were the reductions in projections of wages and salaries and of proprietors’ income, but taken together, other smaller changes that the agency has made to its economic forecast since January more than offset those reductions over the next decade. CBO lowered its projection of interest paid on owner-occupied housing by about \$700 billion, which in turn reduced its projections of deductions for mortgage interest and raised income tax receipts. The agency increased its estimates of the expected returns on assets in retirement plans, boosting projections of taxable withdrawals over the next decade by almost \$400 billion. Moreover, CBO lowered its forecast of inflation; because the tax brackets and other parameters of the individual income tax system are indexed to inflation, lower inflation would push a larger portion of any given amount of taxable income into higher tax brackets and thus raise income tax receipts.

Corporate Income Taxes. CBO lowered its projection of corporate income tax revenues for 2020 to 2029 by \$28 billion (or 1 percent). Corporate profits, both domestic and foreign, for most of the next decade are larger in CBO’s current economic forecast than they were in the previous forecast. The increase in projections of domestic corporate profits boosted projected revenues, but those increases in revenues were more than offset by the combined effects of other changes in CBO’s current economic forecast, particularly higher foreign profits and lower interest rates. The increase in projected foreign profits would result in corporations’ claiming larger credits for their foreign earnings, and the lower interest rates would mean that a larger portion of corporations’ net interest expenses would fall below the new limitation on such expenses and thus be deductible from their current income tax liability.

Other Revenues. In response to announcements made by the Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) since January 2019, CBO increased its projection of the amount of Treasury securities that the Federal Reserve will purchase early in the forecast period.⁹ Those additional purchases would, all else being equal, increase

9. The analysis does not incorporate changes that would result from the FOMC’s announcement on July 31, 2019, that provided additional detail regarding the composition of assets that the Federal Reserve would purchase. That announcement was made after the analysis for this publication was completed. CBO expects that incorporating that detail into its baseline would lower its projection of the Federal Reserve’s remittances for the 2020–2029 period.

interest earned by the central bank on its assets over the forecast period and the amount of interest that it pays to financial firms on the reserves they hold at the Federal Reserve. The lower interest rates in CBO's current economic forecast would partially offset those increases. On net, the additional expenses exceed the increase in interest income in CBO's projections. That change, along with other factors, lowered remittances from the Federal Reserve to the Treasury by \$69 billion (or 10 percent) over the 10-year period.

The agency also lowered its projections of imports over the 10-year period by a total of \$1 trillion (or 3 percent). That change in the economic forecast reduced CBO's projections of revenues from customs duties for 2020 through 2029 by \$38 billion (or 4 percent). (That reduction was largely offset by the technical changes to customs duties discussed below.)

Technical Changes

Technical changes—that is, changes that are neither legislative nor economic—increased CBO's estimate of the deficit in 2019 by \$29 billion and its projections of deficits over the 2020–2029 period by a total of \$250 billion. A downward revision in the agency's projections of revenues accounts for most of that change.

Changes in Revenues

For various technical reasons, CBO lowered its projections of revenues in 2019 by \$22 billion (or less than 1 percent). Tax collections from individual and corporate income taxes have been smaller in recent months than CBO estimated in January—and by more than the currently available economic data can explain. The main factors responsible for the shortfall will become clearer as additional data from tax returns and other sources become available. In addition, CBO has reduced the projection of other receipts in 2019 to reflect the fact that collections from the penalty on some employers that have at least 50 full-time equivalent employees and that do not offer health insurance coverage that meets certain standards have been less than anticipated.

All told, the technical changes that CBO has made have lowered its revenue projections for 2020 through 2029 by a total of \$263 billion. Again, reductions in projected income taxes and collections of penalties were two of the main factors contributing to that downward revision, but those changes were partially offset by increases in projected payroll taxes and customs duties.

Corporate Income Taxes. CBO has lowered its projections of corporate income tax receipts for the next decade by a total of \$186 billion because of modeling changes and new data from corporate tax returns on deductions and income for 2017. The most significant modeling changes are intended to better reflect the historical relationships between the corporate income and expenses accounted for in the national income and product accounts (NIPAs) and the income and expenses reported by businesses on their tax returns. Previously, most differences between the NIPA measure of profit and the tax measure were estimated by projecting those items to grow with broad measures of economic activity; now CBO models those differences in greater detail.

Collections of corporate income taxes in 2019 have been less than they were projected to be in January. The extent to which those smaller collections (as well as the recent weakness in individual income tax collections) are related to underlying economic activity, the effects of the 2017 tax act, or other factors is not yet known. (For a discussion of what CBO has learned from recent data about the effects of the 2017 tax act, see Box 1-1 on page 12.) Alternative causes of the weakness would have differing implications for future receipts. For example, if the weakness results from an underlying change in the relationship between aggregate economic income and reported taxable income, it may be expected to persist permanently.¹⁰ By contrast, if provisions of the 2017 tax act caused businesses to take more deductions in the current year than CBO anticipated rather than delay them for future use, the present weakness in collections would not be expected to persist; indeed, if businesses were accelerating deductions, it would suggest that receipts of corporate income taxes would be stronger in future years. Until the underlying causes are known, CBO anticipates that the unexplained weakness will persist and gradually dissipate over the next several years; the agency has reduced its projections of corporate income taxes during the first half of the decade accordingly.

Individual Income Taxes. The agency has lowered its projections of individual income tax receipts over the 2020–2029 period by \$172 billion. Part of that

10. After CBO completed this analysis, the Bureau of Economic Analysis released its annual revision of historical economic data. That revision included significant reductions in estimated corporate profits for 2017 and 2018, which probably explain part of the weakness in corporate income tax collections. For a discussion of the revisions, see Box 2-1 on page 30.

revision results from new data from the Social Security Administration that indicate that the share of taxes withheld from workers' paychecks in 2018 that went to payroll taxes (instead of income taxes) was larger than anticipated. As a result, CBO lowered its estimate of the amount of income taxes that were collected in 2018 and its projections of such collections in future years. Those changes were mostly offset by the upward revision to payroll taxes described below.

Further reducing CBO's projections of individual income tax receipts over the next several years are weaker-than-anticipated estimated payments for 2019 taxes. The recent payment data are difficult to interpret because taxpayers have discretion to adjust their estimated payments for various reasons. For example, some may have adjusted those payments to reflect recent changes in income, and some may have adjusted their withholding or estimated payment amounts after being surprised by the size of their final tax payment or refund when filing their 2018 return. Furthermore, taxpayers with higher income often take advantage of automatic six-month filing extensions and thus will not file their 2018 tax returns until October 2019.

The most significant factor leading CBO to lower its projections of individual income tax receipts in the latter half of the decade was that the agency reduced its projections of taxable withdrawals from retirement accounts, in response to recent data indicating that assets in retirement accounts are worth less than previously anticipated.

Payroll Taxes. The agency has increased its projections of payroll taxes throughout the next decade by a total of \$131 billion. That revision was made primarily because new data from the Social Security Administration indicate that the payroll tax base in 2018 was larger than CBO had projected.

Other Revenues. CBO lowered its projection of revenues from other sources for the 2020–2029 period by \$37 billion. The most significant change among those revenue sources was a reduction in the projected collections of penalties from some employers that have at least 50 full-time-equivalent employees and that do not offer health insurance coverage that meets certain standards. Although that penalty went into effect for coverage in 2015, the first penalties were not collected until 2019, and thus far, those collections have been lower than CBO anticipated. Consequently, CBO has reduced its

projections of the collections of those penalties for the 2020–2029 period by \$48 billion.

The agency has also increased its projections of customs duties for the next decade by a total of \$33 billion for technical reasons. That change reflects actions by the Administration that increased tariffs on a large share of imports from China from 10 percent to 25 percent in May 2019. In addition, the Administration has made certain types of products and products from certain countries exempt from tariffs; most notably, the Administration has exempted Canada and Mexico from tariffs on steel and aluminum that were imposed in 2018. CBO's projections of customs duties incorporate the assumption that the tariffs in place as of July 25, 2019, will continue permanently, without any changes.¹¹

Changes in Outlays

Because of technical updates—largely for mandatory spending programs—CBO increased its estimate of outlays in 2019 by \$7 billion and decreased its projections of outlays over the 2020–2029 period by a total of \$13 billion.

Mandatory Outlays. Technical changes made by CBO increased its estimate of mandatory outlays in the current year by \$10 billion and decreased its projections of such outlays for the 2020–2029 period by \$56 billion (or less than 1 percent).

Medicare. On the basis of actual outlays through June, CBO now estimates that net Medicare spending in fiscal year 2019 will exceed its previous projections by about \$5 billion (or 1 percent). Two factors account for that difference: higher-than-expected spending for Medicare Advantage stemming from annual payment adjustments to account for unanticipated spending increases in the current and previous calendar years, and less-than-projected receipts of premiums paid by Medicare beneficiaries. Additionally, CBO lowered its projection of outlays for Medicare Part D (prescription drug coverage) over the 2020–2029 period by \$85 billion because the Administration withdrew its proposed rule that would

11. On August 1, 2019, the President announced that tariffs would be imposed on an additional \$300 billion of Chinese imports beginning on September 1, 2019; on August 13, the U.S. Trade Representative announced that those tariffs would be delayed on certain products. Those scheduled changes to tariffs are not included in CBO's current baseline projections.

have eliminated the existing safe-harbor provision for pharmaceutical rebates.¹²

Student Loans. For technical reasons, CBO increased its projections of the costs of student loans over the 2020–2029 period by \$34 billion. That increase, which stems largely from changes to projections of the characteristics and income of borrowers in income-driven repayment plans, mostly offsets the \$43 billion decrease in projected student loan costs attributable to economic changes (discussed above).

Other Mandatory Programs. Technical changes increased CBO's estimate of outlays for other mandatory programs in 2019 by \$5 billion but decreased projections of such outlays for the 10-year period by \$5 billion. The largest of those changes was a \$15 billion increase in projected spending by the Commodity Credit Corporation in 2020 resulting from the Administration's announcement

that it would take actions to assist farmers in response to retaliatory tariffs imposed on their goods by U.S. trading partners and other trade disruptions.¹³ Technical changes reduced the agency's projections of spending for most other mandatory programs by small amounts, resulting in the net decrease in projections of other mandatory outlays for the 2020–2029 period.

Discretionary Outlays. Technical updates reduced CBO's estimate of discretionary outlays in 2019 by \$3 billion and its projections of such outlays over the 2020–2029 period by \$1 billion. Those changes stem from adjustments made to better reflect the recent rates at which funding for various discretionary programs has been spent.

Net Interest. Technical changes increased CBO's projections of net interest outlays for the 2020–2029 period by \$44 billion. That increase results from two partly offsetting effects. Technical changes to revenues and other outlays boosted projected deficits by \$203 billion, and the resulting higher debt-service costs added a total of \$47 billion to projected deficits over the 2020–2029 period. But interest costs for that period are now projected to be \$4 billion less than they were in CBO's May 2019 baseline projections because the agency has made slight changes to its projections of the mix of securities that the Treasury will use in its borrowing on the basis of actual debt issuance since that baseline was published.

12. The existing safe harbor is for rebates paid by pharmaceutical manufacturers to health plans and pharmacy benefit managers (PBMs) in Medicare Part D and Medicaid managed care. It protects those parties from liability or penalty in specific situations defined in regulations implementing the anti-kickback statute, which prohibits offering or accepting payments to induce use of services reimbursable under federal health care programs. Eliminating the safe harbor would have effectively made it illegal for drug manufacturers to pay rebates to health plans or PBMs in those programs in return for coverage or preferred treatment of their drug. After the Administration withdrew the rule, CBO also lowered its projections of Medicaid spending over the 2020–2029 period by \$4 billion. For more information, see Congressional Budget Office, "Incorporating the Effects of the Proposed Rule on Safe Harbors for Pharmaceutical Rebates in CBO's Budget Projections—Supplemental Material for *Updated Budget Projections: 2019 to 2029*" (May 2019), www.cbo.gov/publication/55151.

13. See Department of Agriculture, "USDA Announces Support for Farmers Impacted by Unjustified Retaliation and Trade Disruption" (press release, May 23, 2019), <https://go.usa.gov/xyuw2>.

CBO's Economic Projections for 2019 to 2029

The tables in this appendix show the Congressional Budget Office's economic projections for each year from 2019 to 2029. Table B-1 shows the projections by calendar year, and Table B-2 shows them by fiscal year.

Table B-1.

CBO's Economic Projections, by Calendar Year

	Actual, 2018	2019	2020	2021	2022	2023	2024	2025	2026	2027	2028	2029
Percentage Change From Year to Year^a												
Gross Domestic Product												
Real ^b	2.9	2.6	2.1	1.8	1.7	1.7	1.7	1.8	1.7	1.8	1.8	1.8
Nominal	5.4	4.2	4.1	3.8	3.7	3.7	3.8	3.9	3.8	3.9	3.9	3.9
Inflation												
PCE price index	2.1	1.6	2.1	2.1	2.1	2.0	2.0	2.0	2.0	2.0	2.0	2.0
Core PCE price index ^c	1.9	1.7	2.2	2.1	2.0	2.0	2.0	2.0	2.0	2.0	2.0	2.0
Consumer price index ^d	2.4	1.9	2.4	2.5	2.5	2.4	2.4	2.3	2.3	2.3	2.3	2.3
Core consumer price index ^c	2.1	2.2	2.6	2.6	2.5	2.4	2.3	2.3	2.3	2.3	2.3	2.3
GDP price index	2.4	1.7	1.9	2.0	2.0	2.0	2.0	2.1	2.0	2.0	2.0	2.0
Employment Cost Index ^e	3.0	3.2	3.5	3.5	3.5	3.4	3.3	3.2	3.2	3.1	3.1	3.1
Calendar Year Average												
Unemployment Rate (Percent)	3.9	3.7	3.7	3.9	4.2	4.5	4.7	4.7	4.8	4.7	4.7	4.6
Payroll Employment (Monthly change, in thousands) ^f	221	148	100	50	24	18	21	37	39	57	63	57
Interest Rates (Percent)												
Three-month Treasury bills	1.9	2.2	2.1	2.3	2.3	2.3	2.4	2.4	2.4	2.5	2.5	2.5
Ten-year Treasury notes	2.9	2.3	2.2	2.5	2.9	3.0	3.1	3.1	3.1	3.2	3.2	3.2
Tax Bases (Percentage of GDP)												
Wages and salaries	43.0	42.8	43.1	43.4	43.6	43.7	43.7	43.7	43.8	43.8	43.8	43.8
Domestic corporate profits ^g	8.7	8.4	8.5	8.5	8.3	8.2	8.2	8.2	8.1	8.1	8.1	8.1
Tax Bases (Billions of dollars)												
Wages and salaries	8,888	9,149	9,589	10,020	10,434	10,850	11,268	11,706	12,156	12,631	13,134	13,650
Domestic corporate profits ^g	1,573	1,798	1,895	1,955	1,992	2,049	2,108	2,190	2,257	2,346	2,440	2,525
Nominal GDP (Billions of dollars)	20,580	21,360	22,231	23,083	23,946	24,836	25,769	26,765	27,775	28,860	29,981	31,141

Source: Congressional Budget Office.

GDP = gross domestic product; PCE = personal consumption expenditures.

a. See Table 2-3 for changes that are instead measured from the fourth quarter of one year to the fourth quarter of the next.*

b. Real values are nominal values that have been adjusted to remove the effects of changes in prices.

c. Excludes prices for food and energy.

d. The consumer price index for all urban consumers.

e. The employment cost index for wages and salaries of workers in private industry.

f. The average monthly change in the number of employees on nonfarm payrolls, calculated by dividing by 12 the change in payroll employment from the fourth quarter of one calendar year to the fourth quarter of the next.

g. Adjusted to remove distortions in depreciation allowances caused by tax rules and to exclude the effects of changes in prices on the value of inventories.

[*Corrected on August 22, 2019]

Table B-2.

CBO's Economic Projections, by Fiscal Year

	Actual, 2018	2019	2020	2021	2022	2023	2024	2025	2026	2027	2028	2029
Percentage Change From Year to Year												
Gross Domestic Product												
Real ^a	3.0	2.7	2.2	1.9	1.7	1.7	1.7	1.8	1.7	1.8	1.8	1.8
Nominal	5.4	4.6	4.0	3.9	3.7	3.7	3.7	3.9	3.8	3.9	3.9	3.9
Inflation												
PCE price index	2.1	1.6	2.0	2.1	2.1	2.1	2.0	2.0	2.0	2.0	2.0	2.0
Core PCE price index ^b	1.9	1.7	2.1	2.2	2.1	2.0	2.0	2.0	2.0	2.0	2.0	2.0
Consumer price index ^c	2.4	1.9	2.3	2.5	2.5	2.5	2.4	2.3	2.3	2.3	2.3	2.3
Core consumer price index ^b	2.0	2.2	2.5	2.6	2.5	2.4	2.3	2.3	2.3	2.3	2.3	2.3
GDP price index	2.3	1.8	1.9	2.0	2.0	2.0	2.0	2.1	2.0	2.0	2.0	2.0
Employment Cost Index ^d	2.9	3.1	3.4	3.6	3.5	3.4	3.3	3.2	3.2	3.1	3.1	3.1
Fiscal Year Average												
Unemployment Rate (Percent)	4.0	3.7	3.7	3.8	4.1	4.4	4.6	4.7	4.7	4.7	4.7	4.6
Payroll Employment (Monthly change, in thousands) ^e	212	175	108	62	26	20	17	35	38	52	64	59
Interest Rates (Percent)												
Three-month Treasury bills	1.7	2.3	2.1	2.3	2.3	2.3	2.4	2.4	2.4	2.5	2.5	2.5
Ten-year Treasury notes	2.7	2.5	2.2	2.4	2.8	3.0	3.1	3.1	3.1	3.2	3.2	3.2
Tax Bases (Percentage of GDP)												
Wages and salaries	43.2	42.8	43.1	43.3	43.5	43.7	43.7	43.7	43.8	43.8	43.8	43.8
Domestic corporate profits ^f	8.6	8.5	8.5	8.5	8.3	8.3	8.2	8.2	8.1	8.1	8.1	8.1
Tax Bases (Billions of dollars)												
Wages and salaries	8,801	9,054	9,477	9,914	10,331	10,746	11,163	11,595	12,043	12,509	13,006	13,520
Domestic corporate profits ^f	1,553	1,796	1,872	1,947	1,978	2,038	2,088	2,172	2,239	2,320	2,420	2,501
Nominal GDP (Billions of dollars)	20,336	21,157	22,013	22,870	23,727	24,611	25,529	26,514	27,518	28,582	29,699	30,847

Source: Congressional Budget Office.

GDP = gross domestic product; PCE = personal consumption expenditures.

a. Real values are nominal values that have been adjusted to remove the effects of changes in prices.

b. Excludes prices for food and energy.

c. The consumer price index for all urban consumers.

d. The employment cost index for wages and salaries of workers in private industry.

e. The average monthly change in the number of employees on nonfarm payrolls, calculated by dividing by 12 the change in payroll employment from the fourth quarter of one fiscal year to the fourth quarter of the next.

f. Adjusted to remove distortions in depreciation allowances caused by tax rules and to exclude the effects of changes in prices on the value of inventories.



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About This Document

This volume is one of a series of reports on the state of the budget and the economy that the Congressional Budget Office issues each year. It satisfies the requirement of section 202(e) of the Congressional Budget Act of 1974 for CBO to submit to the Committees on the Budget periodic reports about fiscal policy and to provide baseline projections of the federal budget. In keeping with CBO's mandate to provide objective, impartial analysis, this report makes no recommendations.

CBO's Panel of Economic Advisers commented on an early version of the economic forecast underlying this report. Members of the panel are Katharine Abraham, Alan Auerbach, David Autor, Olivier Blanchard, Markus Brunnermeier, Seth Carpenter, Steven Davis, Kathryn Dominguez, Robert Hall, Jan Hatzius, Donald Kohn, Nellie Liang, Gregory Mankiw, Emi Nakamura, Jonathan Parker, James Poterba, Valerie Ramey, Brian Sack, Robert Shimer, James Stock, Kevin Warsh, and Mark Zandi. Erik Brynjolfsson, Julia Coronado, John Friedman, Avi Goldfarb, Desmond Lachman, and Jeromin Zettelmeyer attended the panel's meeting as guests. Enhancements to the report this year were also made on the basis of comments about previous versions of it that were provided by Martin Neil Baily of the Brookings Institution and James Poterba of the Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Although CBO's outside advisers provided considerable assistance, they are not responsible for the contents of this report.

The following pages list the CBO staff members who contributed to this report by preparing the economic, revenue, and spending projections; writing the report; reviewing, editing, fact-checking, and publishing it; compiling the supplemental materials posted along with it on CBO's website (www.cbo.gov/publication/55551); and providing other support.

CBO continually seeks feedback to make its work as useful as possible. Please send any comments to communications@cbo.gov.

Phillip L. Swagel
Director
August 2019

Economic Projections

The economic projections were prepared by the Macroeconomic Analysis Division, with contributions from analysts in other divisions. That work was supervised by Jeffrey Werling, Robert Arnold, and John Kitchen.

Yiqun Gloria Chen	Labor markets
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John Seliski	Federal, state, and local government spending and revenues
Robert Shackleton	Potential output, productivity
Claire Sleight (formerly of CBO)	Motor vehicle sector, model and data management
Adam Staveski (formerly of CBO)	Housing, research assistance
Christopher Williams	Consumer spending, incomes

Revenue Projections

The revenue projections were prepared by the Tax Analysis Division, supervised by John McClelland, Joseph Rosenberg, Joshua Shakin, and Edward Harris. In addition, the staff of the Joint Committee on Taxation provided valuable assistance.

Kathleen Burke	Individual income taxes, wage distribution
Paul Burnham	Retirement income
Dorian Carloni	Business taxation
Jacob Fabian (formerly of CBO)	Customs duties
Madeleine Fox	Customs duties
Nathaniel Frentz	Federal Reserve System earnings, miscellaneous fees and fines
Bilal Habib	Tax modeling
Bayard Meiser	Excise taxes
Shannon Mok	Estate and gift taxes
Kevin Perese	Tax modeling
Molly Saunders-Scott	International taxation, business taxation
Kurt Seibert	Payroll taxes, depreciation, tax modeling
Jennifer Shand	Corporate income taxes
Naveen Singhal	Capital gains realizations, tax modeling
Ellen Steele	Refundable tax credits
James Williamson	Business taxation

Spending Projections

The spending projections were prepared by the Budget Analysis Division, with contributions from analysts in other divisions. That work was supervised by Theresa Gullo, Leo Lex, Sam Papefuss, Christina Hawley Anthony, Tom Bradley, Megan Carroll, Kim Cawley, Chad Chirico, Sheila Dacey, and David Newman of the Budget Analysis Division, as well as by David Weaver, Jessica Banthin, and Alexandra Minicozzi of the Health, Retirement, and Long-Term Analysis Division and Sebastien Gay of the Financial Analysis Division.

Defense, International Affairs, and Veterans' Affairs

Kent Christensen	Defense (projections, working capital funds, operation and maintenance, procurement, scorekeeping)
Sunita D'Monte	International affairs
Ann Futrell	Veterans' health care and employment training services, international food assistance
Raymond Hall	Defense (research and development, stockpile sales, atomic energy, Navy procurement, military construction, and family housing)
Paul Holland	Veterans' education benefits, reservists' education benefits
William Ma	Defense (operation and maintenance, procurement, compensation for radiation exposure and energy employees' occupational illness, other defense programs)
David Rafferty	Military retirement
Dawn Sauter Regan	Defense (military personnel)
Matthew Schmit	Military health care
Logan Smith	Veterans' compensation and pensions, other benefits for disabled veterans

Health

Alice Burns	Medicaid, health insurance coverage
Julia Christensen	Food and Drug Administration, prescription drugs
Jacob Fabian (formerly of CBO)	Workplace safety programs
Kate Fritzsche	Health insurance marketplaces, other programs
Philippa Haven	Medicare, Public Health Service
Lori Housman	Medicare, Federal Employees Health Benefits program
Jamease Kowalczyk	Medicare
Sarah Masi	Health
Kevin McNellis	Health insurance marketplaces, other programs
Ezra Porter	Health insurance coverage
Lisa Ramirez-Branum	Medicaid, health insurance coverage
Lara Robillard	Medicare
Sarah Sajewski	Medicare

Health (Continued)

Robert Stewart	Medicaid, Children's Health Insurance Program, Indian Health Service
Emily Vreeland	Health insurance coverage
Ellen Werble	Prescription drugs, Public Health Service
Rebecca Yip	Medicare, Public Health Service

Income Security and Education

Susan Yeh Beyer	Child nutrition and other nutrition programs
Tia Caldwell	Child Care and Development Block Grant, refugee assistance
Meredith Decker	Unemployment insurance, training programs, Administration on Aging, Smithsonian Institution, arts and humanities
Elizabeth Cove Delisle	Housing assistance
Jennifer Gray	Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program and other nutrition programs, Social Services Block Grant, support programs for children and families
Justin Humphrey	Student loans, higher education
Wendy Kiska	Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation
Leah Koestner	Elementary and secondary education, Pell grants
Justin Latus	Supplemental Security Income
Susanne Mehlman	Temporary Assistance for Needy Families, Child Support Enforcement program, foster care, child care programs, Low Income Home Energy Assistance Program
Noah Meyerson	Old-Age and Survivors Insurance, Social Security trust funds, Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation
Emily Stern	Disability Insurance

Natural and Physical Resources

Tiffany Arthur	Agriculture
Michael Falkenheim	Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation
Mark Grabowicz	Administration of justice, Postal Service, homeland security
Kathleen Gramp	Energy, Outer Continental Shelf receipts, spectrum auction receipts, Orderly Liquidation Fund
David Hughes	Recreational resources, Commerce, Small Business Administration, Universal Service Fund
Wendy Kiska	Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation
Erik O'Donoghue	Agriculture
Jeffrey Perry	Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, Federal Housing Administration
Matthew Pickford	General government, legislative branch, air and water transportation

Natural and Physical Resources (Continued)

Stephen Rabent	Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, credit unions, pollution control and abatement
Robert Reese	Other natural resources, highways, mass transit, Amtrak, Federal Housing Administration
Mitchell Remy	Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, Federal Housing Administration
Janani Shankaran	Science and space exploration, conservation and land management
Jon Sperl	Judicial branch, community and regional development, Federal Emergency Management Agency, Bureau of Indian Affairs
Aurora Swanson	Water resources, Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac

Other Areas and Functions

Shane Beaulieu	Computer support
Barry Blom	General budget projections
Joanna Capps	Appropriation bills (Labor, Health and Human Services, and Education; Legislative Branch)
Aaron Feinstein	Other interest, monthly Treasury data, historical data
Avi Lerner	Interest on the public debt, automatic budget enforcement and sequestration, Troubled Asset Relief Program
Amber Marcellino	Federal civilian retirement
George McArdle	Appropriation bills (Military Construction and Veterans Affairs; State and Foreign Operations)
Dan Ready	Various federal retirement programs, national income and product accounts, federal pay
Justin Riordan	Appropriation bills (Commerce, Justice, and Science; Financial Services and General Government)
Mark Sanford	Appropriation bills (Agriculture and Food and Drug Administration; Defense)
Esther Steinbock	Appropriation bills (Energy and Water Development; Transportation and Housing and Urban Development)
J'nell Blanco Suchy	Appropriation bills (Interior and Environment; Homeland Security), authorization bills
Patrice Watson	Computer applications and data systems

Writing

Barry Blom prepared the visual summary. Amber Marcellino wrote Chapter 1, with assistance from Aaron Feinstein, Nathaniel Frentz, Avi Lerner, and Molly Saunders-Scott. John Seliski wrote Chapter 2, with assistance from Daniel Fried and Christopher Williams. Aaron Feinstein wrote Appendix A, with assistance from Jennifer Shand. Sarah Robinson compiled Appendix B.

Reviewing, Editing, Fact-Checking, and Publishing

Wendy Edelberg, Mark Hadley, Jeffrey Kling, and Robert Sunshine reviewed the report. The editing and publishing were handled by CBO's editing and publishing group, supervised by Benjamin Plotinsky, and the agency's communications team, supervised by Deborah Kilroe.

Christine Bogusz, Christine Browne, Bo Peery, and Benjamin Plotinsky edited the report; Casey Labrack and Robert Rebach prepared it for publication; and Annette Kalicki, Adam Russell, and Simone Thomas published it on CBO's website.

Erin Deal, Ann Futrell, Stuart Hammond, Paul Holland, Justin Latus, Bayard Meiser, Aldo Prosperi, Sarah Robinson, and Logan Smith fact-checked the report. Dan Ready coordinated the preparation of figures of budget projections. Jeffrey Schafer coordinated the preparation of figures of economic projections. Bayard Meiser, Dan Ready, and Sarah Robinson compiled data and supplemental information. Bo Peery and Simone Thomas coordinated the presentation of those materials.